Newzoo analyst Emmanuel Rosier argues that Epic Games Store’s planned overhaul may be “too little, too late” against Steam’s entrenched ecosystem. Rosier’s concern is conversion: free game giveaways may create account log ins and large libraries without building regular play or paid purchasing on Epic.
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Research answer

Create a landscape editorial hero image for this Studio Global article: What did Newzoo market-intelligence director Emmanuel Rosier argue about the Epic Games Store’s realistic prospects of challenging Steam des. Article summary: Rosier’s core view was that a faster, more polished Epic Games Store is probably “too little, too late” to become a serious Steam challenger: Steam has become the default, effectively unavoidable PC-game library and mark. Topic tags: general, general web, user generated. Style: premium digital editorial illustration, source-backed research mood, clean composition, high detail, modern web publication hero. Use reference image context only for broad subject, composition, and topical grounding; do not copy the exact image. Avoid: logos, brand marks, copyrighted characters, real person likenesses, fake screenshots, UI text, readable text, watermarks, charts with fa
Epic Games Store is not a failed storefront by every measure. Epic reported a record 78 million monthly active users in December 2025, $1.16 billion in total player spending for the year, and a 57% year-over-year increase in third-party spending to $400 million. 4
5
7
Those numbers make the debate more complicated—but they do not automatically answer the strategic question: can Epic turn growth into a durable challenge to Steam?
Newzoo director of market intelligence Emmanuel Rosier’s answer is pessimistic. He argued that a faster, cleaner Epic launcher could be “too little, too late” because Steam has become an effectively unavoidable part of PC gaming. 6
Epic’s planned overhaul is aimed at several long-standing storefront frustrations. The company has discussed a faster launcher, a redesigned store, personalized recommendations, easier browsing and patch notes displayed on store pages. 1
6
Those changes could make Epic Games Store more pleasant to use. Rosier’s argument is that usability improvements alone may not be enough to change where PC players organize their games, buy new releases and return regularly.
Steam’s advantage, in this framing, is accumulated behavior. Players already have libraries, purchasing histories and established routines there. A rival can copy individual features, but it is much harder to persuade users to split their libraries or make a different storefront their default. Rosier described Steam as so entrenched that Epic may struggle to recover its position even with a better product. 6
That is an assessment of market structure, not proof that Epic cannot grow. It also does not establish that every Steam feature or network effect is independently responsible for the gap; the broader explanation is an inference from Rosier’s comments about Steam’s inevitability.
Epic’s giveaways are effective at attracting attention and encouraging people to create or revisit accounts. Rosier questioned what happens after the claim, however. His concern is that some users log in to add a free title to their library without playing it, building a collection rather than a lasting habit on the store. 6
The conversion problem has a second layer. A player might claim a free game on Epic but later purchase it on Steam, where the rest of the player’s active library already lives. In that case, the promotion creates awareness and an Epic account while the eventual paid transaction benefits Steam. Rosier presented that possibility as an example of how a giveaway could fail to move meaningful market share—and, in some cases, help a game sell on Steam instead. 6
The available evidence does not quantify how often this happens. The point is therefore best understood as a strategic risk, not a measured causal result.
Epic’s reported figures directly complicate the harshest version of Rosier’s criticism:
Together, those figures show that Epic has substantial reach and that users do buy and play games made by companies other than Epic. They make it difficult to claim that free-game claimants never become active players.
But the figures do not settle the Steam comparison. Monthly active users and total spending do not show how many people use Epic as their primary storefront, how many are returning purchasers rather than promotion-driven visitors, or whether Epic is taking share from Steam. They also do not show whether the reported growth can continue without aggressive incentives.
The most defensible conclusion is narrower: Epic is demonstrating momentum, while the available figures do not yet demonstrate that it is dislodging Steam as the default PC marketplace.
Epic Games Store vice president and general manager Martin Keely rejected Rosier’s conclusion, arguing that the data tells a different story. Epic pointed to the 2.78 billion hours spent in third-party games and the 57% increase in third-party spending, adding that the improved launcher planned for 2026 could accelerate that momentum. 1
The product response focuses on reducing friction: faster loading, better recommendations, more useful category browsing and patch notes integrated into store pages. 1
6 These features address the everyday reasons a storefront can feel inconvenient, but their impact on long-term switching behavior remains unproven.
The supplied evidence does not independently establish the timing or implementation status of reviews, universal controller support or specific leadership changes beyond Keely’s identified role and public response. Those details should not be treated as confirmed parts of the overhaul without stronger documentation.
Rosier’s criticism extends beyond the launcher. He argued that Epic has been trying to compete with Steam while also fighting Apple and Google Play, creating a risk that the company spreads its resources and attention too thinly. 6
Other commonly cited risks are less firmly supported by the available evidence. Exclusivity deals may bring players to Epic for a particular release but could also create resentment or encourage them to return to Steam later; the supplied sources do not quantify that effect. Similarly, the claim that Tim Sweeney’s social-media presence damages Epic Games Store adoption or spending is not established by the provided reporting.
That distinction matters. Epic may face real strategic liabilities, but not every plausible criticism has been measured.
Rosier was more positive about Epic’s Fortnite strategy, saying its recent performance appeared stronger than it had six months to a year earlier. He highlighted a renewed focus on crossover cosmetics, including collaborations involving Sonic the Hedgehog, Pac-Man, Kingdom Hearts’ Sora and Persona 5’s Joker. 6
Fortnite gives Epic something the storefront does not have to build from scratch: a large, visible live-service platform that can turn cultural partnerships into direct engagement. Crossovers can bring fans of outside franchises into Fortnite and keep attention inside Epic’s ecosystem.
That makes Fortnite a different strategic proposition from Epic Games Store. The store must persuade players to change or divide an established purchasing habit. Fortnite can use its existing audience and marketing surface to create new reasons to return. That comparison is an analytical inference from Rosier’s assessment, not a direct measurement of the relative financial returns of the two strategies.
Epic Games Store’s overhaul is important because a slow or awkward launcher makes the Steam habit even harder to break. But a better interface is only the first step. Epic still needs to convert giveaway-driven visits into repeat play, paid third-party purchases and a default-storefront relationship.
Epic’s 2025 results show that this conversion is happening to a meaningful extent: third-party spending and playtime reached record levels, while monthly active users hit a new peak. 1
4
5
7 They do not yet show that Epic has overcome Steam’s entrenched position.
Rosier’s core thesis therefore survives the rebuttal in a qualified form. Epic is growing, but growth is not the same as replacement. Unless the launcher overhaul changes everyday behavior—not just download counts and giveaway claims—Fortnite may remain Epic’s stronger path to sustained engagement than a direct attempt to become Steam’s equal.
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Newzoo analyst Emmanuel Rosier argues that Epic Games Store’s planned overhaul may be “too little, too late” against Steam’s entrenched ecosystem.
Newzoo analyst Emmanuel Rosier argues that Epic Games Store’s planned overhaul may be “too little, too late” against Steam’s entrenched ecosystem. Rosier’s concern is conversion: free game giveaways may create account log ins and large libraries without building regular play or paid purchasing on Epic.
Epic disputes that assessment, pointing to 2.78 billion hours played in third party games during 2025 and a 57% rise in third party spending.
Newzoo analyst Emmanuel Rosier argues that Epic Games Store’s planned overhaul may be “too little, too late” against Steam’s entrenched ecosystem. Rosier’s concern is conversion: free game giveaways may create account log ins and large libraries without building regular play or paid purchasing on Epic.
Published byEdited with GPT-5.6 LunaImages generated with GPT Image 1.5
Research answer

Create a landscape editorial hero image for this Studio Global article: What did Newzoo market-intelligence director Emmanuel Rosier argue about the Epic Games Store’s realistic prospects of challenging Steam des. Article summary: Rosier’s core view was that a faster, more polished Epic Games Store is probably “too little, too late” to become a serious Steam challenger: Steam has become the default, effectively unavoidable PC-game library and mark. Topic tags: general, general web, user generated. Style: premium digital editorial illustration, source-backed research mood, clean composition, high detail, modern web publication hero. Use reference image context only for broad subject, composition, and topical grounding; do not copy the exact image. Avoid: logos, brand marks, copyrighted characters, real person likenesses, fake screenshots, UI text, readable text, watermarks, charts with fa
Epic Games Store is not a failed storefront by every measure. Epic reported a record 78 million monthly active users in December 2025, $1.16 billion in total player spending for the year, and a 57% year-over-year increase in third-party spending to $400 million. 4
5
7
Those numbers make the debate more complicated—but they do not automatically answer the strategic question: can Epic turn growth into a durable challenge to Steam?
Newzoo director of market intelligence Emmanuel Rosier’s answer is pessimistic. He argued that a faster, cleaner Epic launcher could be “too little, too late” because Steam has become an effectively unavoidable part of PC gaming. 6
Epic’s planned overhaul is aimed at several long-standing storefront frustrations. The company has discussed a faster launcher, a redesigned store, personalized recommendations, easier browsing and patch notes displayed on store pages. 1
6
Those changes could make Epic Games Store more pleasant to use. Rosier’s argument is that usability improvements alone may not be enough to change where PC players organize their games, buy new releases and return regularly.
Steam’s advantage, in this framing, is accumulated behavior. Players already have libraries, purchasing histories and established routines there. A rival can copy individual features, but it is much harder to persuade users to split their libraries or make a different storefront their default. Rosier described Steam as so entrenched that Epic may struggle to recover its position even with a better product. 6
That is an assessment of market structure, not proof that Epic cannot grow. It also does not establish that every Steam feature or network effect is independently responsible for the gap; the broader explanation is an inference from Rosier’s comments about Steam’s inevitability.
Epic’s giveaways are effective at attracting attention and encouraging people to create or revisit accounts. Rosier questioned what happens after the claim, however. His concern is that some users log in to add a free title to their library without playing it, building a collection rather than a lasting habit on the store. 6
The conversion problem has a second layer. A player might claim a free game on Epic but later purchase it on Steam, where the rest of the player’s active library already lives. In that case, the promotion creates awareness and an Epic account while the eventual paid transaction benefits Steam. Rosier presented that possibility as an example of how a giveaway could fail to move meaningful market share—and, in some cases, help a game sell on Steam instead. 6
The available evidence does not quantify how often this happens. The point is therefore best understood as a strategic risk, not a measured causal result.
Epic’s reported figures directly complicate the harshest version of Rosier’s criticism:
Together, those figures show that Epic has substantial reach and that users do buy and play games made by companies other than Epic. They make it difficult to claim that free-game claimants never become active players.
But the figures do not settle the Steam comparison. Monthly active users and total spending do not show how many people use Epic as their primary storefront, how many are returning purchasers rather than promotion-driven visitors, or whether Epic is taking share from Steam. They also do not show whether the reported growth can continue without aggressive incentives.
The most defensible conclusion is narrower: Epic is demonstrating momentum, while the available figures do not yet demonstrate that it is dislodging Steam as the default PC marketplace.
Epic Games Store vice president and general manager Martin Keely rejected Rosier’s conclusion, arguing that the data tells a different story. Epic pointed to the 2.78 billion hours spent in third-party games and the 57% increase in third-party spending, adding that the improved launcher planned for 2026 could accelerate that momentum. 1
The product response focuses on reducing friction: faster loading, better recommendations, more useful category browsing and patch notes integrated into store pages. 1
6 These features address the everyday reasons a storefront can feel inconvenient, but their impact on long-term switching behavior remains unproven.
The supplied evidence does not independently establish the timing or implementation status of reviews, universal controller support or specific leadership changes beyond Keely’s identified role and public response. Those details should not be treated as confirmed parts of the overhaul without stronger documentation.
Rosier’s criticism extends beyond the launcher. He argued that Epic has been trying to compete with Steam while also fighting Apple and Google Play, creating a risk that the company spreads its resources and attention too thinly. 6
Other commonly cited risks are less firmly supported by the available evidence. Exclusivity deals may bring players to Epic for a particular release but could also create resentment or encourage them to return to Steam later; the supplied sources do not quantify that effect. Similarly, the claim that Tim Sweeney’s social-media presence damages Epic Games Store adoption or spending is not established by the provided reporting.
That distinction matters. Epic may face real strategic liabilities, but not every plausible criticism has been measured.
Rosier was more positive about Epic’s Fortnite strategy, saying its recent performance appeared stronger than it had six months to a year earlier. He highlighted a renewed focus on crossover cosmetics, including collaborations involving Sonic the Hedgehog, Pac-Man, Kingdom Hearts’ Sora and Persona 5’s Joker. 6
Fortnite gives Epic something the storefront does not have to build from scratch: a large, visible live-service platform that can turn cultural partnerships into direct engagement. Crossovers can bring fans of outside franchises into Fortnite and keep attention inside Epic’s ecosystem.
That makes Fortnite a different strategic proposition from Epic Games Store. The store must persuade players to change or divide an established purchasing habit. Fortnite can use its existing audience and marketing surface to create new reasons to return. That comparison is an analytical inference from Rosier’s assessment, not a direct measurement of the relative financial returns of the two strategies.
Epic Games Store’s overhaul is important because a slow or awkward launcher makes the Steam habit even harder to break. But a better interface is only the first step. Epic still needs to convert giveaway-driven visits into repeat play, paid third-party purchases and a default-storefront relationship.
Epic’s 2025 results show that this conversion is happening to a meaningful extent: third-party spending and playtime reached record levels, while monthly active users hit a new peak. 1
4
5
7 They do not yet show that Epic has overcome Steam’s entrenched position.
Rosier’s core thesis therefore survives the rebuttal in a qualified form. Epic is growing, but growth is not the same as replacement. Unless the launcher overhaul changes everyday behavior—not just download counts and giveaway claims—Fortnite may remain Epic’s stronger path to sustained engagement than a direct attempt to become Steam’s equal.
Studio Global AI
This page includes a source-backed answer you can continue inside Studio Global.
Newzoo analyst Emmanuel Rosier argues that Epic Games Store’s planned overhaul may be “too little, too late” against Steam’s entrenched ecosystem.
Newzoo analyst Emmanuel Rosier argues that Epic Games Store’s planned overhaul may be “too little, too late” against Steam’s entrenched ecosystem. Rosier’s concern is conversion: free game giveaways may create account log ins and large libraries without building regular play or paid purchasing on Epic.
Epic disputes that assessment, pointing to 2.78 billion hours played in third party games during 2025 and a 57% rise in third party spending.