How the Attacker Exploited a Stale Price Feed

The core vulnerability was an oracle misassignment in Solido Cash's collateral valuation system — specifically, a stale or misconfigured price feed used to value SOLID collateral . The protocol relied on an oracle price for SOLID that had become outdated or was incorrectly mapped, causing the collateral to be valued far above its real market price . By depositing SOLID as collateral at this inflated valuation, the attacker was able to withdraw 293.7 million SUPRA tokens — far exceeding what legitimate collateral should have allowed .

The exploit unfolded in two separate attack waves, both exploiting the same vulnerability :

• Wave A (18:21:35 UTC): A single transaction chained several steps — swapping tokens, depositing them as collateral, and minting new CASH — netting 266,778,767 SUPRA .
• Wave B: The attacker repeated the same pattern, bringing the total to approximately 293.7 million SUPRA .

Security firm PeckShield confirmed the breach and the approximate loss .

Critically, approximately 90% of the stolen funds belonged to the Solido Foundation itself, not to retail users. This means the foundation — not individual lenders or borrowers — absorbed nearly all the loss .

Where Blockchain Forensics Traced the Funds

Solido Money published a forensic report detailing the on-chain trail:

• Approximately 220 million SUPRA — about 84% of the stolen tokens — were moved to a suspected Gate.io deposit address . Some sources round this figure to "nearly 90%" of the stolen funds (220M out of 293.7M) . The 84% figure appears in the protocol's own report and in multiple news accounts .
• The attacker is believed to have deposited these tokens at Gate.io in preparation for liquidation or cross-chain transfer .
• Solido requested assistance from exchanges to help freeze and recover the funds .

A Broader Pattern: Two Supra Oracle Exploits in Two Weeks

The Solido exploit is not an isolated incident. Just 12 days earlier, on July 11, 2026, the Hedera-based lending protocol Bonzo Lend lost ~$9.05 million through a related oracle exploit .

Bonzo Lend (July 11, 2026):

• The attacker deposited only 250 SAUCE tokens (worth a few dollars), then submitted a fabricated SAUCE/wHBAR price update that inflated the token value by 12 orders of magnitude .
• The vulnerability was a BLS zero-signature acceptance flaw in Supra's on-chain verifier contract. The verifier accepted a forged price carrying a zeroed signature and public key as valid .
• In eight seconds, the attacker borrowed 6.63 million USDC and 34.5 million wHBAR .

Both protocols — Solido Money and Bonzo Lend — relied on Supra as their oracle provider . Two different failure modes emerged from the same infrastructure:

• Bonzo's flaw was a cryptographic verification failure (zero-signature bypass) in Supra's on-chain verifier .
• Solido's flaw was a misconfigured/stale price feed assignment for SOLID collateral — a different class of oracle failure but still originating from how Supra price data was ingested and validated .

The two incidents, occurring within two weeks of each other, have put the Supra oracle ecosystem under heightened scrutiny. Security analysts are calling for stricter timestamp validation, feed-decency normalization, and multi-source aggregation to prevent similar exploits .

Key Takeaways for DeFi Protocols

1. Oracle misconfiguration is as dangerous as cryptographic failure. A stale price feed can be exploited just as effectively as a broken signature verifier.
2. 90% of stolen funds belonged to the protocol's foundation, highlighting how closely project treasuries are tied to protocol risk.
3. Single-oracle dependency creates systemic risk. Both Bonzo and Solido relied on the same provider (Supra), creating a cascade of vulnerabilities across multiple protocols.
4. Blockchain forensics enabled traceability. Solido's own forensic report traced 84% of stolen funds to a specific exchange address, giving investigators a clear lead.

The Solido exploit underscores a critical lesson: when price feeds break — whether through stale data or a forged signature — the damage can cascade across an entire ecosystem.

How the Attacker Exploited a Stale Price Feed

The core vulnerability was an oracle misassignment in Solido Cash's collateral valuation system — specifically, a stale or misconfigured price feed used to value SOLID collateral . The protocol relied on an oracle price for SOLID that had become outdated or was incorrectly mapped, causing the collateral to be valued far above its real market price . By depositing SOLID as collateral at this inflated valuation, the attacker was able to withdraw 293.7 million SUPRA tokens — far exceeding what legitimate collateral should have allowed .

The exploit unfolded in two separate attack waves, both exploiting the same vulnerability :

• Wave A (18:21:35 UTC): A single transaction chained several steps — swapping tokens, depositing them as collateral, and minting new CASH — netting 266,778,767 SUPRA .
• Wave B: The attacker repeated the same pattern, bringing the total to approximately 293.7 million SUPRA .

Security firm PeckShield confirmed the breach and the approximate loss .

Critically, approximately 90% of the stolen funds belonged to the Solido Foundation itself, not to retail users. This means the foundation — not individual lenders or borrowers — absorbed nearly all the loss .

Where Blockchain Forensics Traced the Funds

Solido Money published a forensic report detailing the on-chain trail:

• Approximately 220 million SUPRA — about 84% of the stolen tokens — were moved to a suspected Gate.io deposit address . Some sources round this figure to "nearly 90%" of the stolen funds (220M out of 293.7M) . The 84% figure appears in the protocol's own report and in multiple news accounts .
• The attacker is believed to have deposited these tokens at Gate.io in preparation for liquidation or cross-chain transfer .
• Solido requested assistance from exchanges to help freeze and recover the funds .

A Broader Pattern: Two Supra Oracle Exploits in Two Weeks

The Solido exploit is not an isolated incident. Just 12 days earlier, on July 11, 2026, the Hedera-based lending protocol Bonzo Lend lost ~$9.05 million through a related oracle exploit .

Bonzo Lend (July 11, 2026):

• The attacker deposited only 250 SAUCE tokens (worth a few dollars), then submitted a fabricated SAUCE/wHBAR price update that inflated the token value by 12 orders of magnitude .
• The vulnerability was a BLS zero-signature acceptance flaw in Supra's on-chain verifier contract. The verifier accepted a forged price carrying a zeroed signature and public key as valid .
• In eight seconds, the attacker borrowed 6.63 million USDC and 34.5 million wHBAR .

Both protocols — Solido Money and Bonzo Lend — relied on Supra as their oracle provider . Two different failure modes emerged from the same infrastructure:

• Bonzo's flaw was a cryptographic verification failure (zero-signature bypass) in Supra's on-chain verifier .
• Solido's flaw was a misconfigured/stale price feed assignment for SOLID collateral — a different class of oracle failure but still originating from how Supra price data was ingested and validated .

The two incidents, occurring within two weeks of each other, have put the Supra oracle ecosystem under heightened scrutiny. Security analysts are calling for stricter timestamp validation, feed-decency normalization, and multi-source aggregation to prevent similar exploits .

Key Takeaways for DeFi Protocols

1. Oracle misconfiguration is as dangerous as cryptographic failure. A stale price feed can be exploited just as effectively as a broken signature verifier.
2. 90% of stolen funds belonged to the protocol's foundation, highlighting how closely project treasuries are tied to protocol risk.
3. Single-oracle dependency creates systemic risk. Both Bonzo and Solido relied on the same provider (Supra), creating a cascade of vulnerabilities across multiple protocols.
4. Blockchain forensics enabled traceability. Solido's own forensic report traced 84% of stolen funds to a specific exchange address, giving investigators a clear lead.

The Solido exploit underscores a critical lesson: when price feeds break — whether through stale data or a forged signature — the damage can cascade across an entire ecosystem.