He said additional measures should be coordinated through Russia’s National Anti-Terrorism Committee and should strengthen protection for energy and transport infrastructure, public places, Defense Ministry officials, defense-industry representatives, local government representatives, educators and social workers.
That matters because it changes the meaning of the story. The public record points to a system-wide security expansion covering the defense bureaucracy, the military-industrial sector, regional administration and critical infrastructure — not only a narrow question of how many officers stand near Putin.
At the FSB meeting, Putin said Russia’s adversaries had failed to deliver a “strategic blow” on the battlefield and had therefore turned to individual and group terrorism, including shelling cities, damaging infrastructure and assassinating government and military officials.
He also said the number of terrorism-related crimes inside Russia had risen in the previous year and attributed the “overwhelming majority” of them to Ukrainian special services and their foreign backers. That attribution should be treated as Moscow’s claim: the public reporting cited here does not provide a transparent, independently verifiable evidence file for that broader allegation.
Putin separately said missile and drone attacks on Russian infrastructure, social and administrative facilities, and residential buildings had increased significantly. That helps explain why the Russian government is discussing official protection, infrastructure security, public venues and border-area security under the same counterterrorism umbrella.
A separate claim has added weight to Moscow’s security narrative: Russia’s assertion that a Putin residence was targeted by drones. According to a Xinhua report, Russia’s Defense Ministry said on Dec. 31, 2025, that Ukraine had launched an operation on the evening of Dec. 28 involving 91 drones aimed at Putin’s residence in the Novgorod region of northwestern Russia.
But that allegation is contested. The same report said Ukrainian and European representatives responded that Russia’s claim was “fake” or unsupported by evidence, while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called it a “pure fabrication.”
So the residence claim can help explain why Russian officials are emphasizing presidential security and terrorism threats. It should not, on the available public record, be treated as an independently established fact.
The Kremlin had already been speaking publicly about Putin’s security before this latest FSB meeting. In July 2024, after reporters mentioned assassination attempts against Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico and former U.S. President Donald Trump, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Russia had taken “all necessary measures” to ensure Putin’s safety.
Peskov also said that, given the general rise in international tensions, Russia had to ensure an appropriate level of protection for the head of state.
That background suggests the latest move is better understood as an expansion and formalization of an already high-security environment. Putin’s personal protection is part of it, but the order publicly highlighted a wider circle: defense officials, arms-industry leaders, regional officials, public-facing workers and key infrastructure.
The available evidence supports three careful conclusions.
First, Putin did publicly instruct the FSB to strengthen protections for a broad set of officials, defense-industry figures and infrastructure-related targets.
Second, Moscow is explaining that decision through a terrorism and external-threat framework, pointing in particular to drones, missiles, sabotage and assassination risks.
Third, some of the most dramatic specific allegations — especially the claimed drone attack on a Putin residence — remain disputed, with Ukraine and European representatives rejecting or questioning Russia’s version.
What the public reporting does not show is a transparent, independently verified, imminent assassination plot against Putin personally. The safer reading is that Russia is widening its security perimeter while using a terrorism narrative to explain war-related risks at home. The policy move itself is documented; not every threat claim behind it has been independently proven.