A separate point of friction has involved court orders affecting online platforms and political speech. In 2025, the Trump administration warned Moraes over an order involving a right-wing video platform, arguing that the directive lacked validity in the United States.
Moraes played a central judicial role in proceedings connected to allegations that Bolsonaro and his supporters sought to overturn Bolsonaro’s defeat in Brazil’s 2022 presidential election. The case ultimately led to Bolsonaro’s conviction and imprisonment, according to reporting cited in the account of the renewed sanctions discussions.
Moraes was also described as spearheading an inquiry into claims that Bolsonaro and his allies conspired to carry out a coup after the election. Bolsonaro has rejected the allegations and criticized Moraes.
That role made the justice a political target for Bolsonaro’s supporters—and a focal point for U.S. pressure—while Brazilian officials have treated the proceedings as matters for the country’s own courts.
On July 30, 2025, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control designated Moraes under Executive Order 13818, which implements the Global Magnitsky human-rights sanctions framework. Treasury accused him of using his position to authorize arbitrary pre-trial detentions and suppress freedom of expression.
A designation can block property and interests in property within U.S. jurisdiction and generally prohibits U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with the designated person. The restrictions therefore extend beyond a political statement: they can create practical compliance and financial consequences for entities subject to U.S. law.
On September 22, 2025, the administration expanded the action to Moraes’s wife, Viviane Barci de Moraes, and Lex Instituto de Estudos Jurídicos, a family-linked holding company. The State Department described them as part of Moraes’s support network, while Treasury identified the wife as the institute’s head.
Brazilian officials condemned the sanctions as unacceptable interference in the country’s judicial system. The controversy centered on whether a U.S. human-rights sanctions tool was being used to pressure a sitting judge over decisions made within Brazil’s legal and political system.
Washington presented a different rationale, focusing on alleged abuses of judicial power, arbitrary detention and restrictions on expression. The competing explanations made the sanctions unusually difficult to separate from the Bolsonaro case and the broader political conflict between the Trump administration and Bolsonaro’s allies.
The dispute also overlapped with trade pressure. Analysts said that the combination of measures against Bolsonaro and sanctions against Moraes left little room for negotiation over U.S. tariffs on Brazilian goods.
OFAC removed Moraes, Viviane Barci de Moraes and the Lex Institute from its sanctions list on December 12, 2025. The official notice records the deletions but does not provide a substantive explanation for why they occurred.
Contemporaneous reporting connected the move with an easing of U.S. tariffs and broader diplomatic tensions, but the available official evidence does not establish a single definitive reason for the reversal.
That distinction matters: the sanctions were formally lifted, but the underlying disagreements over Brazil’s courts, political speech and the Bolsonaro proceedings were not necessarily resolved.
If the United States reinstated sanctions, the step would represent a renewed escalation rather than a routine legal development. Possible consequences could include asset blocking and restrictions on transactions involving Moraes or other designated parties, depending on the scope of any new action.
Brazil’s stated position in the earlier dispute was that U.S. sanctions amounted to interference in its judicial affairs. A new designation would therefore be likely to deepen the sovereignty dispute, even though Brazil’s specific response has not been confirmed.
The economic effects would also extend beyond Moraes personally. Renewed sanctions could increase compliance costs for banks and companies, add uncertainty for cross-border transactions and make it harder to separate trade negotiations from political retaliation. With tariff disputes already affecting the relationship, another sanctions episode could further narrow the space for diplomatic and commercial dialogue.
For now, the key fact is narrower than some political claims suggest: the FT reported that new sanctions had been discussed, not that they had been approved. Whether Washington proceeds—and how Brasília responds—will determine whether the episode becomes another short-lived pressure tactic or a new phase in the U.S.–Brazil dispute.
A separate point of friction has involved court orders affecting online platforms and political speech. In 2025, the Trump administration warned Moraes over an order involving a right-wing video platform, arguing that the directive lacked validity in the United States.
Moraes played a central judicial role in proceedings connected to allegations that Bolsonaro and his supporters sought to overturn Bolsonaro’s defeat in Brazil’s 2022 presidential election. The case ultimately led to Bolsonaro’s conviction and imprisonment, according to reporting cited in the account of the renewed sanctions discussions.
Moraes was also described as spearheading an inquiry into claims that Bolsonaro and his allies conspired to carry out a coup after the election. Bolsonaro has rejected the allegations and criticized Moraes.
That role made the justice a political target for Bolsonaro’s supporters—and a focal point for U.S. pressure—while Brazilian officials have treated the proceedings as matters for the country’s own courts.
On July 30, 2025, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control designated Moraes under Executive Order 13818, which implements the Global Magnitsky human-rights sanctions framework. Treasury accused him of using his position to authorize arbitrary pre-trial detentions and suppress freedom of expression.
A designation can block property and interests in property within U.S. jurisdiction and generally prohibits U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with the designated person. The restrictions therefore extend beyond a political statement: they can create practical compliance and financial consequences for entities subject to U.S. law.
On September 22, 2025, the administration expanded the action to Moraes’s wife, Viviane Barci de Moraes, and Lex Instituto de Estudos Jurídicos, a family-linked holding company. The State Department described them as part of Moraes’s support network, while Treasury identified the wife as the institute’s head.
Brazilian officials condemned the sanctions as unacceptable interference in the country’s judicial system. The controversy centered on whether a U.S. human-rights sanctions tool was being used to pressure a sitting judge over decisions made within Brazil’s legal and political system.
Washington presented a different rationale, focusing on alleged abuses of judicial power, arbitrary detention and restrictions on expression. The competing explanations made the sanctions unusually difficult to separate from the Bolsonaro case and the broader political conflict between the Trump administration and Bolsonaro’s allies.
The dispute also overlapped with trade pressure. Analysts said that the combination of measures against Bolsonaro and sanctions against Moraes left little room for negotiation over U.S. tariffs on Brazilian goods.
OFAC removed Moraes, Viviane Barci de Moraes and the Lex Institute from its sanctions list on December 12, 2025. The official notice records the deletions but does not provide a substantive explanation for why they occurred.
Contemporaneous reporting connected the move with an easing of U.S. tariffs and broader diplomatic tensions, but the available official evidence does not establish a single definitive reason for the reversal.
That distinction matters: the sanctions were formally lifted, but the underlying disagreements over Brazil’s courts, political speech and the Bolsonaro proceedings were not necessarily resolved.
If the United States reinstated sanctions, the step would represent a renewed escalation rather than a routine legal development. Possible consequences could include asset blocking and restrictions on transactions involving Moraes or other designated parties, depending on the scope of any new action.
Brazil’s stated position in the earlier dispute was that U.S. sanctions amounted to interference in its judicial affairs. A new designation would therefore be likely to deepen the sovereignty dispute, even though Brazil’s specific response has not been confirmed.
The economic effects would also extend beyond Moraes personally. Renewed sanctions could increase compliance costs for banks and companies, add uncertainty for cross-border transactions and make it harder to separate trade negotiations from political retaliation. With tariff disputes already affecting the relationship, another sanctions episode could further narrow the space for diplomatic and commercial dialogue.
For now, the key fact is narrower than some political claims suggest: the FT reported that new sanctions had been discussed, not that they had been approved. Whether Washington proceeds—and how Brasília responds—will determine whether the episode becomes another short-lived pressure tactic or a new phase in the U.S.–Brazil dispute.