Ukraine’s Spy Chief Says Russia Could Sustain the War Until 2028—at a Growing Cost

Ukraine’s military-intelligence chief, Lieutenant General Oleh Ivashchenko, offered a qualified forecast: Russia still has the resources to continue its full-scale war against Ukraine in the near term, potentially through 2027, but its ability to do so could be exhausted in 2028 if military and economic losses continue to mount at the current pace. 711

The key point is not that Russia would necessarily stop fighting on a fixed date. It is that, in Ivashchenko’s assessment, the Kremlin’s war effort is becoming progressively harder to replenish and finance.

The manpower gap at the center of the forecast

Ivashchenko said Russia is recruiting roughly 1,000 to 1,200 people a day. He contrasted that with reported daily battlefield losses of around 1,400 to 1,500 personnel. 89

If those figures are accurate and sustained, losses would exceed new recruitment. That does not mean Russia immediately lacks troops: it can alter recruitment incentives, shift force-generation methods, or change how it commits units. But the gap is central to Ivashchenko’s argument that Russia is consuming manpower faster than it replaces it. 1011

He cited daily casualty examples of 1,410 and 1,551 personnel, while saying roughly 60% of those losses were killed in action. 520

What he projected over the next 18 months

Ivashchenko’s assessment included a projected additional 765,800 Russian personnel killed or wounded over 18 months of continued fighting. He said that, combined with earlier losses, the total would approach 10% of Russia’s male population. 19

These are Ukrainian intelligence estimates, not a settled or independently confirmed accounting. Precise wartime casualty totals are inherently difficult to verify; reporting on broader Russia-Ukraine war estimates has noted that the confirmed total remains elusive. 23

Still, the projection illustrates the demographic concern behind Ivashchenko’s warning: a prolonged high-casualty war can impose costs that stretch beyond the battlefield, affecting the available labor force, recruitment pool and public willingness to bear further losses.

Morale and willingness to fight

Ivashchenko described morale in Russian ranks as “very low” and said willingness to fight was weakening. 34

Morale is difficult to measure comprehensively in an active war, but in his analysis it compounds the numerical manpower problem. A force can continue to generate recruits while facing lower motivation, higher attrition and greater pressure to offer financial incentives to attract replacements.

Why 2028 was a conditional deadline

The 2028 timeframe was not presented as a certainty. Ivashchenko said Russia had military and economic resources for the coming year, but that they could be exhausted in 2028 if military and economic losses continued to increase at roughly the same rate. 79

That qualification matters. The trajectory could change with shifts in battlefield intensity, recruitment, mobilization, external supplies, sanctions enforcement, military production or political decisions in Moscow. Ivashchenko’s forecast is therefore best read as a warning about the direction of Russia’s war capacity rather than a calendar-based guarantee.

Russia could still intensify attacks in the meantime

A deteriorating long-term outlook would not prevent Russia from maintaining—or escalating—attacks in the short term. Ivashchenko warned of possible intensified autumn and winter strikes against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, including thermal power facilities, alongside drone and missile attacks. 1

That is the practical implication of his assessment: Russia may face an increasingly difficult sustainability problem while still retaining substantial capacity to inflict damage. The forecast argues for continued pressure on the inputs that support Russian military production, not for assuming the war is close to an automatic conclusion. 111