Russia’s Expanding Drone Network Is Designed for Scale—and Could Reach NATO

At least 59 rails were identified across the network, and roughly 20 appeared long enough to accommodate larger, newer Geran models. Seven of the 10 sites were reportedly associated with recent attacks on Kyiv, linking the construction activity to Russia’s current operational campaign rather than treating it as a purely future capability.

Satellite reporting on the Tsimbulova site in Russia’s Oryol region offers a useful example of the change. Two rails there were reported to be about 85 metres long, an apparent adaptation for jet-powered drones.

Why dispersed launch sites matter for Ukraine

A larger number of launch locations gives Russia more options for staging attacks and complicates Ukrainian efforts to locate and strike launch infrastructure. Sites closer to Ukraine can also reduce flight distance, allowing more drones to be sent in waves and forcing air defenses to manage a broader, less predictable threat.

The practical pressure was visible in the overnight attack of August 16–17. Ukraine’s Air Force reported that Russia launched 128 Shahed-type, Gerbera and Parodiya decoy UAVs from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, Primorsko-Akhtarsk and occupied Donetsk. Ukrainian forces said they neutralized 106, while impacts were recorded at 14 locations.

“Neutralized” includes drones shot down or suppressed by air-defense and electronic-warfare systems; it does not mean that every threat was destroyed before causing damage. The figures therefore show both the reach of Ukrainian defenses and the difficulty of stopping every drone in a large mixed attack.

The technology is changing, too

Russia is not simply adding more launch positions for the same aircraft. Reporting indicates a shift toward faster, jet-powered Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones, which are intended to make interception more difficult. Ukrainian intelligence reporting cited by the Institute for the Study of War said Russia was refocusing production toward these newer variants.

Other reporting has described a jet-powered BM-35 capable of more than 350 km/h and a range of more than 200 kilometres. Those figures come from reports about Russian claims and Ukrainian assessments, so they should be treated cautiously rather than as independently verified specifications.

The broader direction is nevertheless consistent: Russia is adapting its drones to increase speed and complicate the work of Ukrainian interceptor aircraft, helicopters, drones and ground-based air defenses. The reported use of decoys alongside strike drones adds another way to consume defensive capacity.

What the NATO range claim means

The newer Geran variants are reported to have a range that could put Warsaw and other NATO locations within theoretical reach from some of the identified bases. The investigation’s significance is therefore not that an attack on Warsaw or the Baltic states is imminent, but that Russia is building infrastructure capable of supporting a wider regional strike option.

That distinction matters. A launch site, a drone’s reported maximum range and a target’s position demonstrate potential—not intent. They do, however, create a planning problem for NATO: air-defense coverage, surveillance, early warning and intelligence sharing become more important when launch capacity is distributed across multiple sites.

Separate warnings from Lithuania’s defence minister have raised the possibility of Russian provocations or false-flag attacks involving Ukrainian-made drones and critical infrastructure in the Baltic region. Those warnings merit attention, but they are not evidence that Russia is preparing an imminent attack on NATO.

The strategic takeaway

The clearest conclusion from the investigation is that Russia is institutionalizing drone warfare. The combination of new bases, dozens of launch rails, larger jet-powered designs and ongoing production points to a sustained campaign model rather than occasional improvised attacks.

For Ukraine, that means more launch points to monitor and potentially larger or faster salvos to defeat. For NATO, it means a growing conventional strike capability on the alliance’s eastern flank. The evidence supports concern about Russia’s expanding options—but not the stronger claim that the new bases prove an imminent decision to attack NATO.