That makes the action a major squeeze on Iran’s maritime trade, especially oil exports, but not the same thing as a full closure of Hormuz.
According to AP reporting carried by the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Trump said the U.S. Navy would swiftly begin a blockade of ships entering or leaving the strategic Strait of Hormuz after ceasefire talks between the United States and Iran in Pakistan ended without a deal.
Subsequent reports described the blockade of Iranian ports as part of Washington’s effort to apply economic pressure on Tehran, push Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz to maritime traffic and accept U.S. terms to end the war. In that framing, the Navy was not simply patrolling the area; it was being presented as the enforcement arm of a broader pressure campaign at sea.
CENTCOM’s April 12, 2026, announcement said U.S. forces would begin implementing a blockade of all maritime traffic entering and exiting Iranian ports at 10 a.m. ET on April 13, 2026, applying the measure to vessels of all nations.
The important limit is what CENTCOM did not say. It did not announce a blanket closure of the Strait of Hormuz. AP/AJC reported that CENTCOM would still allow ships traveling between non-Iranian ports to transit the strait, describing the order as a step down from Trump’s earlier threat.
In practical terms, the U.S. order targets shipping linked to Iranian ports. It does not, based on the announced scope, apply to every commercial vessel moving through or near Hormuz.
Two later incidents help show how U.S. forces interpreted the order at sea.
On April 19, CENTCOM said U.S. forces operating in the Arabian Sea enforced blockade measures against the Iranian-flagged cargo ship M/V Touska, which it described as attempting to sail toward an Iranian port. CENTCOM said the guided-missile destroyer USS Spruance disabled the vessel’s propulsion after the ship failed to comply with repeated U.S. warnings over a six-hour period.
On April 28, U.S. Marines from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit boarded M/V Blue Star III, a commercial ship suspected of trying to transit to Iran in violation of the blockade. U.S. forces released the vessel after a search confirmed that its voyage would not include an Iranian port call.
Together, those cases reinforce the central test: whether a ship’s route involves an Iranian port, not merely whether it is operating in the wider waters around Hormuz.
The oil impact comes from the blockade’s focus on ports. Because CENTCOM’s order covers maritime traffic entering or leaving Iranian ports, vessels serving export routes through those ports can fall within the scope of U.S. enforcement.
Modern Diplomacy described the practical aim as restricting Iran’s oil exports without fully closing the Strait of Hormuz. That distinction matters for global energy markets: Washington can put pressure on Tehran’s oil revenue while still saying it is preserving passage for ships traveling between non-Iranian ports.
The broader market risk is tied to Hormuz’s role in energy shipping. Euronews reported that a prior six-week closure of Hormuz had caused global oil prices to surge, and that only about 40 vessels had passed through after the start of the ceasefire, compared with more than 100 per day before the war. Against that backdrop, even a port-focused blockade can deepen concern about oil flows in the region.
It is reasonable to say Iran’s seaborne oil exports face heavy pressure. Iran International assessed that the blockade could rapidly cripple Iran’s economy, cut off much of its maritime trade and halt oil exports.
But that is not the same as a verified count of actual losses. The available sources do not provide independent figures for how many barrels of Iranian oil have been blocked, how much revenue has been lost or what share of exports has been stopped.
The most cautious conclusion is this: the blockade sharply raises the risk and cost of moving Iranian oil by sea, but the evidence provided here is not enough to put a reliable number on the damage.
Trump described a broad naval move against ships entering or leaving the Strait of Hormuz. CENTCOM’s enforceable order was narrower: it targeted vessels entering or leaving Iranian ports while allowing transit between non-Iranian ports.
For Iran’s oil exports, that still matters. Tankers and related shipping tied to Iranian ports face the threat of inspection, interdiction or other enforcement. But for now, the strongest evidence supports a qualitative conclusion — significant pressure on Iran’s oil export routes — rather than a precise estimate of barrels or revenue lost.