Meloni Says Russian Provocations Show Kremlin “Nervousness”

Meloni’s message was that Moscow’s actions should not be read as a sign of strength. Speaking on 16 September, Italy’s prime minister described Russia’s continuing provocations as evidence of “a sort of nervousness,” suggesting they were intended to shift attention from a war in Ukraine that was not unfolding as the Kremlin had expected. At the same time, she insisted that Italy’s position in support of Ukraine remained clear and had “never wavered.” 14

What Meloni said about Russia and Ukraine

Meloni linked Italy’s credibility to policy consistency. “If Italy wants to play a role,” she said, it must maintain a clear position on Ukraine—a position she said Rome has maintained throughout the conflict. 14

Her interpretation of Russian provocations was explicitly political: they reflected agitation in Moscow and an attempt to divert attention from the course of the war, rather than a reason for European governments to soften their backing for Kyiv. 1214

Salvini’s meeting with Russia’s ambassador did not alter Rome’s line

Meloni also addressed criticism of Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini’s meeting with Russia’s ambassador in Milan. She said it began as a meeting involving companies operating in Russia and characterized that as unremarkable, noting that there has never been an absolute prohibition on doing business in Russia. 15

That is not the same as a change in foreign policy. Her point was that commercial activity remains subject to the applicable sanctions regime, while Italy’s political stance in favor of Ukraine remains unchanged. 1215

What Italy has approved for Ukraine

Italy’s cabinet approved a decree in December 2025 to keep military assistance flowing to Ukraine through 2026. The authorization covers transfers of military vehicles, materials and equipment, though the precise contents of assistance packages are not necessarily public. 17

Reports in August and September described a possible new package worth roughly €3 billion that could include SAMP/T NG air-defence batteries, Aster 30 interceptors and long-range radars. But those reports should be treated as unconfirmed: Crosetto said on 26 August that the reported 13th package had not been adopted as a formal act. 1823

The key distinction is therefore between Italy’s standing authorization to continue aid in 2026 and the still-unformalized details of any specific new package.

The Lithuania drone interception

On 15 September, an Italian fighter operating on NATO duty shot down a drone after it entered Lithuanian airspace from Belarus. Crosetto said the drone had “most probably” come from Russia, while Lithuanian authorities continued to investigate the debris. 33

The incident demonstrates the operational side of NATO’s Baltic air-policing mission: an airspace violation was detected and intercepted. It does not, by itself, establish a final public forensic attribution, so descriptions of the aircraft’s origin should remain qualified pending the investigation. 3337

Leipzig and the case for treating incidents as a pattern

Germany has gone further in the Leipzig case. Berlin concluded that Russia was responsible for an attempted explosive-drone attack at Leipzig Airport on 4 August, saying the drone configuration, components and explosives matched methods known from other Russian hybrid operations. Russia has denied responsibility. 64

European leaders treated the allegation as more than an isolated airport-security incident. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen called Leipzig “a new escalation on European Union soil directly attributed to Russia,” while the EU and NATO signalled a tougher response. 4

Why Europe sees a broader hybrid-war challenge

Taken together, the Lithuania and Leipzig cases illustrate why European governments increasingly discuss airspace incidents, sabotage allegations and threats to transport or military-linked infrastructure under the heading of hybrid warfare. The concern is that lower-threshold acts can test readiness, create uncertainty and pressure allied unity without becoming an overt conventional clash.

The appropriate response depends on reliable attribution. In practice, that means stronger air and counter-drone defenses, protected critical infrastructure, information-sharing among allies, and coordinated diplomatic or economic action when evidence supports responsibility. Germany’s public attribution in Leipzig—and NATO’s rapid interception over Lithuania—show the two related parts of that approach: establish the facts where possible, and be able to respond quickly to an immediate threat. 433