Torero stated that commodity prices will rise through the end of 2026, with retail food price increases following with a 3–6 month lag . The risks are highest in Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Philippines), South Asia, the Sahel, southern Africa, and Latin America's Dry Corridor — regions where rice dependence and import exposure are greatest
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Oxford Economics now expects weather-driven factors to add more to 2027 food inflation than the fading war shock, with forecasts suggesting heatwaves will be "a stronger upward driver of food prices next year than the war" . Deutsche Bank estimates the spring commodity shock will lift food prices by around 1.3% in the UK and 0.8% in the euro area
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FAO's longer-term projections already estimated that nearly 600 million people could be chronically undernourished by 2030, with conflicts, climate variability and extremes, and economic setbacks cited as the main drivers .
The specific claim of "total global losses potentially exceeding $4 trillion through 2030" does not appear in the Reuters, DW, Firstpost, or FAO documents reviewed. The $4 trillion figure may come from a separate economic modeling exercise (e.g., by a development bank or private forecaster) rather than from the FAO itself. The FAO's directly stated projections focus on undernourishment numbers, food price indices, and acute hunger populations rather than aggregate dollar loss estimates .
Additionally, some analysts note that improving rainfall and ample food grain stocks in certain regions may help limit domestic economic impacts , and that existing stocks are currently absorbing the initial supply shocks — meaning the real impact may only begin to materialize if the Strait of Hormuz traffic does not resume
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