The key development was not a confirmed rescue of the Zcash short. On September 17, on-chain monitors reported that a wallet attributed to Garrett Jin withdrew 35,001 ETH—valued at roughly $85 million at the time—from Binance and deposited it into Hyperliquid. At that snapshot, the same attributed wallet was reported to hold a 37,760 ZEC short worth about $51.5 million, with unrealized losses above $26 million and a liquidation price near $2,631.53.
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That deposit gave the trader more potential options, including adding collateral or converting assets to support the position. But it did not demonstrate that the ETH had become margin, that the ZEC short had been increased or reduced, or that liquidation risk had been removed. Lookonchain itself framed the use of the ETH as an open question, and the initial report said there had been no further action with the deposited ETH.
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The ZEC short: from June profit to September losses
The reported trading sequence explains why the ETH movement drew attention:
- June: The wallet was reported to have closed an earlier ZEC short for a realized profit of about $11.24 million.
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- Early July: It reportedly opened a new short of roughly 32,760 ZEC at an average entry near $444.
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- September 7: As ZEC traded above $1,200, trackers estimated the 32,760-ZEC position was about $25.7 million underwater.
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- Same day, additional shorting: On-chain reports said the wallet added 7,000 ZEC around $1,195, increasing reported exposure to 39,760 ZEC, about $47.22 million notional. The reported average entry rose to roughly $576.30 and the then-reported liquidation price was about $2,292.
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- By September 17: Reporting described a later snapshot of 37,760 ZEC, about $51.5 million notional, with losses above $26 million and a liquidation level near $2,631.53.
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These changing numbers are best understood as time-stamped position snapshots rather than necessarily conflicting claims. A short position can change through new entries, partial closes, changes in ZEC’s price, and revised collateral or leverage conditions.
Why adding to a losing short matters
Adding to a short after the asset has risen is a high-conviction strategy, not evidence by itself of the trader’s rationale. It can raise the average entry price, meaning a smaller price decline may be needed for the combined position to become profitable. But it also increases exposure if the asset keeps rising.
That is what happened in the reported September data: the wallet added 7,000 ZEC while already facing more than $24 million in unrealized losses.
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41 Subsequent monitoring reported that, as ZEC moved above $1,400, the related wallet’s short was near $53 million with an average entry around $665.85 and an estimated loss around $28 million; losses were later estimated near $30 million when ZEC exceeded $1,500.
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No source provided establishes Jin’s personal reasoning. The observable pattern is a sustained bearish position with additional size added during a rally. Any claim that he expected a reversal, was deliberately defending a liquidation threshold, or intended to use the ETH as collateral remains inference rather than confirmation.
What the $85 million ETH deposit could—and could not—show
A transfer to a derivatives venue may provide capital that can be deployed for trading or collateral. In this case, it could have increased the wallet’s capacity to manage the ZEC short if the assets were converted or committed as margin.
However, on-chain transfer data alone has limits. It can show that ETH moved from Binance to Hyperliquid; it cannot, without a subsequent traceable action, prove the trader’s intent or precisely identify how the assets were used. The contemporaneous monitoring specifically reported no further action and asked whether the ETH would be sold to support the ZEC short.
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The practical takeaway is straightforward: the deposit may have reduced immediate funding constraints, but it was not proof that the position had been saved. The risk to a short remains tied to ZEC’s price, the account’s effective collateral, leverage, and any later trading activity.
Attribution, BitForex, and the Hyperliquid whale claims
Reports identify Garrett Jin as a former BitForex CEO, with coverage placing him in that role from 2017 to 2020.
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25 Separately, on-chain investigator Eye linked a large Hyperliquid whale to Jin through ENS and wallet-activity analysis. Those links have been reported as allegations based on public blockchain attribution, not independently audited proof of wallet ownership.
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Jin disputed ownership of the funds associated with the whale, saying they were not his; another report said he described the assets as belonging to a client.
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27 That denial matters because the ownership of a pseudonymous wallet cannot be conclusively determined from public transaction history alone.
BitForex ceased operations in February 2024 amid reports that approximately $56.5 million had moved from exchange wallets and that users could not withdraw funds. Some coverage characterized the episode as a suspected exit scam. That description is an allegation in the cited reporting—not proof that Jin personally took customer funds, controlled every wallet associated with BitForex, or financed the ZEC position with any such funds.
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Bottom line
The reported 35,001-ETH transfer was a notable escalation in the resources available to a wallet facing a large, losing ZEC short. It did not, on its own, confirm a margin top-up, a short closure, or a successful defense against liquidation. The most firmly supported account is the trade’s reversal of fortune: an earlier reported $11.24 million ZEC-short profit gave way to a larger renewed short and more than $26 million in unrealized losses as ZEC rallied.
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For anyone following the position, the important evidence is not the headline value of the deposit alone, but whether subsequent on-chain activity shows collateral deployment, ETH conversion, a change in ZEC exposure, or a reduction in liquidation risk.