Singapore’s Online Safety Commission: What It Can Do, Who It Covers and What Victims Need to Know

The 13 online harms in the legal framework

OSRAA lists 13 forms of online harmful activity:

1. Online harassment
2. Doxxing
3. Non-consensual disclosure of private information
4. Online stalking
5. Intimate-image abuse
6. Image-based child abuse
7. Online impersonation
8. Inauthentic material abuse, including harmful synthetic or manipulated material
9. Publication of false material
10. Publication of a statement harmful to a person’s reputation
11. Online instigation of disproportionate harm
12. Incitement of enmity
13. Incitement of violence

The list extends beyond direct abuse between individuals. It also covers certain false, manipulated or inciting material, including emerging concerns such as deepfakes and coordinated campaigns intended to cause disproportionate harm.

How victims can report harm

A person can report through the OSC’s online reporting process. The form asks for a description of what happened, information such as usernames or account links, details about how the material was shared and the platforms where it appeared. Supporting evidence can help the OSC assess the report.

Reports can be made by victims or, where authorised, by someone assisting them. Children under 18 can receive help from a parent, guardian or another trusted adult such as a teacher, counsellor or caregiver. A trusted adult or community partner needs the child’s permission to report on the child’s behalf.

The OSC is not a substitute for emergency assistance. People in immediate danger should contact the police; the OSC also directs people seeking emotional support or other assistance to relevant services and partners.

What powers does the Commissioner have?

If the Commissioner finds that online harm has occurred, the OSC can issue directions intended to stop or limit the harm. Depending on the case, those directions may require:

• removal of harmful material;
• stopping the communication of material;
• limiting or disabling a responsible person’s account;
• enabling a victim to publish a reply or correction; or
• limiting Singapore users’ access to material or a service.

The framework can also reach online administrators, platforms, internet access providers and, in some circumstances, app distribution services. Persistent non-compliance by a service may lead to escalated measures, including directions involving app stores.

These are administrative powers, not criminal-court powers. The OSC does not itself award compensation. Its role is to assess reports, provide an avenue for prompt intervention and support accountability through the mechanisms created by OSRAA.

How anonymous perpetrators may be identified

Online anonymity can make civil action difficult when a victim knows the harmful account but not the person behind it. OSRAA allows the Commissioner, in appropriate cases, to require a platform to take reasonable steps to provide end-user information that may help identify the suspected perpetrator. That information could include identifying details or contact information held by the platform.

A victim may apply for End-User Identity information when they do not know who caused the harm and are considering, or intend to commence, civil proceedings. The identity process is therefore connected to potential legal accountability; it is not a general-purpose tool for exposing anonymous users.

Civil remedies remain a separate route

Reporting to the OSC and suing in court are separate processes. A victim does not have to report to the OSC before taking legal action, although an OSC report may help stop the harm more quickly.

OSRAA creates statutory torts for specified online harms. Depending on the circumstances, victims may bring claims against those who communicated the harmful material and, in specified cases, administrators or platforms that caused the harm or failed to act against it. Potential court remedies include orders to stop or remove material and monetary compensation.

This creates a dual-track model:

• Administrative relief: the OSC can act to interrupt ongoing harm, restrict accounts or limit access.
• Civil accountability: courts can determine liability and award remedies such as compensation where the legal requirements are met.

Francis Ng’s role

Francis Ng became Commissioner of Online Safety when the OSC began operations. The OSC describes him as having more than 25 years of experience in public-sector legal roles, including senior positions at the Ministry of Law and the Attorney-General’s Chambers. Before his appointment, he held several statutory and public-service offices under the Ministry of Law.

That background is relevant to building a new public agency, coordinating official processes and applying a legal framework consistently. It does not, on its own, establish specialist expertise in areas such as trauma-informed support, child protection, technology safety or gender-based violence. Those operational capabilities will matter to whether victims experience the OSC as accessible, safe and responsive.

The main implementation tests

The law gives the OSC a broad mandate, but the practical outcome will depend on how that mandate is used.

Speed and platform compliance

Harmful images, personal information and abusive posts can continue circulating after an initial takedown. The OSC will need effective triage, clear procedures and cooperation across platforms if administrative relief is to keep pace with the harm. The law’s promise of faster redress therefore depends not only on the Commissioner’s powers but also on compliance by the services receiving directions.

Clear boundaries and fair process

Terms such as false material, reputational harm, impersonation and inauthentic material abuse require understandable decision criteria. Concerns raised around the legislation include oversight, effectiveness, privacy and the risk that broad powers could be applied disproportionately.

Transparent reasons, meaningful safeguards and accessible review processes will be important for protecting both victims and legitimate expression. The challenge is to provide rapid relief without making unclear or overbroad decisions.

Safeguards for identity disclosure

Helping a victim identify an anonymous perpetrator can make civil action more realistic. At the same time, disclosure must be limited to appropriate cases and handled securely, because identity information could itself be misused or trigger retaliation. OSRA’s identity measures are intended to focus on suspected users and possible legal proceedings, rather than eliminate anonymity generally.

A survivor-centred reporting experience

A reporting system should reduce, rather than add to, the burden on people already dealing with harassment, image abuse or stalking. Practical questions include how much evidence victims must provide, how often they must repeat their account, how confidential updates are handled and how children or vulnerable adults receive support.

The option for trusted adults and authorised community partners to assist under-18s is one part of that support structure. But a content removal or account restriction is only one stage of recovery; referral pathways and continued support will also shape whether the system works for survivors in practice.

What the OSC changes

Singapore’s new framework is designed to make online-harm complaints more direct and actionable. Instead of relying only on platform reporting, criminal processes or an immediate civil lawsuit, victims now have a dedicated administrative route that can seek content-related relief and, where appropriate, help address the problem of anonymous perpetrators.

The important caveat is that implementation is phased: the OSC currently starts with five harms even though OSRAA identifies 13. Its long-term impact will depend less on the number of categories listed in the Act than on response times, transparent decisions, platform compliance, privacy safeguards and whether the process treats victims with care.