The IRGC declared an effective closure on February 28 and has since entrenched a system of conditional passage . As of late March, Iran has been allowing ships from select neutral nations—including China, India, Pakistan, and Turkey—to transit only on a case-by-case basis after submitting ownership and cargo details to the IRGC
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Iranian state TV reported on May 16 that European countries have begun negotiations with Tehran for transit, but this has not yet translated into a measurable increase in traffic . The IRGC claimed 26 commercial vessels transited under its coordination on May 21, yet the Strait remains "mostly closed"
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The few vessels that have crossed the Strait have done so largely through diplomatic coordination rather than open commercial passage.
The military picture remains tense and multi-layered, which directly suppresses commercial confidence.
Sultan Al Jaber's May 21 assessment represents the most concrete and authoritative recovery timeline from an industry leader with direct exposure.
He previously called Iran's blockade "the arithmetic of extortion," noting the world had lost roughly 1 billion barrels of oil over two months . On April 9, he stressed that "the Strait of Hormuz is not open" and that an estimated 230 vessels loaded with oil were awaiting transit
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His latest projection is stark:
Multiple structural barriers make a near-term return to normal flows improbable:
The consensus from ship-tracking data, military statements, and industry leaders is clear: the Strait of Hormuz is not a functioning commercial artery, and it will not become one again for at least a year, even under the most optimistic diplomatic scenario.
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