Traffic Has Collapsed to Near-Zero

Before the conflict, 125 to 140 ships transited the Strait daily . That traffic evaporated within days of the first strikes.

• Day one (Feb. 28): Traffic plunged roughly 70% immediately, with over 150 vessels anchoring outside the Strait to avoid risk .
• Early March: Oil tanker traffic was down 90%, and on March 3, the Joint Maritime Information Center recorded zero tanker transits for the day . Western-affiliated tankers and LNG carriers disproportionately reversed course or paused .
• Late April: Ship traffic averaged around 7 vessels per day—almost entirely dry bulk carriers, not oil tankers .
• Post-ceasefire (April 9 onward): Only 10–12 vessels passed through in the ceasefire's first days, and traffic never rebounded meaningfully; Kpler data showed just four tankers and six bulk carriers in the initial post-ceasefire window .

A Selective Blockade, Not a Free Waterway

The IRGC declared an effective closure on February 28 and has since entrenched a system of conditional passage . As of late March, Iran has been allowing ships from select neutral nations—including China, India, Pakistan, and Turkey—to transit only on a case-by-case basis after submitting ownership and cargo details to the IRGC .

Iranian state TV reported on May 16 that European countries have begun negotiations with Tehran for transit, but this has not yet translated into a measurable increase in traffic . The IRGC claimed 26 commercial vessels transited under its coordination on May 21, yet the Strait remains "mostly closed" .

Tanker Movements: A Trickle, Not a Flow

The few vessels that have crossed the Strait have done so largely through diplomatic coordination rather than open commercial passage.

• China sent three ships through in late March after direct coordination, and the VLCC Yuan Hua Hu—carrying 2 million barrels of Iraqi crude—transited in mid-May .
• India received at least two VLCCs and two Suezmax tankers in March and April .
• Aramco and ADNOC have quietly moved a small number of crude tankers, but total flows remain "a tiny fraction" of pre-war levels .

CENTCOM, IRGC, and the Military Dimension

The military picture remains tense and multi-layered, which directly suppresses commercial confidence.

• CENTCOM's escalation: On April 13, CENTCOM announced it would block all maritime traffic entering or leaving Iranian ports in the Strait, though vessels traveling to or from non-Iranian ports were exempt . Earlier, on March 11, it warned civilians to avoid all Iranian port facilities where naval forces operate, stating those facilities could lose protected status under international law .
• Mine-clearing begins: On April 11, CENTCOM confirmed two U.S. Navy destroyers had entered the Gulf to begin mine-clearing operations, with additional forces including underwater drones to follow . The IRGC responded by threatening to deal "severely" with any military vessels transiting the Strait .
• IRGC entrenchment: Iran has warned against further attacks and continues to unveil steps tightening its control over the waterway . ACLED data records at least 25 Iranian attacks against shipping in the Gulf and Strait since February 28; roughly 40% of those incidents have targeted oil tankers .

ADNOC's Definitive Recovery Timeline

Sultan Al Jaber's May 21 assessment represents the most concrete and authoritative recovery timeline from an industry leader with direct exposure.

He previously called Iran's blockade "the arithmetic of extortion," noting the world had lost roughly 1 billion barrels of oil over two months . On April 9, he stressed that "the Strait of Hormuz is not open" and that an estimated 230 vessels loaded with oil were awaiting transit .

His latest projection is stark:

• 80% recovery: At least four months, even under an immediate peace scenario .
• Full recovery: Not before Q1 or Q2 2027 .

Why a Quick Recovery Is Unlikely

Multiple structural barriers make a near-term return to normal flows improbable:

1. Minefields: Early-stage mine-clearing operations have only just begun and will take extensive time to complete .
2. IRGC control: Iran continues to demand that each ship negotiate passage, creating a system of conditional access that commercial operators and insurers cannot rely on .
3. Destroyed trust: Even if physical hazards are cleared, the security precedent set by the blockade means insurers and shipping firms will require an extended period of stable, unrestricted transit before committing fully.
4. Ceasefire without substance: The April 9 ceasefire has not restored traffic or loosened Iran's administrative control over the Strait .

The consensus from ship-tracking data, military statements, and industry leaders is clear: the Strait of Hormuz is not a functioning commercial artery, and it will not become one again for at least a year, even under the most optimistic diplomatic scenario.

Traffic Has Collapsed to Near-Zero

Before the conflict, 125 to 140 ships transited the Strait daily . That traffic evaporated within days of the first strikes.

• Day one (Feb. 28): Traffic plunged roughly 70% immediately, with over 150 vessels anchoring outside the Strait to avoid risk .
• Early March: Oil tanker traffic was down 90%, and on March 3, the Joint Maritime Information Center recorded zero tanker transits for the day . Western-affiliated tankers and LNG carriers disproportionately reversed course or paused .
• Late April: Ship traffic averaged around 7 vessels per day—almost entirely dry bulk carriers, not oil tankers .
• Post-ceasefire (April 9 onward): Only 10–12 vessels passed through in the ceasefire's first days, and traffic never rebounded meaningfully; Kpler data showed just four tankers and six bulk carriers in the initial post-ceasefire window .

A Selective Blockade, Not a Free Waterway

The IRGC declared an effective closure on February 28 and has since entrenched a system of conditional passage . As of late March, Iran has been allowing ships from select neutral nations—including China, India, Pakistan, and Turkey—to transit only on a case-by-case basis after submitting ownership and cargo details to the IRGC .

Iranian state TV reported on May 16 that European countries have begun negotiations with Tehran for transit, but this has not yet translated into a measurable increase in traffic . The IRGC claimed 26 commercial vessels transited under its coordination on May 21, yet the Strait remains "mostly closed" .

Tanker Movements: A Trickle, Not a Flow

The few vessels that have crossed the Strait have done so largely through diplomatic coordination rather than open commercial passage.

• China sent three ships through in late March after direct coordination, and the VLCC Yuan Hua Hu—carrying 2 million barrels of Iraqi crude—transited in mid-May .
• India received at least two VLCCs and two Suezmax tankers in March and April .
• Aramco and ADNOC have quietly moved a small number of crude tankers, but total flows remain "a tiny fraction" of pre-war levels .

CENTCOM, IRGC, and the Military Dimension

The military picture remains tense and multi-layered, which directly suppresses commercial confidence.

• CENTCOM's escalation: On April 13, CENTCOM announced it would block all maritime traffic entering or leaving Iranian ports in the Strait, though vessels traveling to or from non-Iranian ports were exempt . Earlier, on March 11, it warned civilians to avoid all Iranian port facilities where naval forces operate, stating those facilities could lose protected status under international law .
• Mine-clearing begins: On April 11, CENTCOM confirmed two U.S. Navy destroyers had entered the Gulf to begin mine-clearing operations, with additional forces including underwater drones to follow . The IRGC responded by threatening to deal "severely" with any military vessels transiting the Strait .
• IRGC entrenchment: Iran has warned against further attacks and continues to unveil steps tightening its control over the waterway . ACLED data records at least 25 Iranian attacks against shipping in the Gulf and Strait since February 28; roughly 40% of those incidents have targeted oil tankers .

ADNOC's Definitive Recovery Timeline

Sultan Al Jaber's May 21 assessment represents the most concrete and authoritative recovery timeline from an industry leader with direct exposure.

He previously called Iran's blockade "the arithmetic of extortion," noting the world had lost roughly 1 billion barrels of oil over two months . On April 9, he stressed that "the Strait of Hormuz is not open" and that an estimated 230 vessels loaded with oil were awaiting transit .

His latest projection is stark:

• 80% recovery: At least four months, even under an immediate peace scenario .
• Full recovery: Not before Q1 or Q2 2027 .

Why a Quick Recovery Is Unlikely

Multiple structural barriers make a near-term return to normal flows improbable:

1. Minefields: Early-stage mine-clearing operations have only just begun and will take extensive time to complete .
2. IRGC control: Iran continues to demand that each ship negotiate passage, creating a system of conditional access that commercial operators and insurers cannot rely on .
3. Destroyed trust: Even if physical hazards are cleared, the security precedent set by the blockade means insurers and shipping firms will require an extended period of stable, unrestricted transit before committing fully.
4. Ceasefire without substance: The April 9 ceasefire has not restored traffic or loosened Iran's administrative control over the Strait .

The consensus from ship-tracking data, military statements, and industry leaders is clear: the Strait of Hormuz is not a functioning commercial artery, and it will not become one again for at least a year, even under the most optimistic diplomatic scenario.