ISW Says Ukraine Has Contested Russia’s Battlefield Initiative Since March

ISW’s September 12, 2026 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment described a meaningful change in the battlefield balance: Ukrainian forces had, in its assessment, contested the strategic and operational initiative from late 2025 through 2026 and held Russian forces to near-zero net territorial gains since March. ISW framed this as the first sustained shift of its kind since the August 2024 Kursk offensive. 3

That is a judgment about momentum, not a declaration that the war was nearing a conclusion. Russia retained positions and continued offensive activity in several sectors, while its strikes on Ukrainian civilians and infrastructure continued.

What ISW meant by a contested initiative

A contested initiative means Ukraine was not simply reacting to Russian attacks or winning isolated engagements. ISW argued that Ukrainian counteroffensives in the Kupyansk, Oleksandrivka, and Lyman directions were forcing Russia to respond, limiting the practical effect of Russian advances, and complicating Moscow’s wider operational plans. 3

ISW credited these operations with defeating Russian efforts to push into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and with recovering lost ground near Kupyansk. Earlier ISW reporting said Ukrainian forces had liberated at least 129.81 square kilometers during counteroffensive activity in August alone. 46

The assessment’s broader estimate placed the area reclaimed by Ukrainian counterattacks at roughly 150 to 250 square kilometers. Russia still made limited gains near Kostyantynivka and east of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, but ISW judged that these did not add up to a decisive advance against Ukraine’s heavily defended Donetsk “Fortress Belt.” 3

Why the Lyman sector mattered

The Lyman fighting was important because Russia’s operations there were connected to an intended wider encirclement of the Fortress Belt. ISW assessed that Ukrainian counterattacks had eliminated the Russian salient north of Lyman, pushed Russian forces back toward the Zherebets River, and disrupted the northern element of that plan. 3

The picture remained contested at the tactical level. ISW noted that Russian sources themselves disagreed over the salient’s status, although one Russian military blogger said Ukrainian counterattacks along a broad front had forced Russian forces onto the defensive north of Lyman. 2

Russia’s force-generation problem

ISW also presented Russian manpower as a growing constraint on sustaining or expanding offensive operations. It cited reports that Russian generals had requested an additional 800,000 personnel, while reported daily recruitment of about 1,000 to 1,200 people lagged behind Russian casualty rates. The assessment further cited an estimate that roughly 60 percent of Russian casualties were killed in action. 3

Even without a publicly announced formal mobilization, ISW assessed that Russia faced practical limits in training, equipping, organizing, and absorbing additional recruits. In other words, acquiring personnel would not by itself solve the problem of turning them into effective combat formations. 3

Refinery strikes added pressure

Ukraine’s campaign against Russian energy infrastructure was another part of ISW’s analysis. The assessment said Ukrainian strikes had hit at least 26 Russian refineries, reducing Russian oil-processing capacity by about 30 percent and nearly halting refined-product exports. ISW assessed that this could increase pressure on Russia’s ability to finance and sustain the war effort. 3

These estimates should be read as ISW’s assessment of an evolving campaign, not as a guarantee of a permanent effect: repair capacity, air defenses, future strikes, and global energy conditions can all change the outcome.

The Donetsk timetable looked unrealistic at August’s pace

The report’s sharpest strategic implication concerned Moscow’s reported aim of taking the remaining Ukrainian-held territory in Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2026. ISW calculated that, if Russia continued at its August 2026 rate of advance, it would take until roughly October 2032 to seize that territory. 3

That calculation was an illustration based on one month’s rate, not a prediction that battlefield conditions would remain fixed for six years. Its point was narrower: Russia’s pace at that time was far out of line with its stated deadline.

Bottom line

ISW’s conclusion was that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations had imposed a sustained strategic cost on Russia: they reduced Russia’s net territorial progress, disrupted a key Lyman-to-Donetsk operational concept, and exposed the manpower and economic burdens behind Russia’s offensive posture. 3

The assessment did not minimize the continuing danger. Russia retained the capacity to fight and to strike Ukraine. But ISW found that Ukraine had moved the war away from a picture of uninterrupted Russian momentum and toward a contested campaign in which Moscow’s objectives faced major time, manpower, and resource constraints. 3