North Korea’s military support for Russia is expanding, Ukraine says

Ukraine’s military intelligence says North Korea’s support for Russia has expanded beyond ammunition and frontline manpower. The latest reported contingent in Russia includes about 8,500 personnel, among them 400 experienced drone operators and roughly 1,000 engineers and deminers. Kyiv’s assessment is that most will support Russian positions behind the front, freeing Russian troops for combat elsewhere, while the drone unit could conduct reconnaissance and strikes against targets inside Ukraine.

Those figures are claims by Ukrainian intelligence, not independently verified public findings. North Korea has also rejected the prospect of a major new troop deployment, making the scale and future direction of the partnership uncertain.

What Ukraine says about the 8,500 personnel

According to Maj. Gen. Vadym Skibitskyi, deputy head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, most of the new North Korean contingent is concentrated in Russia’s Kursk region. The group reportedly includes:

• About 400 drone operators, many of whom are described as having operational experience.
• Around 1,000 engineers and deminers, whose work would support Russian positions and logistics.
• Other personnel intended primarily for Russia’s rear areas rather than direct combat on Ukrainian soil.

The strategic effect, in Kyiv’s view, would be indirect as well as tactical. If North Korean troops take over rear-area duties, Russian units could be released for frontline operations. The drone operators could add another layer of surveillance and attack capability, including missions against targets inside Ukraine.

Skibitskyi also said roughly 25,000 North Korean personnel had been deployed to, or rotated through, Russia since the first deployment in late 2024. He assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin could ask North Korean leader Kim Jong Un for as many as 50,000 additional troops during a planned September meeting.

That possible request should not be treated as a confirmed future deployment. Kim Yo Jong has described the larger troop scenario as a “groundless self-fabricated scenario,” according to the reporting supplied for this account.

The drone threat is the newest operational concern

The reported presence of hundreds of North Korean drone operators matters because it suggests a more specialized role than simply supplying troops or artillery ammunition. Ukraine says the unit could use unmanned aircraft for both observation and attacks, potentially extending North Korea’s involvement into the day-to-day targeting cycle of the war.

The available evidence does not establish how many drones have been delivered, what models they are using, or whether the unit has already conducted attacks. The public claim is instead an assessment of what the personnel could do once integrated with Russian forces.

Ballistic missiles and a separate missile deployment

Ukraine has separately reported that North Korea supplied Russia with KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles. Ukrainian intelligence said Russia had received about 150 of the missiles previously and had been promised another 120. A North Korean missile unit deploying in western Russia could eventually operate up to 120 missiles from six launchers.

Reuters reported that a new batch of 40 KN-23 and KN-24 missiles had already been sent to Russia, together with personnel. The final configuration of the unit and the total number of missiles were expected to be settled in high-level talks.

The missile reports are significant because they point to a continuing supply channel for Russian strikes on Ukraine. Ukraine’s Air Force reported that KN-23 missiles were used during the July 29–30 strike period, while President Volodymyr Zelensky said Russia had used a North Korean missile.

A July 30 ballistic-missile strike on Radushne in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast destroyed a residential building and killed six members of one family, including four children, according to the Institute for the Study of War’s account of Ukrainian reporting. Skibitskyi’s more specific attribution of two missiles to that attack remains a Ukrainian intelligence assessment rather than an independently established finding.

Ukraine says newer North Korean missiles may have ranges of up to 800 kilometers but have shown poor accuracy, with some reportedly landing 15–19 kilometers from their intended targets. Kyiv’s assessment is that combat use in Ukraine may help Pyongyang improve missile targeting and payload performance.

What North Korea may be receiving from Russia

The reported relationship is not a one-way transfer of personnel and weapons. Skibitskyi said North Korea had requested Russia’s S-400 air-defense system and had already received a Pantsir-S1 air-defense launcher.

If accurate, the exchange would give Pyongyang access to Russian military equipment and battlefield experience while providing Moscow with additional personnel, drones and ballistic missiles. The available reporting does not independently confirm the full scope or timing of these technology transfers, so they should be understood as intelligence claims.

Why NATO allies are concerned

The concern is broader than the immediate number of North Korean troops in Russia. The reported arrangement could help Russia compensate for manpower shortages and maintain its missile supply, while giving North Korean personnel experience with modern drones, targeting and air-defense systems.

For NATO and its partners in the Indo-Pacific, the potential feedback loop is especially important: North Korea could gain practical combat knowledge and Russian technology, while Russia receives equipment and personnel for its war against Ukraine. The scale of that exchange remains difficult to verify publicly, but the reported cooperation links the European and Korean security environments more closely.

How the US–South Korea drills fit into the story

The developments come as the United States and South Korea shortened the annual Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise. The drills, originally scheduled to run for 10 days, were cut to five days at Washington’s request after President Donald Trump called for a reduction and cited his relationship with Kim Jong Un.

Kim Yo Jong said reducing the drills did not change North Korea’s hostile view of Washington. She also said she was “completely unaware” of whether Kim Jong Un had recently communicated with Trump, despite Trump’s claim that the two had been in contact. That is a public contradiction between the accounts, not proof that no communication occurred.

What is known—and what is still uncertain

The strongest conclusion supported by the available reporting is that Ukraine sees North Korea’s role in Russia’s war becoming more specialized. The reported support now includes:

• Personnel for rear-area duties;
• Drone operators who could support reconnaissance and attacks;
• Engineers and deminers;
• KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles;
• A possible North Korean missile unit in western Russia; and
• Alleged Russian air-defense transfers to Pyongyang.

But the central numbers and attributions remain contested. The 8,500-person total, the cumulative figure of 25,000 personnel, the possible request for 50,000 more troops, the number of missiles delivered, the precise responsibility for the July 30 strike and the reported transfers of Russian technology are not all independently established. They should be presented as Ukrainian intelligence assessments, corroborated in some cases by reporting from other outlets, rather than as settled facts.