Inside Ukraine's 'Logistics Lockdown': How Mid-Range Drones Are Cutting Crimea Off from Russia

The campaign is enabled by a dramatic expansion of Ukraine's mid-range drone fleet. Fedorov stated that the Defense Ministry contracted 300% more "Middle Strike" drones in the first four months of 2026 than during all of 2025 . This surge in procurement, backed by $113 million in additional funding announced on 27 May, allows Ukraine to conduct a sustained interdiction campaign at a scale previously impossible .

The New Drone Arsenal: Behemoth and FP-2

Two new Ukrainian-made platforms are central to the campaign: the Behemoth (Бегемот) and the FP-2.

Behemoth: Developed by GLEFA and Culver Aerospace and unveiled in late May 2026, the Behemoth is a Shahed-style loitering munition with a strike radius of up to 300 km . Its distinguishing feature is a tandem warhead: a 40 kg high-explosive fragmentation charge in the nose followed by a 35 kg thermobaric warhead (75 kg total) . The drone can fly at low altitudes (around 180 km/h) to evade air defense systems and supports autonomous, semi-automatic, and FPV control modes . Its first known combat use was a strike on the Chongar Bridge in early June .

FP-2: Developed by the Ukrainian miltech company Fire Point, the FP-2 is a purpose-built "middle strike" drone optimized for heavy payloads at medium range. It carries a warhead of up to 105-170 kg over a distance of approximately 200 km . The FP-2 trades the extreme range of its predecessor (the FP-1, which can reach 1,400 km) for a much heavier warhead, making it ideal for striking hardened logistics infrastructure such as bridges, fuel depots, and air defense systems . The drone uses Starlink for communication and navigation, and has recently been upgraded to launch unguided air-to-surface rockets .

Cost Advantage: Both drones are far cheaper than Western-supplied cruise missiles like Storm Shadow/SCALP, allowing Ukraine to mass-produce and deploy them for sustained, high-volume interdiction missions . The FP-2 is reported to cost around $55,000 per unit, making it expendable enough for widespread use .

Key Targets: Bridges, Highways, and Fuel

The campaign systematically targets three categories of logistics infrastructure:

1. Chokepoint Bridges: Ukrainian drones have repeatedly struck the bridges that serve as the only road and rail links between Crimea and the mainland. Hits have been confirmed at the Chonhar (Chongar) bridge, the Armyansk bridge, the Henichesk bridge, and the bridge near the village of Myrne . On the night of June 11, the 1st Separate Assault Regiment struck the Armyansk bridge as a convoy of up to 50 Russian fuel and ammunition trucks was concentrated there, destroying the vehicles and rendering the bridge inoperable .

2. The "Highway of Death": The primary focus is the Novorossiya highway (the M-18/E-97 route along the Azov coast), which Russia uses as its main land corridor from Rostov-on-Don through Mariupol and Melitopol to Crimea. Ukrainian troops have rebranded it the "highway of death" due to the constant drone patrols . Since late May, civilian traffic on the route has "almost ceased," and dozens of burned-out trucks and fuel tankers line the road .

3. Energy Infrastructure: On June 19, Brovdi's drones struck the Hlibivske gas storage facility deep in Crimea, along with radars, fuel tankers, and a Russian command post . The strike extended the campaign to fuel storage and distribution networks inside the peninsula itself.

Measurable Impacts: Fuel Crisis and Traffic Collapse

Available evidence points to significant operational effects:

• Traffic Reduction: Brovdi reported that drone operations have cut traffic on the Novorossiya highway by more than two-thirds (71%) over the past month .
• Fuel Crisis: The strikes triggered the worst fuel crisis in Crimea since Russia's illegal annexation in 2014. Occupation authorities introduced fuel rationing in May, and fuel shortages have also been reported in at least 25 Russian regions . The New York Times described the campaign as "really hurting the Russians" .
• Operational Effects: The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assessed that the campaign has degraded Russia's ability to use key GLOCs, complicated troop rotations, reduced combat capability on the front line, and made it more difficult for Russia to sustain offensive operations in southern Ukraine .

AI Integration: Beating Electronic Warfare

A critical enabler of the campaign is the integration of artificial intelligence into the drone guidance systems. Ukraine is using AI-equipped drones — such as the Hornet system — that can autonomously identify, track, and strike moving targets without persistent human control . This capability is particularly important for overcoming Russian electronic warfare (EW) jamming, which can sever the radio link between a human operator and a manually piloted drone. BBC Verify analyzed footage and confirmed at least 14 AI-directed strikes on supply vehicles in a single week in late May .

The combination of AI targeting, mass-produced mid-range drones, and a deliberate interdiction strategy marks a significant shift from earlier tactical drone use (striking individual vehicles on the front line) to a strategic-level campaign aimed at decisive operational effects. As Fedorov put it, "Crimea is being isolated by drones. And in the near future, it looks as though Crimea will become an island" .