The network used Japanese .jp domains to lend legitimacy to a fake cryptocurrency token called "Zksync.jp" — a counterfeit version of the legitimate ZKsync project . The scam defrauded global investors of over ¥100 million (well over $1 million) by marketing the fraudulent token through Japanese web infrastructure
. A Hong Kong-based Chinese national is reported to have registered the .jp domains used in the scheme
. The fake token was designed to closely resemble the real ZKsync token, an Ethereum Layer 2 scaling project, tricking users into sending funds that were then stolen
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Blockchain analysis by Nikkei revealed more than 120 transactions between wallets controlled by this network and entities tied to Wuhan Yuancheng Gongchuang Technology Co., Ltd. — a chemical company that the U.S. Treasury's OFAC sanctioned in December 2021 under the Illicit Drug Trafficking Executive Order . The money laundering pathway worked like this: proceeds from the crypto scam were routed through blockchain wallets connected to Yuancheng, which itself was already under U.S. sanctions for supplying fentanyl precursor chemicals to Mexican drug cartels
. This created a closed loop where drug smuggling, cyber fraud, and sanctions evasion reinforced each other.
1. Japan as a Command-and-Control Node. Nagoya served not just as a logistics transit point for precursor chemicals, but as the financial and digital fraud headquarters for the network. A key figure — the "Japan boss" — issued instructions from Japan on precursor deliveries and fund management until at least July 2024 . The same person controlled 18 companies across China, Japan, and the U.S.
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2. Exploitation of Japan's Corporate and Domain Registration System. The network exploited Japan's relatively loose corporate registration rules to incorporate Firsky KK and registered .jp domains that gave the crypto scam an appearance of legitimacy, enabling global victim outreach . Japanese domains typically require a local address to register, a requirement the network easily bypassed
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3. Dual-Use Infrastructure — Smuggling and Cybercrime Fused. This case collapses the distinction between fentanyl smuggling and cryptocurrency-enabled financial crime: the same organization that shipped precursor chemicals to the U.S. also ran a multi-million-dollar crypto fraud, using proceeds to further launder funds through sanctioned Chinese chemical suppliers . Firsky even operated a specialty website selling Amarvel's drugs in exchange for cryptocurrency
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4. Japan Caught in the U.S.-China Fentanyl Crossfire. Japan's Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya has publicly dismissed suggestions of Japan's role in fentanyl trafficking, but the Nikkei and Bellingcat evidence chains directly implicate Japanese corporate registration, banking, and domain systems as enablers . The DEA acknowledged in May 2026 that Japan was becoming a transit point for fentanyl exports, and U.S. authorities have called for deeper Japanese cooperation on fentanyl-related investigations
. Firsky KK was suddenly dissolved in July 2024 as the Amarvel trial progressed
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Key caveat: Some details — including the exact amount stolen and the specific identity of the Hong Kong-based domain registrant — have been reported by outlets summarizing Nikkei's investigation (such as MEXC, Bitget, Gate.io, and Hankyung) but the original Nikkei report itself may have additional granularity not fully captured in secondary summaries. The direct link between Amarvel Biotech and the cryptocurrency scam is circumstantial but strongly supported by blockchain transaction records, shared personnel, and the corporate structure linking Firsky KK to Amarvel Biotech .
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