Global refining is approaching a turning point, but Wood Mackenzie’s forecast does not mean one in five plants will automatically shut. It projects refined-product demand rising from 105 million barrels a day in 2025 to 108 million in 2032, then entering a structural decline. About 20% of existing global refining capacity faces falling or negative operating cash margins, increasing the risk of closure.
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What “20% at risk” means
The figure refers to refining capacity on a weakening financial trajectory—not a list of plants certain to close. A refinery’s prospects depend on whether it can remain competitive as demand changes and whether it can fund investments to adapt. Wood Mackenzie describes the at-risk capacity as facing falling or negative operating net cash margins.
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That is different from a temporary supply disruption. A disruption limits available product for a time; a structural decline means the market is expected to need less refined product over the longer term. A temporary shock may pass, but a shrinking end market presents a more enduring challenge for plants competing to sell their output. The forecast points to the latter risk after the 2032 demand peak.
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Not every product faces the same outlook
The cited Wood Mackenzie material expects gasoline demand to decline while petrochemical feedstock needs rise. It also identifies naphtha and LPG as products that can benefit from petrochemical demand.
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21 That can create different prospects for refineries depending on what they produce and how they are configured.
Those broad trends do not amount to a product-by-product forecast. The available sources do not provide specific demand paths for diesel or jet fuel, or enough detail to quantify how quickly individual products change. Nor does demand for petrochemical feedstocks guarantee strong returns: Wood Mackenzie has separately warned of structural oversupply in petrochemicals.
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Why refinery type matters
Wood Mackenzie divides refineries into five broad archetypes. Its published description identifies large-scale, high-complexity plants as among the most competitive, citing their scale and ability to process a wider range of lower-quality crudes into higher-value products.
1 The source also identifies complex chemical-integrated refineries, but the available description does not establish that integration alone protects a site from weak economics.
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The implication is that the demand peak will not affect every plant equally. Competitive position and the ability to adapt matter; the 20% estimate is a warning about vulnerable capacity, not a uniform verdict on all refineries.
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Why investment decisions are becoming urgent
Wood Mackenzie says that by 2040, only three to four refinery turnaround cycles remain—planned maintenance windows that can also serve as opportunities to make major changes. The firm says this narrows the time available for major investment decisions.
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Its adaptation analysis points to upgrading refinery configurations to turn lower-value crude into higher-value transport fuels, petrochemicals and specialty products.
14 But the available sources do not provide comparable costs or returns for individual projects, so they cannot establish which option is right for a particular plant. The practical choice is whether an investment can improve a refinery’s competitiveness enough to justify its cost and timing.
Why India is still adding capacity
Global decline does not mean every region is already contracting. Wood Mackenzie expects India to account for 40% of global refining-capacity additions through 2030, even as it forecasts a later peak in worldwide refined-product demand.
3 That figure concerns the share of new capacity additions, not India’s share of existing global capacity.
The wider lesson is that refinery risk is uneven. The demand forecast signals a structural challenge for the industry, while the outcome for any individual plant depends on its competitive position and investment choices—not on the 2032 peak alone.
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