The Hidden Danger Inside Your SIM Card: How Researchers Found a New Attack Surface Affecting Billions of Devices

While this feature was designed for legitimate purposes like operator services, the researchers found that very few real-world use cases remain active. Yet almost every device they tested still accepts these commands by default .

Affected Devices: From Smartphones to EV Chargers

The team tested 26 representative devices — 18 smartphones and 8 cellular-connected IoT modules — and found widespread vulnerability across multiple manufacturers and operating systems . The affected IoT modules included devices embedded in:

• Electric vehicle (EV) chargers
• Industrial equipment
• Connected cars and vehicles

The research notes that devices from multiple manufacturers and operating systems were found to support SIM-originating AT commands despite few remaining legitimate use cases .

Attacks Demonstrated: What a Malicious SIM Can Do

Using CATana, the researchers demonstrated that a malicious (or compromised) SIM card could execute the following attacks via the SIM AT interface :

• Re-enable closed-down debug interfaces on the device
• Exfiltrate sensitive information, including the device's unique IMEI
• Send SMS messages or initiate calls without user consent
• Obtain arbitrary command execution on the victim's communication processor (baseband)
• Force a network downgrade from secure 4G (LTE) to older, less secure 2G
• Shut down the victim device entirely
• Disable cellular communications altogether
• On recent Android devices, force the phone to open an attacker-controlled website with no user interaction, even when the phone was locked

Additional findings included privacy leaks, corrupted baseband memories, and lockscreen bypasses .

How an Attacker Gets a Hostile SIM Card

The research outlines four distinct scenarios through which an attacker could obtain a hostile SIM, each with real-world precedent :

1. Remote attackers exploiting vulnerabilities in SIM software (applets) to install malicious code over the air
2. Physical attackers who replace a victim's SIM card or install a thin hardware implant (SIM interposer) — a commercially available layer often sold for carrier unlocking that can be planted in seconds
3. Compromised operators who abuse remote SIM management features, including eSIM provisioning
4. Supply-chain attackers who modify SIMs during manufacturing or distribution before they reach end users

Industry Response and Remediation

The researchers coordinated disclosure with the GSM Association (GSMA) and affected chip and device manufacturers before publishing the findings . The industry response was positive: reports were treated seriously, and key manufacturers made software updates and hardened configurations available to customers .

The vulnerabilities identified by the CATana research are tracked under:

• CVE-2025-48618
• CVE-2026-57550
• CVD-2026-0122

Notably, CVE-2026-0122 is listed in the March 2026 Pixel Update Bulletin as a Critical baseband vulnerability capable of remote code execution .

Dr. Marius Muench of the University of Birmingham noted that the resulting mitigations "will benefit billions of future SIM-enabled devices operating worldwide, including smartphones, connected vehicles, payment terminals, routers, critical infrastructure and EV charging systems" .

The Bigger Picture: A Class of Risks, Not a Single Bug

The CATana research builds on earlier work from the same team, including the SIMURAI platform, which demonstrated that SIM card attacks are not one-off vulnerabilities but a class of risks that can be understood across three attack surfaces: physical access, hostile SIM, and baseband firmware bugs .

The CATana toolkit is open-source and designed to help security researchers and device manufacturers systematically test for these SIM-originating AT command vulnerabilities, lowering the barrier to entry for future security research .