The process stalled after a Eurosceptic centre-right government came to power following the 2013 election. The eurozone debt crisis had also weakened the appeal of EU membership, while opposition inside Iceland focused on sovereignty and the protection of sensitive domestic sectors.
The most politically difficult subjects were still unresolved. Agriculture had not been opened as a negotiating chapter, and the fisheries chapter stopped before the screening process was completed and substantive negotiations began. Iceland later asked the EU in 2015 to stop treating it as a candidate country.
Fishing is not simply another policy area in Iceland’s EU debate. It is tied to exports, regional livelihoods and the country’s broader sense of control over its natural resources. Earlier analysis of Icelandic public opinion found that protecting fisheries and agriculture ranked among the strongest concerns, followed by worries about Iceland’s ability to influence decisions in Brussels.
The key institutional question is the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy, or CFP. Critics fear that EU membership could move decisions about quotas, access and management into a common European framework, limiting Iceland’s ability to set its own rules. The issue became particularly visible during disputes over mackerel, as the distribution of the stock changed and countries disagreed over catch shares.
Supporters of reopening talks argue that Iceland cannot know the real terms without negotiating. They hope the country could secure arrangements suited to its fishing industry, but such protections are not guaranteed simply because negotiations resume.
The Icelandic government has nevertheless made its position explicit. Foreign Minister Þorgerður Katrín Gunnarsdóttir has said Iceland would demand “sovereign control over all fisheries” in any accession agreement. EU enlargement commissioner Marta Kos has responded that “creative solutions” could be found during negotiations, without promising in advance that Iceland’s full demand would be accepted.
The case for reopening talks is no longer being made only in economic terms. Russia’s war against Ukraine, growing competition in the Arctic and North Atlantic, and uncertainty about the United States’ future reliability have changed the political setting.
U.S. pressure and rhetoric concerning Greenland have made that shift especially visible. Greenland is part of the strategically important North Atlantic space linking Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom, so debate about the territory has heightened discussion in Iceland about the vulnerability of its wider security environment.
Iceland is already a NATO member, and opponents argue that NATO—not the EU—is the relevant military security guarantee. Supporters respond that EU membership could add political and economic weight alongside NATO, rather than replace it.
The security argument has therefore made the EU question more relevant, but it has not displaced domestic concerns. Reporting on the campaign suggests that prices, currency stability, fishing and sovereignty remain more immediate issues for many voters than Arctic geopolitics.
Iceland’s choice is not between Europe and isolation. Through the European Economic Area, Iceland participates in much of the EU single market and applies a substantial body of relevant EU rules. It is also part of the Schengen Area, which provides passport-free travel with other Schengen countries.
The EEA arrangement is extensive, but it is not the same as EU membership. Iceland remains outside the EU’s common agriculture and fisheries policies and is not part of the customs union or the common commercial policy. It also does not elect members of the European Parliament or appoint an EU commissioner, leaving it without a formal vote in EU law-making.
Full membership would consequently involve both greater influence and greater obligations. Iceland would gain representation in EU institutions, while also facing questions about contributions to the EU budget, common external trade policy, agriculture and fisheries rules.
Supporters of a yes vote make three main arguments:
For this side, reopening talks is an information-gathering and bargaining step—not an irreversible commitment to accession.
Opponents say Iceland already receives the main commercial benefit it wants from Europe through the EEA, without accepting the full political and financial costs of membership. Their concerns include:
For critics, the second referendum does not eliminate the risk. They argue that reopening negotiations would create political momentum toward membership and put Iceland’s most sensitive national interests on the negotiating table before voters know the outcome.
The available evidence points to a more complicated picture than a simple pro-EU or anti-EU split. The European Parliament’s 2026 briefing says a majority supports holding a referendum on launching accession talks, while reporting indicates that support for reopening negotiations is closely divided.
Support for exploring the terms of membership is also not the same as support for joining. One poll cited in the European Parliament briefing found 43% in favour of EU membership and 39% opposed in April 2025, illustrating both the competitiveness of the issue and the importance of question wording and timing.
The second referendum is therefore politically important. Voters who support a yes vote on August 29 can still oppose membership later if the negotiated agreement does not protect fisheries, agriculture, economic interests or national autonomy. Conversely, opponents see the first vote as the point at which Iceland should stop the process rather than risk being carried toward accession.
The clearest conclusion is that Iceland is not voting on a settled European future. It is voting on whether to reopen the negotiation itself, with fisheries likely to remain the hardest test of any eventual deal.