Iran Is Reassembling Ballistic Missiles Underground, WSJ Reports

U.S. and Middle Eastern officials told The Wall Street Journal that Iran has resumed assembling ballistic missiles in underground facilities using stockpiled components. The reported activity suggests that U.S. and Israeli strikes severely damaged Iran’s missile-industrial base without eliminating Tehran’s ability to field missiles or rebuild a portion of its arsenal. 1

What the report says Iran is doing

According to the Journal’s reporting, Iran is assembling both liquid-propellant missiles and solid-propellant missiles underground. The distinction matters: liquid-fueled missiles must be fueled shortly before launch, while solid-fueled missiles can be stored ready to fire. 1

The work is reportedly being done with components accumulated before the strikes, rather than through a demonstrated return to full-scale manufacturing. The report identifies underground facilities as the setting for that assembly, including reporting connected to the Khojir military complex. 1

Damage was significant—but the capability was not erased

U.S. Central Command said in March that more than two-thirds of Iran’s missile, drone and naval manufacturing capabilities had been compromised or eradicated. 9 The Journal’s newer reporting does not negate the damage. Instead, it indicates that damage to factories and known sites did not necessarily remove every usable component, production skill or sheltered assembly location. 1

That creates an important distinction:

• Industrial recovery means restoring the ability to manufacture major inputs and missiles at sustained scale.
• Assembly from stockpiles means turning surviving components into usable weapons even while broader manufacturing remains constrained.

The current reporting supports the second conclusion more clearly than the first. 1

The scale of Iran’s recovery remains uncertain

The most consequential unanswered question is how many missiles Iran can assemble from remaining stocks. Officials cited by the Journal did not establish whether the inventory could sustain production of only hundreds of missiles or extend into the thousands. 1

Iran’s ability to import materials for solid-propellant production is also described as a constraint. That means an underground restart should not be treated as evidence that Tehran has fully restored its previous output or solved its longer-term supply problems. 1

Why underground facilities change the assessment

Iran has long invested in underground missile facilities intended to protect launchers, stockpiles and related activity from airstrikes. 8 The Journal reports that Tehran is seeking additional underground sites, a move that could make future targeting and post-strike assessments more difficult. 1

Buried and dispersed infrastructure does not make a missile force invulnerable; the strikes reportedly damaged many Iranian facilities. But it can preserve enough equipment, inventory and assembly capacity to complicate claims that a missile enterprise has been permanently destroyed. 18

Tension with earlier U.S. assessments

The reported assembly activity sits uneasily beside earlier U.S. statements about the extent of the damage. Central Command said it had compromised or eradicated more than two-thirds of Iran’s relevant manufacturing capabilities. 9 Those assessments may accurately describe major losses at identified facilities, while the newer intelligence points to surviving capacity outside—or below—the most visible parts of that industrial system. 1

The Journal’s account therefore supports a narrower conclusion: Iran’s missile program appears to have been degraded substantially, but not rendered incapable of replenishment. 1

Why the remaining missiles still matter

Iran’s continued ability to threaten U.S. forces highlights the operational significance of a smaller surviving arsenal. The Journal reported that three Iranian missiles struck Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan during a 24-hour period; reporting on the episode said two U.S. service members were killed and a third was presumed dead. 312

That does not prove those particular weapons came from the newly reported assembly effort. It does show why the difference between a destroyed missile industry and a degraded-but-functioning one is strategically important.

Bottom line

The Journal’s reporting does not show that Iran has returned to prewar missile production levels. It does show, according to officials familiar with the intelligence, that Tehran can assemble some liquid- and solid-fueled ballistic missiles from stockpiled components in underground locations. 1

For policymakers and regional militaries, the implication is straightforward: destroying visible factories can sharply reduce output, but it may not eliminate a missile threat built around dispersed stockpiles, sheltered assembly and underground infrastructure. The eventual scale and durability of Iran’s recovery remain unresolved. 18