Un-sanctioned: The Stakes Behind Sjoerd Sjoerdsma’s Critical Trade Mission to China

A diplomatic workaround began taking shape in March, when Sjoerdsma met Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao on the sidelines of a WTO meeting in Cameroon. The two agreed to hold economic and trade consultations in China, and Sjoerdsma signaled he would use the occasion to lead a Dutch trade delegation . In late April, sources confirmed that Beijing had quietly removed Sjoerdsma from its sanctions list, ending the standoff without public acknowledgment .

The ASML squeeze

The most urgent item on Sjoerdsma’s agenda is the proposed US MATCH Act. Unveiled in April 2026 by a cross-party group of American lawmakers, the legislation would force US allies to follow Washington’s export controls, specifically blocking ASML from selling and servicing its DUV immersion lithography tools to Chinese customers .

The Dutch government objected formally in May, arguing the bill encroaches on Dutch sovereignty over export policy . Sjoerdsma himself has stated that the cabinet opposes the extraterritorial application of American rules, and that the Netherlands wants to determine its own export controls . His visit provides a direct channel to signal to Beijing that the Dutch government is pushing back against Washington—but also to manage expectations about how far that pushback can go, given that the Netherlands has previously aligned with US restrictions on ASML’s most advanced tools .

ASML’s CEO has warned that tighter curbs will ultimately push China to develop competing chipmaking equipment, a dynamic that could reshape the global semiconductor landscape regardless of what the MATCH Act does .

The Nexperia powder keg

If ASML is the long-term structural issue, the Nexperia dispute is the immediate crisis. In September 2025, the Dutch government invoked the rarely used Goods Availability Act to place Nexperia—a Nijmegen-based chipmaker owned by China’s Wingtech Technology—under temporary state supervision, citing national security concerns over improper technology transfers . The move triggered a retaliatory spiral: Beijing imposed export controls on Chinese-made Nexperia components in October 2025, disrupting global auto production; Nexperia’s Chinese subsidiary told employees to ignore directives from the Dutch headquarters ; and Wingtech projected losses of up to $1.9 billion for the year .

In May 2026, Wingtech escalated further, filing a lawsuit in a Guangdong court against Nexperia and three of its executives under China’s Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law. The company is demanding 8 billion yuan (approximately $1.17 billion) in damages and full restoration of control . A Dutch court had already ordered a formal investigation into mismanagement at Nexperia in February 2026, allowing the European management team that took over during the state intervention to remain in place .

China’s commerce ministry has warned the dispute risks triggering a new global chip shortage, citing the breakdown between Nexperia’s European wafer production and its China-based packaging and testing operations . The conflict is now entangled in multiple jurisdictions, with the Dutch government urging de-escalation while Beijing’s new ambassador to the Netherlands, Shen Bo, has publicly called on The Hague to withdraw the court case .

The tightrope

Sjoerdsma’s visit—the first high-level Dutch trade mission to China since his own sanctions were imposed in 2021—is a test of the Jetten cabinet’s “de-risking” doctrine. The approach aims to reduce strategic dependencies on China without severing economic ties, but the simultaneous pressure from Washington and Beijing makes that balance harder to hold.

The Netherlands hosts Europe’s most valuable semiconductor equipment company in ASML and one of its most contested chipmakers in Nexperia. Any outcome of Sjoerdsma’s meetings in Beijing and Shanghai will ripple through supply chains, boardrooms, and diplomatic cables far beyond the four-day trip. Both sides appear willing to compartmentalize past grievances for the sake of economic diplomacy—but the two disputes waiting for them on the table leave little room for anything less than concrete progress.