PET lead analyst Josefine Christensen said on October 7 that Russia had moved from planning sabotage against Danish companies supplying Ukraine in the spring to carrying out more operations in early summer. She described this as an escalation of Moscow’s hybrid campaign, not as a publicly documented finding about each operation or its perpetrators. 3

• Why the target changed: Christensen said broad disruption had not deterred NATO countries from supporting Ukraine, so Russia was turning toward weapons production that could affect supplies at the front line more directly. 3
• How PET says it works: She described Russian political control over operations carried out by increasingly bold, often untrained recruits—including homeless people, drug users and people seeking quick money. Recruited through Telegram and other social media, they may begin with reconnaissance or photographs, then be tasked with sabotage; unsuccessful recruits can be replaced. 3
• The April list: Christensen pointed to the Russian Defense Ministry’s publication of European drone and component manufacturers as potential military targets as a warning sign consistent with that shift. She gave no further details tying the list to particular Danish operations. 3
• Russia’s response: The Russian Embassy in Copenhagen did not respond to Reuters’ request for comment on these allegations. Moscow has repeatedly denied conducting sabotage in Europe; the allegations therefore remain contested. 3
• Wider context: Denmark’s defence intelligence service warned on September 24 that Russian hybrid attacks could become more frequent and consequential. Germany separately accused Russia over an attempted August drone attack at Leipzig/Halle Airport. 24 The reported June encounter southeast of Bornholm—in which a Russian corvette came within about 200 metres of a Danish uncrewed sea drone and deployed a reconnaissance drone—and the September 2025 drone disruptions at six Danish airports, which Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen called a hybrid attack, add context. They should not, on the evidence cited here, be treated as proof that Russia directed every incident or that those incidents were part of the specific sabotage operations Christensen described. 3

PET lead analyst Josefine Christensen said on October 7 that Russia had moved from planning sabotage against Danish companies supplying Ukraine in the spring to carrying out more operations in early summer. She described this as an escalation of Moscow’s hybrid campaign, not as a publicly documented finding about each operation or its perpetrators. 3

• Why the target changed: Christensen said broad disruption had not deterred NATO countries from supporting Ukraine, so Russia was turning toward weapons production that could affect supplies at the front line more directly. 3
• How PET says it works: She described Russian political control over operations carried out by increasingly bold, often untrained recruits—including homeless people, drug users and people seeking quick money. Recruited through Telegram and other social media, they may begin with reconnaissance or photographs, then be tasked with sabotage; unsuccessful recruits can be replaced. 3
• The April list: Christensen pointed to the Russian Defense Ministry’s publication of European drone and component manufacturers as potential military targets as a warning sign consistent with that shift. She gave no further details tying the list to particular Danish operations. 3
• Russia’s response: The Russian Embassy in Copenhagen did not respond to Reuters’ request for comment on these allegations. Moscow has repeatedly denied conducting sabotage in Europe; the allegations therefore remain contested. 3
• Wider context: Denmark’s defence intelligence service warned on September 24 that Russian hybrid attacks could become more frequent and consequential. Germany separately accused Russia over an attempted August drone attack at Leipzig/Halle Airport. 24 The reported June encounter southeast of Bornholm—in which a Russian corvette came within about 200 metres of a Danish uncrewed sea drone and deployed a reconnaissance drone—and the September 2025 drone disruptions at six Danish airports, which Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen called a hybrid attack, add context. They should not, on the evidence cited here, be treated as proof that Russia directed every incident or that those incidents were part of the specific sabotage operations Christensen described. 3