The move is not an isolated incident but the institutionalization of a long-running practice. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has tracked Russia pressing captured Ukrainian soldiers into combat roles since 2022 . By consolidating these ad-hoc units into a formal Spetsnaz brigade, Russia is scaling up and legitimizing a policy that independent monitors and Ukrainian officials say relies on coercion and duress .
Escalation of a systemic practice. Russia has been recruiting Ukrainian POWs into penal-style units for years, but the formal creation of a brigade under the Volunteer Corps of the Ministry of Defense marks a significant shift. It moves the practice from irregular detachments to an official, named military formation, making the coercion an institutional policy rather than an ad-hoc battlefield tactic .
Psychological and operational weaponization. Forcing captured Ukrainian soldiers to fight against their own countrymen serves multiple purposes for Russia. It provides a source of manpower for Russian forces, acts as a tool of propaganda (Russia labels the unit "volunteer"), and creates psychological coercion by placing POWs in a position where they must harm their own compatriots to survive .
Undermining global POW protections. This sets a dangerous precedent. If captured soldiers can be coerced into fighting for the captor state without consequence, the fundamental protections guaranteed by POW status are eroded. The Geneva Conventions exist precisely to prevent captors from using prisoners as soldiers, and Russia's formal brigade challenges those norms directly.
Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Article 130 explicitly states that POWs "cannot be compelled to serve in the forces of the Detaining Power." Compelling POWs to serve in the armed forces of the hostile power is a grave breach of the convention . Under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, such grave breaches constitute war crimes.
The issue of "consent." Russia labels the POWs in the brigade as "volunteers." However, the ISW and multiple independent sources assess that coercion and duress are involved in the recruitment process. Under international law, duress invalidates any purported consent. A soldier who is told to join or face punishment, execution, or continued torture cannot be said to have volunteered freely .
Existing evidence of coercion. Ukrainian authorities have documented cases of POWs being pressured into signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense. The Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War in Ukraine stated in November 2025 that it had verified information about at least 62 contracts signed by Ukrainian POWs to fight against Ukraine . This documented pattern of forced recruitment undermines Russia's claims of volunteerism.
Russia's use of prisoners as soldiers is not new. Since the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022, Moscow has recruited between 140,000 and 180,000 convicts into military units through programs like the Storm-Z series . However, the use of POWs—who enjoy special protections under the Geneva Conventions—represents a distinct and more serious violation. While convicts are not protected as POWs, captured enemy combatants are, and forcing them to fight is a grave breach of international law.
The formation of the 1st Ukrainian Volunteer Spetsnaz Brigade represents a deliberate escalation of this practice. By formalizing the unit structure and naming it a Spetsnaz (special forces) brigade, Russia is signaling that this is not a temporary battlefield expedient but a sustained policy. The international community, including the ISW and Ukrainian authorities, has condemned the move as a clear war crime under the Geneva Conventions .