For Syria, the pledge creates an immediate energy supply gap. The country has been heavily dependent on Russian crude—Moscow increased deliveries by 75% in 2026 to approximately 60,000 barrels per day following the fall of the Assad regime, according to Reuters . Agreeing to slash those imports forces Damascus to urgently find alternative suppliers, which is precisely where the Western energy deals come in.
Since late 2025, Syria has signed a series of landmark agreements that shift its hydrocarbon sector away from Russian and Iranian dominance:
ConocoPhillips & Novaterra (gas development). In November 2025, the Syrian Petroleum Company signed a memorandum of understanding with ConocoPhillips and Novaterra for natural gas cooperation . This was upgraded to a binding contract in June 2026 to explore new gas fields and boost output at existing ones
, and a final gas-sector development contract was signed in Damascus on July 23, 2026
. The agreement grants Syria a 56% share, with the two investing companies holding the remaining 44%
.
TotalEnergies, QatarEnergy & ConocoPhillips (offshore Block 3). On May 12, 2026, the three companies signed an MoU to explore the offshore Block 3 area near Latakia—a major Western-led consortium entering Syrian waters for the first time in years .
These deals turn an important page: U.S. and European energy majors are replacing or supplementing the role Russia and Iran once played in Syrian energy infrastructure, giving Damascus both revenue and diplomatic cover for its pivot.
While the oil import pledge weakens Russia's economic position, Congress has been actively legislating to reduce Moscow's strategic military foothold in Syria.
House Armed Services Committee amendments (June 2026). Representative Joe Wilson introduced a package of amendments to the FY2027 Defense budget that specifically target the Russian military presence in Syria . These amendments direct the Pentagon to assess options for reducing Russia's access to and operational capacity at Tartous naval base and Hmeimim air base
. A report is due by December 31, 2026, outlining mechanisms to limit and potentially end Russian use of these facilities
.
Helsinki Commission hearing (February 2026). A hearing titled "Securing Syria's Transformation by Diminishing Russia's Influence" examined the precise question of how to roll back Moscow's military basing rights . Congressional concern centers on Russia using these bases to arm militant groups and destabilize the broader Middle East
.
Senate SST letter (July 2026). A bipartisan group of senators—Shaheen, Wilson, and Warren—urged Secretary of State Rubio to proceed with SST removal while pressing Syria to "continue to take credible steps to limit and eventually end the Russian military presence" .
Russia has attempted to counter by converting one of two Tartous berths into a commercial logistics hub while maintaining a military presence at the other, a move reported in July 2026 . However, the congressional pressure creates a clear trajectory: further U.S. normalization with Syria is conditional on demonstrable progress in reducing Moscow's military footprint
.
The evidence points to a coordinated three-phase approach:
The SST delisting is being used as leverage, not a reward. Washington is extracting concrete concessions—oil import cuts and energy-sector reorientation—before final delisting .
Economic decoupling precedes military rollback. By replacing Russian crude and Iranian influence with Western energy investment, the U.S. is weakening Moscow's economic rationale for maintaining its bases .
Congress is institutionalizing the goal. The NDAA amendments and Helsinki Commission hearings show that both chambers view reducing Russia's Syria presence as a formal policy objective, not just an administrative preference .
Together, these moves represent the most significant shift in Syria's geopolitical alignment since the fall of the Assad regime. The oil import pledge is the leading edge of a broader effort to sever the economic ties that have sustained Russia's military presence—and to ensure that Syria's future energy partnerships are with the West, not with Moscow.