MOL Slovenia introduced a 30-litre-per-visit limit for private customers, while commercial vehicles and businesses were allowed larger quantities. Shell also introduced restrictions. The stated purpose was to distribute available fuel more evenly and prevent localized shortages, rather than allow a small number of customers to exhaust a station’s tanks.
Those company-level limits were stricter in one respect than the later government rule: MOL’s cap applied per visit, while the government’s national rule set a daily limit. The measures were therefore emergency demand-management tools. They did not, by themselves, establish that Slovenia’s total fuel inventories had been exhausted.
The pressure on Slovenia’s pumps formed part of a broader energy shock linked in the supplied reporting to the conflict involving the United States, Israel and Iran. Disruption around the Strait of Hormuz restricted the movement of crude and refined products. Flows through the route, which had averaged about 18 million barrels per day before the war, fell to 4.8 million barrels per day in July and about 2 million barrels per day in early August, according to data cited by Reuters.
Refinery capacity was also damaged or taken offline. Middle Eastern processing was estimated to be 2.9 million barrels per day below pre-war levels in the second quarter, with a further 2.2 million-barrel-per-day shortfall expected in the third quarter. Ukrainian attacks pushed Russian refining close to a two-decade low, while reduced Chinese processing and fuel exports added to the pressure.
That combination mattered because petrol and diesel are refined products, not simply barrels of crude oil. When refineries are damaged or cannot obtain crude, the market can lose diesel even if crude remains available elsewhere. European diesel prices subsequently rose by more than 70% from the start of the war, while the premium paid for European gasoil over Brent reached a record level.
Crude and retail fuel prices do not always move together. Refinery outages, shipping constraints, limited inventories and higher processing margins can keep diesel expensive even when the crude benchmark falls. The U.S. Energy Information Administration expected Brent to average $103 per barrel in the second quarter of 2026 before declining to $70 per barrel in the fourth quarter, illustrating the volatility of the underlying crude market rather than a stable price near $90.
The downstream shortage was especially visible in refining margins. Reuters reported that the European low-sulphur gasoil premium over Brent reached $74.66 per barrel in July, a measure of how expensive diesel had become relative to its crude input. Goldman Sachs also expected refined-fuel margins to remain sharply elevated through 2026 because product markets were tighter than crude markets.
Governments across the region responded with a mixture of price caps, tax changes and emergency supply measures. An EU Council document recorded Croatian diesel at €1.88 per litre on March 30, while later August market data placed Croatia’s average diesel price near €1.835 per litre.
Moldova experienced a separate but related logistics and pricing squeeze. Its regulated diesel price rose to about €1.62 per litre in late July, and the country declared a 30-day energy and water-management alert after reports that dozens of stations had run out of diesel.
These figures should not be treated as a single Europe-wide price or as proof that every country faced identical shortages. They show instead how refinery disruption, transport constraints and national price policies produced different outcomes from one market to another.
The supplied sources clearly document the March 22 introduction of the 50- and 200-litre limits and explain why distributors had already begun restricting sales. They do not provide strong confirmation that Slovenia formally lifted the measure in late May. That date should therefore be treated as unverified rather than presented as an established part of the timeline.
The larger lesson is that a fuel crisis can appear first as empty pumps, queues and purchase limits rather than as empty national warehouses. Slovenia’s intervention was aimed at slowing exceptional retail demand and keeping fuel available across the network while the distribution system adjusted. The continuing European price problem, meanwhile, depended on damaged refineries, constrained shipping routes and reduced product exports—bottlenecks that can take much longer to repair than the initial disruption takes to cause.