Pouyanné identified alternative export routes in the UAE, Iraq, and through Syria as viable options for new pipeline infrastructure . He further warned that if the closure "perdures encore deux ou trois mois" (continues for another two or three months), France would enter an era of energy shortages — a scenario already affecting some Asian countries .

Strait Closure Timeline: Four Months and Counting

The Strait of Hormuz has been effectively closed since late February 2026. The U.S. and Israel launched an air war against Iran on February 28, 2026; Iran then blockaded the strait, halting nearly all commercial traffic . By late March 2026, both the BBC and Bloomberg had reported massive crew strandings . As of June 17, 2026 — nearly four months later — a preliminary U.S.-Iran reopening agreement was announced, though safe passage remained uncertain as of that date . A brief reopening on April 21, 2026, was reversed the following day .

Key correction: The strait closed in late February 2026, not March 2025 as sometimes reported. The March 2025 date is not supported by any verified source.

Stranded Vessels and Mariners: The Human Cost

Confirmed. U.S. officials reported that more than 1,550 commercial vessels and over 22,500 mariners were stranded as of early May 2026 . The BBC reported ~20,000 sailors trapped as of early June ; Bloomberg cited an estimate of ~40,000 total seafarers stuck on both sides of the strait, with roughly half that figure (20,000) being those who remained on board rather than being evacuated . The 1,550/22,500 figure is the most precise official tally.

Conditions for stranded crews are dire. Mariners face dwindling supplies of food and fresh water, constant threats from missiles and mines, and the psychological toll of being trapped in a war zone with no clear end date . The U.S. has launched "Project Freedom" to restore the flow of commerce, with naval and air assets escorting ships through the strait, though safe passage is not yet assured .

Pre-Crisis Throughput: 20 Million Barrels Per Day

Confirmed. The Strait of Hormuz carried roughly 20 million barrels per day of crude oil and petroleum products in 2025, representing about 25% of global seaborne oil trade and 20% of the world's total oil consumption . Approximately 80% of these flows were destined for Asian markets . Major exporters dependent on the route included Saudi Arabia (5.43 mb/d crude), Iraq (3.32 mb/d), the UAE (2.02 mb/d crude + 1.22 mb/d products), and Kuwait .

Existing Bypass Pipeline Capacity: A Wartime Surge

The picture is more complex than any single number suggests. Sources show a wide range of capacities depending on date and operational status:

• Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline (Petroline): Reported at 7 million barrels per day at full capacity by late March 2026 . Earlier estimates (March 2026) had put it at 5 mb/d nameplate with only ~2 mb/d actually flowing ; the ramp-up to 7 mb/d was a wartime surge achieved by converting natural gas liquid pipelines to crude oil service and pushing the system to its emergency maximum .
• UAE's existing Abu Dhabi–Fujairah pipeline (ADCOP): 1.8 mb/d capacity . Completed in 2012 at a cost of $3.3–$4.2 billion, this pipeline runs from the Habshan oil fields to the Fujairah port on the Gulf of Oman .
• Pre-crisis total bypass capacity: Before the crisis, IEA data showed alternative pipelines at only 3.5–5.5 mb/d total . One analysis put total bypass capacity at only ~3.5 mb/d before the surge .
• Current effective total: Saudi at 7 mb/d + UAE at 1.8 mb/d = ~8.8 mb/d. This is close to the 8–8.5 mb/d range often cited, though the Saudi 7 mb/d figure is a crisis-driven maximum that may not be sustainable long-term.

Important caveat: The Yanbu port terminal on the Red Sea has a combined loading capacity of only about 4 million barrels per day, limiting the effective export capacity of the Saudi pipeline even if the line itself can handle 7 mb/d . This port bottleneck is a major constraint on how much oil can actually bypass the strait via this route.

The Gap: 11+ Million Barrels Still Trapped Daily

Even at full emergency capacity, the combined bypass systems can move at most ~8.8 million barrels per day, leaving a gap of roughly 11 million barrels per day (or more) compared to the normal 20 mb/d that transited the strait . This gap is the core of the crisis: an estimated 11–15 million barrels of oil per day remain effectively trapped in the Gulf, unable to reach global markets .

Expansion Projects: UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq

UAE West-East Pipeline (second bypass route): Construction began in the first quarter of 2025 for a new 1.5 mb/d capacity pipeline . The UAE confirmed in May 2026 that the project was nearly 50% complete and had been expedited due to the crisis, with expected service in early 2027 .

Saudi Arabian capacity: Already at 7 mb/d on the East-West line, operating at full emergency capacity. Any further expansion would be additive, but no specific new Saudi pipeline projects beyond the current surge are detailed in available sources.

Iraq expansion: Iraq is referenced as a contributor to potential future increases, but specific capacity numbers for Iraqi bypass pipeline expansion are not independently verified in the search results . Iraq's dormant IPSA pipeline to Saudi Arabia has a theoretical capacity of 1.65 mb/d but has been mothballed .

Combined future target of 12–13 mb/d: The three-to-five-year trajectory appears consistent with adding the UAE's 1.5 mb/d line to the current ~8.8 mb/d running capacity, plus potential Iraqi and Saudi expansions. However, source material is less explicit on a single precise combined target figure, and this projection should be treated as an informed estimate rather than a confirmed target.

Key Caveats and Uncertainties

• Closure start date: The strait closed in late February 2026, not March 2025. The earlier date is not supported by any verified source.
• Reopening status: A preliminary U.S.-Iran agreement was announced June 17, 2026, but ship tracking data three days later showed no increase in marine traffic . The strait may be partially reopening as of late June 2026, but full normal operations remain uncertain.
• Bypass capacity volatility: The 7 mb/d Saudi figure is a wartime surge to maximum capacity. Sustainable operational rates may be lower, and the Yanbu port bottleneck limits effective export throughput to ~4 mb/d.
• Iraq data: Specific capacity figures for Iraqi bypass pipeline expansion could not be independently verified in the available search results.

Pouyanné identified alternative export routes in the UAE, Iraq, and through Syria as viable options for new pipeline infrastructure . He further warned that if the closure "perdures encore deux ou trois mois" (continues for another two or three months), France would enter an era of energy shortages — a scenario already affecting some Asian countries .

Strait Closure Timeline: Four Months and Counting

The Strait of Hormuz has been effectively closed since late February 2026. The U.S. and Israel launched an air war against Iran on February 28, 2026; Iran then blockaded the strait, halting nearly all commercial traffic . By late March 2026, both the BBC and Bloomberg had reported massive crew strandings . As of June 17, 2026 — nearly four months later — a preliminary U.S.-Iran reopening agreement was announced, though safe passage remained uncertain as of that date . A brief reopening on April 21, 2026, was reversed the following day .

Key correction: The strait closed in late February 2026, not March 2025 as sometimes reported. The March 2025 date is not supported by any verified source.

Stranded Vessels and Mariners: The Human Cost

Confirmed. U.S. officials reported that more than 1,550 commercial vessels and over 22,500 mariners were stranded as of early May 2026 . The BBC reported ~20,000 sailors trapped as of early June ; Bloomberg cited an estimate of ~40,000 total seafarers stuck on both sides of the strait, with roughly half that figure (20,000) being those who remained on board rather than being evacuated . The 1,550/22,500 figure is the most precise official tally.

Conditions for stranded crews are dire. Mariners face dwindling supplies of food and fresh water, constant threats from missiles and mines, and the psychological toll of being trapped in a war zone with no clear end date . The U.S. has launched "Project Freedom" to restore the flow of commerce, with naval and air assets escorting ships through the strait, though safe passage is not yet assured .

Pre-Crisis Throughput: 20 Million Barrels Per Day

Confirmed. The Strait of Hormuz carried roughly 20 million barrels per day of crude oil and petroleum products in 2025, representing about 25% of global seaborne oil trade and 20% of the world's total oil consumption . Approximately 80% of these flows were destined for Asian markets . Major exporters dependent on the route included Saudi Arabia (5.43 mb/d crude), Iraq (3.32 mb/d), the UAE (2.02 mb/d crude + 1.22 mb/d products), and Kuwait .

Existing Bypass Pipeline Capacity: A Wartime Surge

The picture is more complex than any single number suggests. Sources show a wide range of capacities depending on date and operational status:

• Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline (Petroline): Reported at 7 million barrels per day at full capacity by late March 2026 . Earlier estimates (March 2026) had put it at 5 mb/d nameplate with only ~2 mb/d actually flowing ; the ramp-up to 7 mb/d was a wartime surge achieved by converting natural gas liquid pipelines to crude oil service and pushing the system to its emergency maximum .
• UAE's existing Abu Dhabi–Fujairah pipeline (ADCOP): 1.8 mb/d capacity . Completed in 2012 at a cost of $3.3–$4.2 billion, this pipeline runs from the Habshan oil fields to the Fujairah port on the Gulf of Oman .
• Pre-crisis total bypass capacity: Before the crisis, IEA data showed alternative pipelines at only 3.5–5.5 mb/d total . One analysis put total bypass capacity at only ~3.5 mb/d before the surge .
• Current effective total: Saudi at 7 mb/d + UAE at 1.8 mb/d = ~8.8 mb/d. This is close to the 8–8.5 mb/d range often cited, though the Saudi 7 mb/d figure is a crisis-driven maximum that may not be sustainable long-term.

Important caveat: The Yanbu port terminal on the Red Sea has a combined loading capacity of only about 4 million barrels per day, limiting the effective export capacity of the Saudi pipeline even if the line itself can handle 7 mb/d . This port bottleneck is a major constraint on how much oil can actually bypass the strait via this route.

The Gap: 11+ Million Barrels Still Trapped Daily

Even at full emergency capacity, the combined bypass systems can move at most ~8.8 million barrels per day, leaving a gap of roughly 11 million barrels per day (or more) compared to the normal 20 mb/d that transited the strait . This gap is the core of the crisis: an estimated 11–15 million barrels of oil per day remain effectively trapped in the Gulf, unable to reach global markets .

Expansion Projects: UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq

UAE West-East Pipeline (second bypass route): Construction began in the first quarter of 2025 for a new 1.5 mb/d capacity pipeline . The UAE confirmed in May 2026 that the project was nearly 50% complete and had been expedited due to the crisis, with expected service in early 2027 .

Saudi Arabian capacity: Already at 7 mb/d on the East-West line, operating at full emergency capacity. Any further expansion would be additive, but no specific new Saudi pipeline projects beyond the current surge are detailed in available sources.

Iraq expansion: Iraq is referenced as a contributor to potential future increases, but specific capacity numbers for Iraqi bypass pipeline expansion are not independently verified in the search results . Iraq's dormant IPSA pipeline to Saudi Arabia has a theoretical capacity of 1.65 mb/d but has been mothballed .

Combined future target of 12–13 mb/d: The three-to-five-year trajectory appears consistent with adding the UAE's 1.5 mb/d line to the current ~8.8 mb/d running capacity, plus potential Iraqi and Saudi expansions. However, source material is less explicit on a single precise combined target figure, and this projection should be treated as an informed estimate rather than a confirmed target.

Key Caveats and Uncertainties

• Closure start date: The strait closed in late February 2026, not March 2025. The earlier date is not supported by any verified source.
• Reopening status: A preliminary U.S.-Iran agreement was announced June 17, 2026, but ship tracking data three days later showed no increase in marine traffic . The strait may be partially reopening as of late June 2026, but full normal operations remain uncertain.
• Bypass capacity volatility: The 7 mb/d Saudi figure is a wartime surge to maximum capacity. Sustainable operational rates may be lower, and the Yanbu port bottleneck limits effective export throughput to ~4 mb/d.
• Iraq data: Specific capacity figures for Iraqi bypass pipeline expansion could not be independently verified in the available search results.