Inside Iran’s Four-Phase Plan to End the War and Delay Nuclear Talks

Phase 2: Open Hormuz and Ease Sanctions—First

Phase 2 shifts to what Ajorlou described as “executive and tangible measures,” centered on the vital Strait of Hormuz . These measures include mine clearance, lifting the US naval blockade, removing oil sanctions, and releasing a portion of Iran’s frozen assets and blocked financial resources . An Iranian official told The Washington Post the first concrete steps would involve releasing $12 billion in frozen assets, beginning minesweeping operations, and ending the US blockade . This phase frontloads Iran’s economic and maritime priorities before any nuclear concessions are made .

Phase 3: Nuclear Talks Only After You Prove It

Only after Phases 1 and 2 are verifiably implemented will Iran enter formal negotiations on sanctions relief and nuclear-related matters . This sequencing is the plan’s central strategic pivot. Iran will not discuss its nuclear program while the war continues and demands proof that earlier commitments have been kept before moving forward . This effectively delays the hardest bargaining to a later stage, buying Iran time and leverage .

Phase 4: A Watchdog, but Not the IAEA

A joint oversight committee would be created to verify compliance and resolve disputes . Unlike the 2015 JCPOA’s heavy reliance on IAEA verification, this monitoring body would be bilateral or mediated by a third party, without the same level of technical inspection infrastructure . Reports on the broader draft note a lack of specific enforcement mechanisms for any nuclear commitments beyond a vague 60-day negotiation window .

How This Breaks from the 2015 JCPOA

The framework represents a deliberate inversion of the 2015 nuclear deal’s logic.

Sequencing reversal. The JCPOA linked nuclear restrictions and sanctions relief in parallel from the start. Iran’s four-phase plan treats full regional de-escalation as a strict precondition, pushing nuclear talks to Phase 3 only after a verified ceasefire and Strait of Hormuz normalization . Ali Vaez of the International Crisis Group described it as “a face-saving change in sequencing: Put Hormuz first as part of war-ending arrangements, not formal negotiations, lift the blockade, and defer the harder issues so they don’t sink the process at the outset” .

Scope. The JCPOA was tightly focused on Iran’s nuclear program. The proposed MoU is a broader war-termination framework that addresses military fronts across the region, maritime security, and the naval blockade first, leaving nuclear matters for a secondary phase .

Verification architecture. The JCPOA relied on the IAEA to monitor centrifuges, enrichment, and stockpiles. The MoU’s Phase 4 committee lacks such a defined technical mandate . Reports indicate the current draft includes no specific mechanism for verifying or enforcing nuclear commitments beyond the temporary negotiation window .

Talks on Ice Despite the Roadmap

Even as Iran publicized its plan, the diplomatic track was already unraveling. As of late May, US and Iranian officials confirmed the MoU was not finalized or approved by either President Trump or Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei . Unresolved clauses and lingering mistrust from Washington’s 2018 JCPOA withdrawal remain major sticking points .

On June 1—two days before the roadmap was unveiled—Iran suspended all indirect negotiations, accusing Israel of violating ceasefire understandings through ongoing military action in Lebanon . IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reported that any ceasefire breach on one front breaks the truce entirely and threatened a “complete closure” of the Strait of Hormuz .

President Trump posted on Truth Social that “talks are continuing, at a rapid pace” with Iran, even as Tehran publicly walked away . The contradictory signals underscore a deeply fragile moment: Iran says it’s paused, Washington says it’s still talking, and neither capital has blessed the draft deal.

In short, the four-phase plan is Tehran’s maximalist sequenced offer—verified de-escalation and sanctions relief first, nuclear concessions later—but the window to turn it into a signed memorandum of understanding appears to have slammed shut almost as soon as it was opened.