הפוגה מדומה: צעדי ענק חדשים חושפים את חלל היציבות בין ארה

• Control Technology Leakage: Require government authorization for any Chinese business or investor to export restricted goods, technology, services, or data overseas .
• Retaliate and Unwind Deals: Explicitly give the state the legal authority to retaliate against foreign governments that restrict Chinese capital and even force the unwinding of completed overseas transactions .
• Ban Talent Transfers: Specifically prohibit cross-border talent transfers in sensitive sectors without approval, targeting the movement of critical expertise .

The move came just one month after Beijing ordered Meta to unwind its acquisition of the AI startup Manus, signaling an aggressive new phase in the battle to ring-fence Chinese technological gains .

The Summits's Fragile Foundations

To understand how the diplomatic framework collapsed so quickly, it's necessary to look at what the May 13-15 Beijing summit actually produced—and what it carefully avoided. The centerpiece was Xi Jinping's "constructive strategic stability" framework, a phrase Washington accepted but which both sides interpret in fundamentally opposing ways .

Beijing saw it as a doctrine for a new power-shift paradigm where competition is managed on China's terms, focused on “positive stability with cooperation as the mainstay” . Washington framed it as a package of tactical wins: specific deals on agricultural products, Boeing aircraft, and a commitment from China to address rare earth supply chain concerns .

A critical observer might say the two readouts could have come from two separate meetings. The Brookings Institution pointed out that the U.S. readout emphasized business deals, while Beijing’s focused on a new relationship framework .

The summit did establish two new bilateral mechanisms—a Board of Trade and a Board of Investment—chartered to manage non-sensitive goods and facilitate investment . While these sounded constructive, they lacked any binding enforcement power, making them vulnerable to becoming nothing more than talking shops .

The Three Cracks in the Armistice

The swift return to aggressive restrictions in June was not a surprise but a direct result of three critical, unresolved tensions.

1. The Unresolved Tariff Sword of Damocles
The May summit did not extend the key October 2025 tariff truce . A $30 billion tariff reduction framework, part of a November 2025 deal, existed in principle, but no permanent schedule was agreed upon . Without a new agreement, the truce was set to expire on November 10, threatening a rise in reciprocal tariffs on Chinese goods from an effective rate of 47% back to 57% . This ticking clock was complicated by the Supreme Court striking down all tariffs issued under IEEPA in February 2026, forcing the administration into legal scrambling over alternative authority .

2. A Direct Regulatory Collision Course
The competing restrictions from June 1 are not isolated incidents; they are two trains on a collision course. The U.S. is pursuing an extraterritorial strategy, applying its laws globally to Chinese subsidiaries. China, in turn, is building an extraterritorial wall of its own, issuing regulations designed explicitly to nullify foreign sanctions and block the overseas transfer of any sensitive technology or data . This creates a direct legal conflict for multinational corporations forced to comply with opposing laws .

3. The Doctrine Gap: Tactical Patches vs. Strategic Maneuvering
The fundamental problem is the incompatible definition of "stability." As the Council on Foreign Relations noted, for the U.S., it is about avoiding conflict while striking economic deals . For China, it is a framework for "strategic stalemate" that legitimizes its technological self-sufficiency drive and accepts managed competition as the new normal . This means that any U.S. action to maintain a technological edge is interpreted by Beijing as a violation of a framework meant to manage such competition, triggering reciprocal measures.

A Truce That Never Was

The early June 2026 actions make clear that the "Beijing Stabilisation" was tactical, not transformational. The diplomatic stagecraft of a presidential visit and the creation of vague institutional bodies could not paper over an accelerating decoupling in the technology sector and a fundamentally broken tariff architecture. The agreement was a photo-op, not a peace treaty. The real story is that both powers seem to have decided that stability on their own terms can only be secured by preparing more vigorously for a protracted economic and technological struggle.