However, this bonanza comes with a dangerous asterisk. Analysts have described a significant portion of the rate spike as “non-executable” because the security and legal risks make it virtually impossible to actually trade at those nominal levels . This tension between on-paper profits and real-world danger is driving a wave of speculative new vessel orders. The very owners enjoying record revenues now fear that if the strait were to fully open, the sudden release of pent-up tonnage from stranded vessels, combined with an influx of newly built ships, would flood the market and trigger a devastating crash in freight rates
.
The false dawn of a reopening came in April. On April 7, President Trump agreed to suspend attacks on Iran’s infrastructure, and Iran subsequently declared the strait open under strict conditions . For roughly 24 hours on April 17, it seemed the crisis might relent. More than a dozen tankers, including three previously sanctioned vessels, successfully transited the waterway in a brief flurry of activity
.
The hope was instantly extinguished on April 18. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) reimposed a strict naval blockade, and its gunboats opened fire on merchant vessels . At least two India-flagged ships, the Jag Arnav and Sanmar Herald, were hit by gunfire as they tried to cross, prompting multiple vessels to immediately reverse course or halt
. Lloyd’s List captured the moment succinctly: “Hormuz traffic halts again as shots fired”
. The strait had effectively snapped shut, and the message was clear that commercial traffic could only resume on Tehran’s terms.
As of June 2026, the strait is anything but an open waterway. Matt Smith, an analyst at Kpler, an energy intelligence firm, reported that passage is “only a trickle,” with verified outbound commercial transits dropping to zero on some days . A staggering 57 loaded Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) remain stranded around the strait, carrying a significant volume of the world's oil supply
. The situation is expected to remain this way at least through August
.
The flow of what little traffic exists is split between two realities. A comprehensive dataset from Kpler recorded 895 total crossings between March 1 and May 19. Of those, a majority—just over half—used a route directly along the Iranian coast, indicating that many shipowners are coordinating directly with Tehran, and some reports suggest Iran has charged tolls exceeding $1 million per ship for the privilege .
A parallel system has been carved out by the U.S. military. In early May, the U.S. launched Operation Project Freedom, a mission to escort merchant ships out of the Gulf . Over the three weeks leading up to June 1, U.S. Central Command guided approximately 70 ships through the strait, with nearly 40 previously stranded vessels quietly exiting under Navy coordination
. The Kpler data confirms a “dark” or unknown route, accounting for roughly 40% of crossings, which is likely this U.S.-guided lane. The figures do not contradict each other; the U.S. military’s count is a narrow snapshot of recent escort missions, while Kpler’s higher number captures all transits since the conflict began across multiple control regimes
.
Beyond the immediate military threats, the near-total halt in traffic was effectively enforced through the insurance market. Within 96 hours of the initial February 28 strikes, Lloyd’s Joint War Committee redesignated the entire Arabian Gulf as a conflict zone, and major P&I clubs issued notices removing automatic war-risk coverage .
While cover is technically still available for individual voyages, the pricing makes it prohibitive. War-risk premiums for a single VLCC transit soared from a pre-crisis rate of roughly 0.125% of a vessel’s hull value to a peak of 2.5–5%—translating to a staggering $5 million per passage . Although premiums have since eased to around 1% ($2 million per transit), they remain an order of magnitude above historical norms, a financial barrier that reinforces the functional closure as much as any gunboat patrol
.
In the separate but related development raised, reports indicate the U.S. seized the MT Davina, a sanctioned stateless supertanker capable of carrying up to 2 million barrels of crude oil, near Sri Lanka. This type of interdiction in the Indian Ocean is consistent with U.S. enforcement actions during the conflict period, although the available sources in this session do not independently confirm the specific vessel name, date, or precise location of the seizure.
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