Sina Finance reported that Trump said Iran had fired on vessels from countries not involved in the conflict during passages connected to the “Freedom Plan,” including a South Korean cargo ship. The same report described the “Freedom Plan” as a US-launched effort, begun on a Monday, to guide merchant vessels through the Strait of Hormuz.
Trump then wrote: “Maybe it is time for South Korea to join this mission!” Politically, that line did two things at once. It moved South Korea from the category of distant energy importer into the category of country whose own ships were being framed as at risk. It also turned a maritime-security issue into a test of whether Seoul would support a US-led operation.
Before the cargo-ship episode, Trump had already cast Hormuz as a burden-sharing issue. Dong-A Ilbo reported that, on March 14 local time, he called on South Korea, Japan, China, the United Kingdom and France to send naval vessels to the Strait of Hormuz, saying countries affected by Iran’s attempted closure should help the United States keep the strait open and secure.
The Hankyoreh’s Chinese-language edition described this as Trump’s transactional approach to security: major crude-oil importers benefit from the route, so they should bear part of the security cost of keeping it open. In that reading, South Korea was not singled out only because of one ship. It was singled out because Washington was trying to define Hormuz protection as a bill to be shared by the countries that rely on it.
The first reason is energy exposure. Aju Business Daily, citing the Korea Energy Economics Institute, reported that in 2024 South Korea, Japan and China depended on crude oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz for 62%, 69% and 49% of their crude imports respectively. On that basis, South Korea is a major Asian economy with significant reliance on the route.
There is an important caveat: Trump’s own figures do not line up neatly with the Korean institute’s numbers. Yonhap reported that Trump claimed Japan, China and South Korea imported 95%, 90% and 35% of their crude oil, respectively, through Hormuz; Aju Business Daily noted that those public figures differed from the Korea Energy Economics Institute data. In other words, Trump’s political argument and the available Korean data point in the same broad direction—South Korea has exposure—but his specific numbers should not be treated as settled fact.
The second reason is the alliance. Yonhap reported that, while urging several countries to join the escort effort, Trump emphasized that the United States had long supported the security of allies and partners, and that pressure was directed at countries such as South Korea and Japan, where US forces are stationed. Aju Business Daily summarized Trump’s criteria as twofold: how dependent a country is on Hormuz energy transport, and how much it benefits from US security guarantees.
Put those two tests together, and South Korea becomes difficult for Trump to ignore. In his framing, Hormuz is not just a Middle Eastern shipping problem. It is also an energy-security question, an alliance-responsibility question and a test of whether a US-protected partner will shoulder costs in a US-led security order.
The request has not stayed at the level of Trump’s public statements. The Chosun Ilbo’s Chinese-language edition reported that Marco Rubio, described as US secretary of state and White House national security adviser, told South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun by phone that cooperation was more important than ever to secure the Strait of Hormuz over the long term and stabilize the global economy and international oil prices.
That report said Rubio did not explicitly say “send warships,” but his remarks could be read as a request for South Korea and other countries to take part in Trump’s proposed multinational Hormuz escort concept. It also reported that Trump said he would remember which countries helped, implying that participation—or refusal—could affect future dealings with Washington.
Korean reporting does not show a final decision by Seoul. Dong-A Ilbo cited a South Korean government figure as saying that, because Trump had made his intention clear, South Korea would “discuss carefully.” Another government figure said Seoul had already expected Washington might make substantive requests such as troop deployment or weapons support, and that while South Korea wanted to avoid direct deployment as much as possible, the issue still had to be discussed.
The same report said some in the South Korean government believed it would be hard to reject the US request outright because of the country’s high dependence on crude imports through Hormuz. Others raised the idea of responding under the premise of a “joint operation,” potentially in an escort role rather than as a direct troop deployment.
So the choice facing Seoul is not a simple yes-or-no vote. The real options could include sending a ship, joining a multinational coordination effort, providing escort support, or finding a narrower contribution that limits the risk of being pulled deeper into a Middle East conflict.
Trump named South Korea for three connected reasons. First, he said Iran had fired on vessels involved in the “Freedom Plan” transit effort, including a South Korean cargo ship. Second, South Korea is described in Korean reporting as heavily dependent on crude-oil routes through Hormuz. Third, Washington sees Seoul as both a beneficiary of US security guarantees and an ally that should help bear the cost of keeping a vital sea lane open.
The key point is not simply that Trump publicly called out another ally. It is that the United States is trying to reframe Hormuz security as a shared-cost problem: those who benefit from the route, and from US protection, should contribute to protecting it. For South Korea, the dilemma is how to balance energy security, alliance pressure and the danger of being drawn into a wider regional conflict.