Teodoro vs. Kao: A Fractured ASEAN Exposed at the 2026 Shangri-La Dialogue

Kao’s Institutional Optimism

In a separate appearance at the same dialogue, ASEAN Secretary-General Kao Kim Hourn projected a very different message. He expressed optimism that the COC negotiations could conclude this year, stressing that both ASEAN member states and China remain "committed to advancing the talks" . Kao reiterated that finalizing the agreement by 2026 serves the strategic interests of all parties involved and that the work plans are in motion .

Kao’s optimism is consistent with his earlier public statements. In late 2025, he dismissed the idea that bilateral tensions between the Philippines and China were among the substantive issues delaying the COC, stating he had "every confidence" the text would be finalized . His tone reflects the ASEAN Secretariat’s traditional role of keeping diplomatic processes alive and publicly on track, even when private disagreements among members and with Beijing persist. This institutional stance also dovetails with Beijing’s diplomatic messaging; Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Kao in July 2025 to call for the two sides to complete the COC on schedule, framing it as a key area of cooperation .

The glaring tonal gap between a defence secretary who sees negotiations as a Chinese trap and a secretary-general who sees them as a viable near-term goal illustrates the balancing act that defines ASEAN-led diplomacy on maritime security.

The State of the Stalled Negotiations

The public drama should not obscure the substantive impasse. Though ASEAN and China finalized a single draft negotiating text in 2022—often cited as a milestone—the text remains confidential, and multiple critical disputes are unresolved:

• Legal status: Crucially, the U.S. State Department and several analysts have noted that a COC must go beyond a non-binding document to be effective, yet whether it will legally bind the parties—especially China—remains a central sticking point .
• Geographic scope: It is unclear whether the COC will cover the entirety of the South China Sea or just areas directly claimed by both ASEAN states and China, a distinction with significant implications for contested features like the Spratly Islands.
• Military and construction activities: Provisions on restrictions for military exercises, island building, and the deployment of security personnel on disputed features are among the most contentious areas.

The 2026 ASEAN Chair, Malaysia, has reportedly made the COC a priority, pushing for a final draft during its tenure . Yet, as of June 2026, there is no public evidence of a finalized, agreed text. Kao himself has acknowledged that negotiating the text "is not an easy task" and that "many issues need to be resolved" .