Power comes from two CFM International LEAP-1C turbofans — a joint venture between GE Aerospace (US) and Safran (France) — producing up to ~31,000 lbf thrust each . A domestically built alternative, the CJ-1000A, is in flight testing and expected to enter service around 2028–2029
.
The C919's most critical subsystem — its engines — comes from CFM International, making the program vulnerable to US export controls . In May 2025, the US Commerce Department briefly suspended LEAP engine export licenses to COMAC, directly threatening production
. Those licenses were restored in July 2025, providing temporary relief, but analysts note that dependence on US-made core modules remains a "strategic vulnerability"
.
Many other key systems (avionics, flight controls, landing gear) are sourced from Western suppliers including Honeywell, Rockwell Collins, and Liebherr, meaning the aircraft is far from fully indigenous .
The C919 is certified only by China's CAAC. It has not received type certification from the US FAA or the European EASA, sharply limiting where it can be flown and sold . In April 2025, EASA's executive director stated that European certification of the C919 would take 3 to 6 years
. EASA began flight evaluations in Shanghai in January 2026, a significant step but still early in a long process
.
China has reportedly delayed final approvals for new Airbus deliveries in an apparent effort to pressure Europe to expedite C919 certification, according to Bloomberg and Reuters reports . Without Western certification, COMAC cannot sell the C919 to airlines in most major non-Chinese markets. The Beijing–Ulaanbaatar route is possible via a bilateral air services agreement, but does not require EASA/FAA approval.
COMAC has delivered only a small number of C919s to Chinese carriers since the aircraft entered commercial service in May 2023. By mid-2026, fewer than two dozen aircraft had been delivered, far below the original production targets . The LEAP engine export suspension in May 2025 underscored how quickly geopolitics can throttle production
. Even with licenses restored, the reliance on foreign suppliers for engines and other critical parts creates ongoing bottleneck risks.
COMAC needs to reach an annual production rate of at least 100–150 aircraft to be a credible competitor to Boeing and Airbus, but it remains far from that level, constrained by industrial capacity and supplier integration .
The first international commercial flight proves the C919 can operate a scheduled cross-border service and helps build confidence among potential international customers . For now, the C919 primarily serves the Chinese domestic market, where state-owned airlines are mandated or incentivized to operate it. International expansion into markets that require EASA/FAA approval remains years away
.
Analysts widely view this flight as an important step, but caution that COMAC is still years — possibly a decade or more — from becoming a serious third force in global commercial aviation. As CNBC reported, "the C919 is still heavily reliant on foreign components and has not received certification from major U.S. or European regulators, limiting its ability to win customers" . Euronews similarly noted that "building the plane is only half the battle; COMAC also needs to scale production and build a global support network"
.
Beijing's push for a domestic CJ-1000A engine and increasing localization of subsystems suggests the strategic goal is to eventually decouple from Western supply chains, but that outcome is likely several years away at best .