The messaging channel is active but opaque. Araghchi has previously confirmed direct and indirect message exchanges with U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff, while consistently downplaying the exchanges as less than formal talks . His "final formula" phrasing signals that both Tehran and Washington view the current diplomatic window as critical — but also that core disagreements have narrowed the scope of what a deal can achieve.
Crucially, Araghchi linked any agreement to a full cessation of hostilities across all fronts, specifically citing the Israeli war in Lebanon. He warned that an Israeli attack on Beirut would collapse the ceasefire entirely . This condition presents a complicating factor outside the direct Iran–U.S. dynamic.
According to U.S. officials and sources cited by Axios, Anadolu, and other outlets, the tentative agreement includes several concrete steps :
The deal is explicitly framed as an interim agreement — a platform for serious talks rather than a comprehensive peace treaty .
Despite the technical progress on paper, several issues block final approval.
Iran has repeatedly stated that no deal with the United States is possible unless the Israeli military campaign in Lebanon ends and the ceasefire there is fully respected . This is a firm red line for Tehran, and the Lebanon front is not under Washington’s direct operational control. Araghchi has made clear that Iran insists on "a complete end to the war across the region" rather than a fragmented truce
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The central unresolved question is the fate of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile and its enrichment capability. The United States has proposed a 20-year suspension of all enrichment activity, while Iran countered with a 3- to 5-year pause . A further disagreement concerns disposal: Washington wants highly enriched uranium removed from Iran entirely, whereas Tehran has proposed down-blending it or retaining it under IAEA supervision
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Trump acknowledged the gap on May 24, stating that the deal "isn't even fully negotiated yet" and insisting any agreement must not give Iran "a clear and open path to a Nuclear Weapon" . U.S. negotiators have reportedly demanded the removal of 400 kilograms of uranium to the United States and a limit of operational nuclear activity to a single facility
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After the Islamabad Talks collapsed in mid-April 2026, both sides downgraded their ambitions from a comprehensive peace deal to an interim memorandum precisely because the nuclear file could not be resolved . Washington's reported conditions include no compensation for war damages inflicted by the U.S., retaining significant sanctions architecture, conditioning a full regional ceasefire on progress in nuclear talks, and expanded restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missile program
. Iran has insisted on full sanctions relief and rejected terms it views as unilateral concessions without binding guarantees
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Araghchi has repeatedly stated there is "zero trust in the US" . That posture shapes Tehran's insistence on indirect talks, phased confidence-building, and guarantees before moving to core issues. The U.S. position, by contrast, has emphasized that time is on Washington’s side and that the blockade will remain in "full force and effect" until a deal is "reached, certified, and signed"
. These asymmetries make even a temporary MoU politically combustible in both capitals.
The tentative 60-day framework represents a practical waypoint — a mechanism to freeze the military standoff while deferring the hardest questions. Reopening the Strait of Hormuz would restore a critical global energy artery currently costing Iran an estimated $400 million per day in lost revenue . Easing the U.S. blockade and allowing oil sales would give Tehran immediate economic relief
. For Washington, the deal would lock in a de-escalation, remove the immediate threat to Persian Gulf shipping, and create a dedicated channel for nuclear talks
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But the deal's viability depends on two individuals who have yet to sign off. Araghchi's reference to a "final formula" as texts circulate suggests both sides recognize this is the last plausible off-ramp before diplomacy exhausts itself. The framework itself is no longer the primary gap; the approval and sequencing of the hardest trade-offs — Lebanon, enrichment levels, sanctions — remain the true test of whether an interim deal can hold or whether the war will enter a new phase.