His core warning was that direct Commission involvement would produce the very outcome the package claims to fix—slow, bureaucratic decision-making. “We need to avoid the risk of over-complication and bureaucracy, while relying on private sector expertise,” Fouquet wrote .

Industry group DIGITALEUROPE has raised a similar alarm, advocating for cutting approval times for strategic projects to under seven months and simplifying the broader regulatory framework to minimize compliance costs for chip companies .

What alternative approach did he advocate?

Fouquet’s counterproposal was straightforward: an industry-led, bottom-up process where companies propose projects based on market demand rather than political direction. He praised the Commission’s own demand-side initiatives—specifically the new “Demand Accelerators” that link chip producers to buyers through offtake agreements—and the appointment of Jim Hagemann Snabe as Special Envoy for tech sovereignty .

This stance echoes industry feedback from SEMI Europe and a broader coalition of EU semiconductor companies, which has called for a shift “from a supply-driven approach to a long-term strategy that addresses actual market demand” . A joint industry report from March 2026 went further, urging the EU to provide a framework where “end-user industries and semiconductor designers/manufacturers bilaterally or multilaterally drive system designs” rather than being directed from Brussels .

A year of regulatory criticism

Fouquet’s pushback on June 5 is not an isolated complaint. It continues a consistent pattern of criticism he has leveled at EU regulators since 2025:

• AI Act (May 2026): In an interview with Politico, Fouquet captured his frustration memorably: “We didn’t start running, we didn’t start even walking, and we already had in front of us all the obstacles to not be able to walk.” He argued the EU approved its AI rulebook before the bloc had a meaningful AI sector .
• Over-regulation driving companies out (May 2026): He warned that restrictive EU rules are out of touch with industry needs, risking an exodus of tech firms from the region .
• Chips Act 1.0 delays (May 2026): In a co-signed opinion piece with six other European tech CEOs, Fouquet wrote that “more than three years after the ‘Chips Act’, we are still waiting for its impact” .

Across all these interventions, Fouquet’s central argument remains the same: Europe’s instinct to regulate first—on AI, semiconductors, or tech sovereignty—is eroding its competitiveness. He wants Brussels to be an enabler of industry-led innovation, not its director.

What’s in the European Technological Sovereignty Package?

The package, proposed by the Commission on June 3, 2026, aims to strengthen the EU’s position in semiconductors, AI, cloud, and open source through four main components :

1. Chips Act 2.0: Building advanced semiconductor capacity, linking supply to demand, and supporting large-scale investment. It would repeal and replace the original 2023 Chips Act.
2. Cloud and AI Development Act: Supporting research and commercial deployment of cloud capacity and artificial intelligence.
3. Open Source Strategy: A €2 billion, seven-year plan to foster a European open-source ecosystem.
4. AI and Energy Roadmap: Aligning the growth of AI infrastructure with energy sustainability goals.

The Chips Act 2.0 introduces several practical provisions: permitting for strategic projects capped at 12 months, “Grand Challenges” for EU-critical chip types like AI processors, and the first EU open foundry for sub-3nm manufacturing with pilot production targeted for 2030–2033 .

The price tag and what happens next

The Commission has set out the total investment it believes Europe needs to mobilize :

These figures are not EU budget allocations—the majority must come from private capital, with public funds from Horizon Europe, the future European Competitiveness Fund, and national programs acting as catalysts .

Next steps: The package moves to the European Parliament and the Council of the EU for negotiation. Given the Chips Act 2.0 is structured as a regulation to repeal the 2023 act, it requires co-legislator approval . Industry groups are already lobbying hard: a coalition representing all 27 member states previously pushed for sharper focus beyond the original 20% market-share target, and DIGITALEUROPE has called for pooling EU, national, and private funding to mobilize €200 billion for semiconductor investments by 2035 .

Fouquet’s public caution ensures the debate over who controls project selection—industry or Brussels—will be loud as negotiations proceed.

His core warning was that direct Commission involvement would produce the very outcome the package claims to fix—slow, bureaucratic decision-making. “We need to avoid the risk of over-complication and bureaucracy, while relying on private sector expertise,” Fouquet wrote .

Industry group DIGITALEUROPE has raised a similar alarm, advocating for cutting approval times for strategic projects to under seven months and simplifying the broader regulatory framework to minimize compliance costs for chip companies .

What alternative approach did he advocate?

Fouquet’s counterproposal was straightforward: an industry-led, bottom-up process where companies propose projects based on market demand rather than political direction. He praised the Commission’s own demand-side initiatives—specifically the new “Demand Accelerators” that link chip producers to buyers through offtake agreements—and the appointment of Jim Hagemann Snabe as Special Envoy for tech sovereignty .

This stance echoes industry feedback from SEMI Europe and a broader coalition of EU semiconductor companies, which has called for a shift “from a supply-driven approach to a long-term strategy that addresses actual market demand” . A joint industry report from March 2026 went further, urging the EU to provide a framework where “end-user industries and semiconductor designers/manufacturers bilaterally or multilaterally drive system designs” rather than being directed from Brussels .

A year of regulatory criticism

Fouquet’s pushback on June 5 is not an isolated complaint. It continues a consistent pattern of criticism he has leveled at EU regulators since 2025:

• AI Act (May 2026): In an interview with Politico, Fouquet captured his frustration memorably: “We didn’t start running, we didn’t start even walking, and we already had in front of us all the obstacles to not be able to walk.” He argued the EU approved its AI rulebook before the bloc had a meaningful AI sector .
• Over-regulation driving companies out (May 2026): He warned that restrictive EU rules are out of touch with industry needs, risking an exodus of tech firms from the region .
• Chips Act 1.0 delays (May 2026): In a co-signed opinion piece with six other European tech CEOs, Fouquet wrote that “more than three years after the ‘Chips Act’, we are still waiting for its impact” .

Across all these interventions, Fouquet’s central argument remains the same: Europe’s instinct to regulate first—on AI, semiconductors, or tech sovereignty—is eroding its competitiveness. He wants Brussels to be an enabler of industry-led innovation, not its director.

What’s in the European Technological Sovereignty Package?

The package, proposed by the Commission on June 3, 2026, aims to strengthen the EU’s position in semiconductors, AI, cloud, and open source through four main components :

1. Chips Act 2.0: Building advanced semiconductor capacity, linking supply to demand, and supporting large-scale investment. It would repeal and replace the original 2023 Chips Act.
2. Cloud and AI Development Act: Supporting research and commercial deployment of cloud capacity and artificial intelligence.
3. Open Source Strategy: A €2 billion, seven-year plan to foster a European open-source ecosystem.
4. AI and Energy Roadmap: Aligning the growth of AI infrastructure with energy sustainability goals.

The Chips Act 2.0 introduces several practical provisions: permitting for strategic projects capped at 12 months, “Grand Challenges” for EU-critical chip types like AI processors, and the first EU open foundry for sub-3nm manufacturing with pilot production targeted for 2030–2033 .

The price tag and what happens next

The Commission has set out the total investment it believes Europe needs to mobilize :

These figures are not EU budget allocations—the majority must come from private capital, with public funds from Horizon Europe, the future European Competitiveness Fund, and national programs acting as catalysts .

Next steps: The package moves to the European Parliament and the Council of the EU for negotiation. Given the Chips Act 2.0 is structured as a regulation to repeal the 2023 act, it requires co-legislator approval . Industry groups are already lobbying hard: a coalition representing all 27 member states previously pushed for sharper focus beyond the original 20% market-share target, and DIGITALEUROPE has called for pooling EU, national, and private funding to mobilize €200 billion for semiconductor investments by 2035 .

Fouquet’s public caution ensures the debate over who controls project selection—industry or Brussels—will be loud as negotiations proceed.