/PSIGW/HttpListeningConnectorGoogle's investigation revealed a broad and focused operation. ShinyHunters compromised approximately 300 distinct PeopleSoft instances spread across more than 100 organizations globally . GTIG took the proactive step of notifying over 100 of these exposed organizations during the active exploitation window
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The campaign displayed a clear pattern of targeting. 68% of the known victims were entities within the higher education sector, primarily colleges and universities, with the majority based in the United States .
To maintain persistence and control, the attackers deployed MeshCentral remote management agents, but disguised the filenames as legitimate Microsoft Azure services, using names such as meshagent64-azure-ops.exe. The command-and-control infrastructure further mimicked Azure by using the domain azurenetfiles.net . The stolen data was later published on the ShinyHunters Data Leak Site (DLS) on June 9, 2026
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The University of Nottingham became the first publicly confirmed victim, providing a stark illustration of the breach's consequences. The university acknowledged a cyber incident affecting its student records system, confirming that a significant amount of data, totaling tens of gigabytes, had been accessed .
Reports from multiple sources indicate that between 454,600 and 500,000 personal and academic records belonging to current and former students were stolen . The compromised data primarily consisted of student and alumni records, but the university noted that staff bank details and research data were not part of the breach
. The stolen data, which included details like home addresses, phone numbers, and dates of birth, was quickly published on ShinyHunters' leak site and indexed by “Have I Been Pwned”
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While Oracle issued an out-of-band security alert on June 10, 2026, the initial guidance consisted of workarounds rather than a complete software fix. Google’s threat intelligence blog, in alignment with Oracle’s advisory, recommends organizations take the following immediate steps to protect vulnerable PeopleSoft instances :
/PSEMHUB/* and /PSIGW/HttpListeningConnector, using network firewalls or access control lists /PSEMHUB/hub and /PSIGW/HttpListeningConnector originating from external IP addresses to identify historical compromise .jsp files that an attacker may have planted, particularly under the path /webserv/applications/peoplesoft/PSEMHUB.war/ logs, persistantstorage, or scratchpad within PSEMHUB paths. Additionally, scrutinize any outbound SMB traffic from PeopleSoft servers, which could indicate data exfiltration
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