HSBC CEO Georges Elhedery’s five year forecast means Gulf states could rely less on the Strait of Hormuz by expanding alternative pipelines, ports and logistics—not that the waterway will stop being used. Saudi and UAE crude rerouting shows alternatives can carry substantial flows, but pipeline, port and security co...
Published byEdited with GPT-6 LunaImages generated with GPT Image 2
Research answer

Create a landscape editorial hero image for this Studio Global article: What did HSBC Group CEO Georges Elhedery mean when he said at the bank’s Future Forum in Dubai on October 20, 2026, that the Iran war could. Article summary: Elhedery’s point was that the war could accelerate investment in pipelines, ports and overland logistics that let Gulf exporters reach world markets without using Hormuz—making the strait less indispensable within roughl. Topic tags: general, news, general web, user generated. Style: premium digital editorial illustration, source-backed research mood, clean composition, high detail, modern web publication hero. Use reference image context only for broad subject, composition, and topical grounding; do not copy the exact image. Avoid: logos, brand marks, copyrighted characters, real person likenesses, fake screenshots, UI text, readable text, watermarks, charts wi
HSBC Group CEO Georges Elhedery’s forecast that the Strait of Hormuz could become “redundant” within about five years is best read as a call for reduced dependence, not a prediction that shipping through the strait will end. The Iran war has exposed the risks of relying on one route: before the conflict, about one-fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas trade passed through Hormuz.1
His argument is that investment in pipelines, ports and other logistics could give Gulf exporters more ways to reach buyers when the strait is disrupted. Existing crude-oil bypasses show the idea in practice—but they do not yet offer a complete alternative for every exporter or for LNG.1
17
42
The word describes a possible change in the strait’s importance, not its physical disappearance. If more exports can move through routes outside Hormuz, a disruption there may become less damaging for some producers. Elhedery linked that possibility to investment in alternative Gulf logistics and said the region could recover and continue growing; he also expressed hope for a resolution to the conflict.1
3
4
That is an outlook, not a confirmed infrastructure plan with a five-year completion date. The available reporting does not establish that the proposed routes will have enough capacity to replace Hormuz for all Gulf trade.
Saudi Arabia can send crude west through its East-West pipeline to the Red Sea port of Yanbu. The UAE has a pipeline route to Fujairah, outside Hormuz. Kpler data reported in October showed Saudi Red Sea loadings rising from 0.75 million barrels per day before the war to 4.3 million in June; UAE loadings at Fujairah rose from 1.1 million to 2.7 million barrels per day over the same comparison.17
These routes have helped move crude around the strait, but a pipeline’s stated capacity is not the same as the volume that can be exported consistently. The Saudi route also relies on port loading capacity at Yanbu. After the East-West pipeline restarted in late September, Reuters reported throughput estimates of about 2 million barrels per day from an industry source and 2.65 million from Kpler—below the pipeline’s stated 7-million-barrel daily capacity.13
Export totals also need careful interpretation. Kpler-based reporting put Gulf crude and condensate exports excluding Iran at at least 16.5 million barrels per day in September, its prewar benchmark. That recovery does not mean Hormuz itself had returned to normal: some exports were moving through bypass routes.15
The distinction matters because a crude pipeline cannot simply replace a shipping route for liquefied natural gas. One analysis says LNG has no viable pipeline bypass for the relevant Gulf exports.42 Meanwhile, LNG cargoes continued to pass through Hormuz: Kpler data reported by Reuters counted 21 cargoes exiting in September, up from 15 in June and the highest monthly total since the war began.
14
That evidence makes a blanket claim that Hormuz will become unnecessary for all Gulf energy exports especially difficult to support. Elhedery’s forecast may be more plausible for some oil flows than for LNG, but the sources do not establish exactly how much dependence can be removed in five years.
HSBC cited a $872 billion pipeline of infrastructure projects across the Middle East, North Africa and Türkiye, and Elhedery described the bank’s commitment to the Gulf Cooperation Council as “steadfast.”3 That figure signals a broader regional investment opportunity; it should not be treated as money already committed to building routes around Hormuz or as completed bypass capacity.
The central caveat is practical: alternative routes need pipelines, ports and secure transport links, and those components can themselves face capacity limits or disruption. The most defensible reading of Elhedery’s five-year scenario is therefore less dependence on Hormuz—particularly for some crude exports—not proven redundancy for every Gulf country, energy product or shipping route.13
17
42
Studio Global AI
This page includes a source-backed answer you can continue inside Studio Global.
HSBC CEO Georges Elhedery’s five year forecast means Gulf states could rely less on the Strait of Hormuz by expanding alternative pipelines, ports and logistics—not that the waterway will stop being used.
HSBC CEO Georges Elhedery’s five year forecast means Gulf states could rely less on the Strait of Hormuz by expanding alternative pipelines, ports and logistics—not that the waterway will stop being used. Saudi and UAE crude rerouting shows alternatives can carry substantial flows, but pipeline, port and security constraints limit what they can replace.[13][17]
HSBC CEO Georges Elhedery’s five year forecast means Gulf states could rely less on the Strait of Hormuz by expanding alternative pipelines, ports and logistics—not that the waterway will stop being used. Saudi and UAE crude rerouting shows alternatives can carry substantial flows, but pipeline, port and security co...
Published byEdited with GPT-6 LunaImages generated with GPT Image 2
Research answer

Create a landscape editorial hero image for this Studio Global article: What did HSBC Group CEO Georges Elhedery mean when he said at the bank’s Future Forum in Dubai on October 20, 2026, that the Iran war could. Article summary: Elhedery’s point was that the war could accelerate investment in pipelines, ports and overland logistics that let Gulf exporters reach world markets without using Hormuz—making the strait less indispensable within roughl. Topic tags: general, news, general web, user generated. Style: premium digital editorial illustration, source-backed research mood, clean composition, high detail, modern web publication hero. Use reference image context only for broad subject, composition, and topical grounding; do not copy the exact image. Avoid: logos, brand marks, copyrighted characters, real person likenesses, fake screenshots, UI text, readable text, watermarks, charts wi
HSBC Group CEO Georges Elhedery’s forecast that the Strait of Hormuz could become “redundant” within about five years is best read as a call for reduced dependence, not a prediction that shipping through the strait will end. The Iran war has exposed the risks of relying on one route: before the conflict, about one-fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas trade passed through Hormuz.1
His argument is that investment in pipelines, ports and other logistics could give Gulf exporters more ways to reach buyers when the strait is disrupted. Existing crude-oil bypasses show the idea in practice—but they do not yet offer a complete alternative for every exporter or for LNG.1
17
42
The word describes a possible change in the strait’s importance, not its physical disappearance. If more exports can move through routes outside Hormuz, a disruption there may become less damaging for some producers. Elhedery linked that possibility to investment in alternative Gulf logistics and said the region could recover and continue growing; he also expressed hope for a resolution to the conflict.1
3
4
That is an outlook, not a confirmed infrastructure plan with a five-year completion date. The available reporting does not establish that the proposed routes will have enough capacity to replace Hormuz for all Gulf trade.
Saudi Arabia can send crude west through its East-West pipeline to the Red Sea port of Yanbu. The UAE has a pipeline route to Fujairah, outside Hormuz. Kpler data reported in October showed Saudi Red Sea loadings rising from 0.75 million barrels per day before the war to 4.3 million in June; UAE loadings at Fujairah rose from 1.1 million to 2.7 million barrels per day over the same comparison.17
These routes have helped move crude around the strait, but a pipeline’s stated capacity is not the same as the volume that can be exported consistently. The Saudi route also relies on port loading capacity at Yanbu. After the East-West pipeline restarted in late September, Reuters reported throughput estimates of about 2 million barrels per day from an industry source and 2.65 million from Kpler—below the pipeline’s stated 7-million-barrel daily capacity.13
Export totals also need careful interpretation. Kpler-based reporting put Gulf crude and condensate exports excluding Iran at at least 16.5 million barrels per day in September, its prewar benchmark. That recovery does not mean Hormuz itself had returned to normal: some exports were moving through bypass routes.15
The distinction matters because a crude pipeline cannot simply replace a shipping route for liquefied natural gas. One analysis says LNG has no viable pipeline bypass for the relevant Gulf exports.42 Meanwhile, LNG cargoes continued to pass through Hormuz: Kpler data reported by Reuters counted 21 cargoes exiting in September, up from 15 in June and the highest monthly total since the war began.
14
That evidence makes a blanket claim that Hormuz will become unnecessary for all Gulf energy exports especially difficult to support. Elhedery’s forecast may be more plausible for some oil flows than for LNG, but the sources do not establish exactly how much dependence can be removed in five years.
HSBC cited a $872 billion pipeline of infrastructure projects across the Middle East, North Africa and Türkiye, and Elhedery described the bank’s commitment to the Gulf Cooperation Council as “steadfast.”3 That figure signals a broader regional investment opportunity; it should not be treated as money already committed to building routes around Hormuz or as completed bypass capacity.
The central caveat is practical: alternative routes need pipelines, ports and secure transport links, and those components can themselves face capacity limits or disruption. The most defensible reading of Elhedery’s five-year scenario is therefore less dependence on Hormuz—particularly for some crude exports—not proven redundancy for every Gulf country, energy product or shipping route.13
17
42
Studio Global AI
This page includes a source-backed answer you can continue inside Studio Global.
HSBC CEO Georges Elhedery’s five year forecast means Gulf states could rely less on the Strait of Hormuz by expanding alternative pipelines, ports and logistics—not that the waterway will stop being used.
HSBC CEO Georges Elhedery’s five year forecast means Gulf states could rely less on the Strait of Hormuz by expanding alternative pipelines, ports and logistics—not that the waterway will stop being used. Saudi and UAE crude rerouting shows alternatives can carry substantial flows, but pipeline, port and security constraints limit what they can replace.[13][17]