Despite BRICS accounting for nearly 50% of global technology company IPOs in 2025, the distribution is far from uniform .
The concentration is stark: about 90% of those tech listings occurred in China and India, according to SPIEF discussions . This means the bloc's headline IPO dominance is functionally a China-India story, with Brazil, Russia, South Africa, and the newer African and Middle Eastern members playing a far smaller role
.
In the first half of 2025, Greater China alone captured roughly one-third of all global IPO proceeds, a dramatic rebound from just 12% a year earlier, while India claimed about 20% of global IPO deal count . This concentration pattern is consistent across multiple data sources: an analysis of historical BRICS IPOs finds that most listed companies are Chinese, about one-third are Indian, and Russia, Brazil, and South Africa combined represent less than 10% of the sample
.
The practical implication is important for investors and policymakers: the BRICS tech public-market narrative is largely driven by the two Asian giants, and claims of broad-based BRICS tech equity strength should be viewed with that distribution in mind.
Sanctions imposed after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine have severed much of Russia's access to the SWIFT messaging system and dollar-denominated clearing, pushing Moscow to accelerate alternative payment infrastructure ,
.
Russia has been actively promoting its System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS), which by early 2025 had attracted 159 foreign participants from 20 countries, according to Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina ,
. Discussions are underway about integrating national financial messaging systems across BRICS, with China, India, and other members maintaining their own domestic alternatives
,
.
The broader BRICS vision includes BRICS Pay—a decentralized, blockchain-based cross-border payment system designed to bypass SWIFT and reduce dependence on the U.S. dollar ,
. President Vladimir Putin confirmed in late 2024 that BRICS nations were developing a "BRICS Bridge Multisided Payment Platform" to connect national financial infrastructures
. Finance Minister Anton Siluanov has emphasized that the goal is a blockchain-based common platform for exchanging digital financial assets issued by central banks, not an immediate common currency
.
In parallel, Russia’s own digital ruble initiative aims to further reduce reliance on Western payment channels, though its rollout has faced repeated delays. The Central Bank of Russia originally targeted an "extensive introduction" by July 2025, but public adoption was postponed to September 2026 due to merchant resistance and logistical obstacles, with full coverage of all credit institutions now planned for 2027 .
The Carnegie Endowment notes that while a CBDC could in theory provide Russia with a SWIFT alternative, the digital ruble "has a long way to go before it enters mainstream circulation" . In the near term, Russia's crypto policy is also evolving: the central bank has been considering a model to let banks and brokers operate crypto exchanges under a notification process, though domestic crypto payments would remain prohibited
.
For all the ambitious technocratic visions discussed at SPIEF, Russia's domestic economic data tells a different story. The initial "sugar rush" from wartime military spending has clearly faded.
Growth deceleration: After expanding by roughly 4% in both 2023 and 2024, Russia's GDP growth slowed sharply to approximately 1% in 2025, and the IMF has forecast only 0.8% growth in 2026 ,
,
. This trajectory places Russia well below the average growth rate projected for the broader BRICS membership.
Inflation and monetary tightening: The Central Bank of Russia has been running what has been described as "the world's tightest monetary policy," with inflation-adjusted real interest rates exceeding 10% from late 2024 through 2025 . The central bank's key rate peaked at 21% before a rate-cutting cycle began in mid-2025, eventually falling to around 16%
,
. Inflation hit 9.5% in 2024 before easing to around 5.6% in 2025—still significantly above the 4% target
.
Oil and budget pressure: In 2025, oil and gas revenues fell by roughly 24% to $111 billion, the lowest level since 2020 ,
. The federal budget deficit reached an estimated 5.6 trillion rubles, or around 2.6% of GDP, while spending climbed sharply
. Some forecasts suggest the deficit could exceed 3.5% or even 4.4% of GDP in 2026, forcing the government to raise the VAT rate and seek alternative revenue sources
,
.
Sanctions cumulation: The peaceRep analysis emphasizes that "sanctions have a cumulative and escalating negative impact" on the Russian economy, and falling global oil prices compound the fiscal pressure . Meanwhile, "tactical poverty"—belt-tightening measures imposed by Russian companies—has become a visible indicator of private-sector stress as the IMF slashed its growth forecast
.
The BRICS expansion and alternative-finance push sit within a global realignment. The IMF now projects that BRICS and ASEAN economies together will generate roughly 56% of all global real GDP growth in 2026, with China contributing 26.6% and India 17.0% . The BRICS bloc has surpassed the G7 in purchasing-power-parity GDP terms, commanding over 35% of global output as of late 2024
.
Yet within the bloc, the distribution of growth, IPOs, and financial infrastructure remains deeply uneven. The SPIEF 2026 discussions spotlight a bloc in transition: ambitious about its future, increasingly integrated on trade and payment rails, but still defined by sharp internal asymmetries between China and India on one side, and economies like Russia that are racing to build institutional alternatives while their domestic foundations erode under sanctions and war costs.
Comments
0 comments