Google’s New EU Search Layout After the €460 Million DMA Fine

Google has rolled out a new European Search layout after the European Commission fined it €460 million for giving its own shopping, hotel, transport and sports services preferential treatment in Search. The redesign is meant to address the EU Digital Markets Act’s ban on self-preferencing by major platform “gatekeepers.” 135

The immediate change is visible in commercial and travel-related searches: specialized comparison services receive more prominent space, while some of the integrated information Google previously displayed—such as real-time prices in the relevant carousel—is removed. Google argues that makes Search less useful; the Commission’s underlying position is that Google cannot use its dominant search product to favor its own comparable services over rivals. 12

What the new EU Search results look like

For affected queries, Google’s revised format presents:

• One specialized search service prominently at the top of the results;
• Two additional specialized services with less detail below it; and
• A carousel for hotels, airlines or restaurants further down the page, with certain features, including real-time prices, removed. 2

This is a marked shift away from a tightly integrated Google-owned vertical-results experience. The Commission found that Google had favored its own services in shopping, hotels, transport and sports results over third-party services. The €460 million Search penalty was separate from a €430 million DMA fine concerning Google Play’s anti-steering restrictions, making the combined fines €890 million. 1

Why Google had to change the design

Article 6(5) of the DMA bars gatekeepers from treating their own products and services more favorably in rankings than similar third-party offerings. For Google Search, the obligation covers both Google’s vertical search services and the way its own content can be ranked or embedded in results. 3035

The Commission’s goal is not simply a different visual layout. It is to make online search markets fairer and more contestable by preventing a dominant search engine from using its results page to advantage its own downstream services. 31

Who may gain—and who may face trade-offs

Price-comparison and specialized search services

The most direct beneficiaries are likely to be specialized services, including comparison platforms, because the new design gives them more prominent distribution in Google Search. That outcome aligns with the DMA’s aim of improving rivals’ ability to compete for attention and traffic. 131

Prominence alone does not guarantee long-term traffic or conversions, but it gives those services a placement that Google’s own vertical products were previously found to receive preferentially.

Users searching for travel and local options

Google says the loss of consolidated real-time pricing and other richer result features makes comparison and booking more cumbersome. It told Reuters that its tests showed a high level of user dissatisfaction and described the change as its largest reduction in service quality in 29 years. 2

Those are Google’s assessments, not independently published findings. The practical user impact will depend on whether the new links make it easier to compare competing services or instead add steps for people who want a quick price, availability check or booking path.

Hotels, airlines, restaurants and other local businesses

Google also argues that businesses could receive less free direct traffic and become more dependent on intermediaries. It has cited a 30% decline in free direct-booking traffic after earlier DMA-related changes. 2

That figure should be treated carefully: it is Google-supplied data, and the available reporting does not provide an independent methodology or verification. The broader concern is plausible as a business-model question—more referrals through comparison platforms can change customer-acquisition economics—but the scale of any effect is not established by Google’s claim alone.

Is this really a decline in search quality?

The answer depends on what “quality” is meant to measure.

Google’s view is that an integrated results page, with directly actionable information such as current prices, is more convenient for users and can send customers directly to suppliers. From that perspective, displaying competitor services more prominently and removing features makes the page less efficient. 2

The Commission’s view is different: a highly integrated experience is not neutral if the platform operator gives its own services preferential placement. Under the DMA, the relevant standard includes fair treatment and contestability, not solely minimizing clicks in a Google-controlled journey. 131

So the dispute is not just about page design. It is about whether convenience produced by a dominant platform’s own integration should outweigh rivals’ opportunity to compete on the same search results page.

What happens if the Commission finds the remedy inadequate?

Google was required to bring the Search infringement to an end within 60 days of the Commission decision. The rollout is therefore a compliance measure, but it is not necessarily the final word on whether the Commission considers Google compliant. 1

Under the DMA, the Commission can impose fines of up to 10% of a company’s total worldwide annual turnover, rising to 20% for repeated infringements. It can also impose periodic penalty payments of up to 5% of average daily worldwide turnover. In cases of systematic infringement, additional remedies may follow a market investigation. 33

That gives the Commission substantial leverage if it concludes that a redesign has not effectively ended the self-preferencing conduct.

The key issue to watch

The new layout is best understood as a live experiment in DMA enforcement. Comparison services have gained valuable visibility; users may encounter a less information-dense results page; and local suppliers may need to assess whether referral patterns change.

Google’s claims about user dissatisfaction, reduced quality and direct-booking traffic deserve scrutiny, not automatic acceptance. Equally, more prominent rival placement should be judged by measurable outcomes, including whether it creates meaningful competition rather than merely rearranging search-page real estate. The Commission’s eventual assessment will determine whether this design becomes a durable European Search model or another step in Google’s compliance process. 12