Thailand Says It Will Stay Neutral in the U.S.-China AI Rivalry

The same logic applies to security ties. A report on the Thai position said Anutin viewed Thai-U.S. security cooperation as separate from trade discussions, suggesting that Bangkok wants to compartmentalize its relationships rather than let one policy area dictate all others.

That does not guarantee that neutrality will carry no cost. If Washington ultimately makes access to specific AI projects, export controls or supply-chain cooperation conditional on political alignment, Thailand could face practical choices even while formally maintaining a neutral position. The available reporting, however, describes a proposed U.S. policy rather than a confirmed penalty already imposed on Thailand.

Thai officials emphasize domestic AI capacity

Thailand’s response has not been limited to diplomacy. Higher Education, Science, Research and Innovation Minister Yodchanan Wongsawat said Thailand should focus on developing its own AI capabilities instead of simply choosing between the U.S. and Chinese systems.

That goal is consistent with Thailand’s semiconductor ambitions. The Siam Silica Framework is intended to build domestic high-tech capacity while connecting Thailand more closely to the wider ASEAN supply chain. Its roadmap includes photonics fabrication, advanced packaging, silicon design, quantum photonics and power devices.

The strategy also sets 2030 targets for eight integrated-circuit design companies, one semiconductor fabrication facility and two advanced packaging centres. These targets do not make Thailand technologically independent overnight, but they show why preserving access to multiple partners matters to Bangkok: domestic capacity can strengthen bargaining power while reducing excessive dependence on either side.

Pax Silica and WAICO: why the choice matters

The reported U.S. pressure centers on two competing technology frameworks. Pax Silica is a U.S.-backed, nonbinding initiative intended to coordinate partners around AI and semiconductor-related cooperation. Reuters reported that Washington’s draft warned participating countries against joining rival initiatives associated with China and could exclude them from the U.S.-led coalition.

China’s World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization, or WAICO, was launched in Shanghai in July 2026 as an alternative platform for international AI cooperation. Several Southeast Asian governments participated in the surrounding diplomacy; reporting identified five Southeast Asian countries among WAICO’s founding members, while Thailand’s prime minister attended the conference but did not sign the organization.

Thailand’s official foreign ministry also reported Anutin’s participation in the World Artificial Intelligence Conference in China, where he commended China’s role in digital technology and AI while reaffirming Thailand’s readiness to cooperate. That engagement illustrates the distinction Bangkok is trying to maintain: cooperation with China does not necessarily equal strategic alignment with Beijing, just as security cooperation with the United States does not automatically require exclusive participation in every U.S.-led technology framework.

The wider lesson for middle powers

The dispute is about more than AI standards. The competing frameworks are connected to chips, critical minerals, AI models, export controls, joint projects and the supply chains needed to develop advanced systems. Reuters reported that the U.S. strategy aims to deepen cooperation among partners while reducing reliance on China in those areas.

Thailand’s position shows the appeal—and the difficulty—of strategic autonomy for developing and middle-income countries. Keeping both doors open can support access to investment, technology and markets. But as the two ecosystems become more exclusive, neutrality may become harder to practice in operational terms.

For now, Bangkok’s answer is to separate the policy tracks: remain neutral in AI geopolitics, continue trade negotiations with Washington, preserve security cooperation, engage with regional and Chinese technology initiatives, and invest in domestic capability. Whether that balance survives a more explicit U.S.-China technology divide will depend less on Thailand’s stated neutrality than on the conditions attached to access to each side’s ecosystem.