Iran Hardliner Urges Cutting Undersea Cables in the Strait of Hormuz

The immediate answer is straightforward: Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of Iran’s ultra-conservative Kayhan newspaper and a representative of the supreme leader, urged Iran’s military and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to seriously disrupt—or cut—international fiber-optic cables on the Persian Gulf seabed and through the Strait of Hormuz. 25

He portrayed the move as a retaliatory response to what he called the crimes of the United States and its allies. Shariatmadari acknowledged that deliberately severing the cables would breach international law, but argued that Iran was justified in using the disruption to pressure those adversaries. 25

What Shariatmadari proposed

The September 3 intervention was not a technical proposal for regulating cable traffic. It was a call for coercive action against physical communications infrastructure. Shariatmadari argued that preventing cables from operating through the Persian Gulf and Hormuz could deprive the United States and its allies of a vital connection and compel them to yield. 25

That distinction matters: a newspaper editor’s demand does not itself establish an Iranian operational order or an attack plan. It does, however, add to public rhetoric treating subsea infrastructure as leverage in the conflict.

How the call fits earlier Iranian cable pressure

Earlier reporting described state-linked or IRGC-adjacent proposals to assert greater control over undersea cables passing through Iranian-controlled waters. These proposals included permits or licensing requirements, annual fees, compliance with Iranian law, and a larger Iranian role in maintenance and repairs. 37

Reporting at the time also said Iran had not formally adopted an official cable-fee policy or passed legislation to impose it. 3 Shariatmadari’s argument therefore represented a more escalatory position: from seeking regulatory or commercial leverage to endorsing disruption or severance.

Did U.S. strikes preempt a cable attack?

The timing raised that question, but the public evidence is limited. A report citing an unnamed U.S. source said the September 2 U.S. strikes were intended to preempt an Iranian plot against undersea cables in Hormuz. 8 The Institute for the Study of War similarly characterized that report as conditional, saying that, if accurate, it could indicate Iran was considering coercion against fixed undersea infrastructure. 39

What was publicly confirmed is narrower: U.S. Central Command said its strikes hit IRGC air-defense sites, radar systems, maritime assets and facilities, mine-laying capabilities, and communications sites. 1718 Public CENTCOM statements cited in the available reporting did not independently confirm that preventing a cable attack was the reason for the operation.

The most defensible conclusion is that the reports and Shariatmadari’s call are relevant context, not proof of a confirmed Iranian cable-attack operation.

Why the Strait of Hormuz is a digital chokepoint

The Strait of Hormuz is known for energy shipping, but it is also a concentrated communications route. Major submarine systems in or through the area include:

• Asia-Africa-Europe 1 (AAE-1), which connects Southeast Asia to Europe via Egypt and has landing points in the UAE, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia;
• FALCON, linking India and Sri Lanka with Gulf countries, Sudan, and Egypt; and
• Gulf Bridge International, which connects Gulf countries, including Iran. 1

These systems help connect India and Southeast Asia with Europe through Gulf states and Egypt. 1 Because multiple international routes run through a geographically constrained area, damage to several cables could reduce available capacity even where networks are able to reroute traffic.

What disruption could mean for internet, cloud, and finance

A successful attack on multiple cable systems would not necessarily disconnect the world from the internet. Networks can reroute traffic, and effects would depend on which cables, landing points, and backup capacity were affected.

Still, the immediate consequences could be serious, particularly for the Gulf:

• Internet access: Users could face slower connections, congestion, and outages as operators shift traffic to alternative paths.
• Cloud and corporate networks: Cloud access, data-center interconnection, enterprise applications, video services, and cross-border communications could degrade where they rely on affected capacity.
• Financial operations: Market-data distribution, banks’ cross-border communications, and payment-related workflows could be delayed or interrupted when their telecom providers lose capacity.
• Regional exposure: Countries whose international connectivity relies heavily on these maritime routes would face the greatest immediate disruption. The affected cable systems serve landing points across Oman, the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, among others. 1

It is important not to overstate the case. The available evidence does not establish that a cable attack would cause a total global SWIFT shutdown. Nor does it support a confident forecast that cable damage alone would recreate the 2008 financial crisis. Those comparisons are warnings about potential cascading risk—especially if digital disruption occurred alongside wider conflict and shipping or energy disruption—not demonstrated outcomes. 16

The larger implication

Shariatmadari’s statement reframed the Strait of Hormuz as more than an oil and shipping chokepoint: it is also a vulnerable corridor for digital infrastructure. The risk is not only the physical loss of cables, but the economic pressure created when cloud services, businesses, public communications, and financial networks must compete for reduced international capacity.

For policymakers and network operators, the key lesson is resilience rather than prediction. Diversified routes, tested failover arrangements, and clear public attribution standards matter because public threats, unverified intelligence claims, and confirmed military actions can easily be conflated during a fast-moving conflict.