Ghana Evacuates 300 Citizens as South Africa's Anti-Migrant Crisis Deepens

The Groups Driving the Violence: March and March and Operation Dudula

Two organized anti-immigrant movements have been at the center of the unrest.

March and March emerged in 2025, led by Durban-based media personality Jacinta Ngobese-Zuma. The group first gained traction in KwaZulu-Natal before expanding into Gauteng, staging demonstrations in Tshwane, Johannesburg, Durban, and Pretoria . Its demands are sweeping: mass deportation of undocumented foreign nationals, restrictions on foreign-owned businesses, and even the deployment of the army to areas with large immigrant populations .

Operation Dudula is an older vigilante-style organization that has been documented conducting illegal document checks, blocking foreign nationals' access to public services, and carrying out what critics describe as "militia-style" operations . The group first marched through Soweto in June 2021 targeting suspected foreign drug traffickers and businesses employing immigrants .

The two groups frequently coordinate their protests. In late April 2026, they marched together to the Gauteng Provincial Legislature, joined by political parties including ActionSA and the Inkatha Freedom Party . By late March 2026, their coordinated actions had turned fatal—at least seven people were killed and thousands displaced as demonstrations escalated in Pretoria, Johannesburg, and Durban . Human Rights Watch documented that the protests turned violent and sometimes deadly, with the government failing to provide systematic protection for foreign nationals .

Why the Unrest Exploded: Economic Grievances and Political Opportunism

The protests are rooted in real socio-economic pain. South Africa's chronically high unemployment, competition over informal-sector businesses such as foreign-owned spaza shops, and widespread frustration with undocumented migration have created fertile ground for anti-immigrant sentiment . March and March explicitly links its demands to crime reduction and economic protectionism, arguing that undocumented immigrants take jobs and strain public services .

But analysts and human rights observers point to another factor: political entrepreneurs are weaponizing these economic anxieties ahead of the 2026 local government elections . Daily Maverick reported that the marches were staged with "little pushback from authorities," suggesting a permissive environment that emboldened the groups .

Diplomatic Fallout Across Africa

The violence triggered a swift and sharp diplomatic response from across the continent.

Nigeria took some of the strongest action. The Federal Government summoned South Africa's Acting High Commissioner in Abuja on May 4, 2026, to formally protest attacks on Nigerian nationals . Foreign Minister Bianca Odumegwu-Ojukwu called her South African counterpart Ronald Lamola directly to discuss alleged violence against Nigerians, including reported deaths . By early May, 130 Nigerians had registered for voluntary evacuation flights .

The African Union's Agenda 2063 Diplomatic Mission condemned the attacks as "unacceptable" and in direct contradiction to African unity and solidarity . Several other African nations, including Kenya, Malawi, and Zimbabwe, issued safety advisories for their citizens .

Ghana, beyond its own evacuation, raised the issue with Pretoria and pushed for a formal debate at the African Union level . South Africa's Department of International Relations and Cooperation responded by insisting the government had moved swiftly to condemn the violence and direct law enforcement to act, while rejecting what it called inaccurate portrayals of the country as xenophobic .

Criticism of Ramaphosa's Response: Too Slow, Too Defensive

President Cyril Ramaphosa formally condemned the violence on May 11, 2026, calling perpetrators "opportunists" exploiting legitimate grievances and insisting that "there is no place for xenophobia in South Africa" . He warned against vigilante behavior and reaffirmed a commitment to tackling illegal immigration within the law .

But the timing drew sharp criticism. The violence had been escalating since late March—weeks before Ramaphosa issued a national statement . On May 6, he pushed back against accusations of xenophobia, arguing that concerns over immigration reflected "global pressures" rather than hostility . Some African governments interpreted this as downplaying the severity of the crisis .

Human Rights Watch documented a pattern: sporadic waves of attacks against foreign nationals since 2015, with the government consistently failing to establish systematic prevention measures . While authorities did charge some groups with inciting violence in January 2026, enforcement remained inconsistent . The result was a response that critics called reactive rather than proactive, and defensive rather than decisive.

What began as protests over economic grievances had, by May 2026, metastasized into a continental diplomatic crisis—and Ghana's evacuation of its citizens became the most visible symbol of how badly South Africa's credibility had been damaged.