Bloomberg’s finding points to a possible increase in Qatari LNG exports, not a confirmed return to normal trade: at least 12 empty QatarEnergy-owned or chartered carriers have assembled near Qatar, with room for about 1.1 million tonnes of LNG—roughly 2% of global LNG tanker capacity—if they can load and sail through Hormuz. The September rebound and early-October deliveries make that prospect credible, but security risks, damaged production capacity and unfulfilled contracts limit what the ships alone can prove. 531

• Traffic is recovering, but counts are estimates. S&P Global Energy counted 19 outbound LNG cargoes in September—13 Qatari and six Emirati—while Kpler estimated 21. Both indicate the busiest month since the war began, rather than a full reopening. Qatar-linked loaded ships were again heading out and empty ships returning by late September after an August lull driven by attack fears. 32

• Some cargoes demonstrably got through. Four Qatari LNG vessels reappeared outside Hormuz around October 2–3 after gaps in their tracking signals. Al Sadd delivered to India’s Dahej terminal on October 3; Al Gattara signalled Zhejiang, China, as its destination. Transponder-off “dark transits” help explain why trackers’ totals differ and why a missing signal cannot by itself establish that a ship did not cross. 134

• Commercial activity is not the same as restored supply. Adnoc Trading’s multi-year agreement to deliver about 2 million tonnes in total to Thailand’s Gulf Group beginning in 2027 shows continued Asian demand, but undisclosed pricing, scheduling and cargo origins make it no evidence of imminent Hormuz shipments. QatarEnergy’s delivery problems also persist: Edison said supplies were suspended until early December, and Asian customers faced cancellations through November. 101

• The ceiling remains uncertain. The March 18 strike on Ras Laffan reportedly disabled about 17% of Qatar’s LNG production capacity, so available ships cannot on their own restore prewar output. Qatar’s push for a Gulf–Iran security framework and protection against attacks may help reduce shipping risk, but it is not a reopening agreement; Iran’s stated conditions involving the U.S. blockade of its ports and oil sanctions remain a political obstacle. For a strait that carried about one-fifth of global oil and LNG supplies before the war, the evidence supports a fragile, partial recovery, not dependable normal service. 115

Bloomberg’s finding points to a possible increase in Qatari LNG exports, not a confirmed return to normal trade: at least 12 empty QatarEnergy-owned or chartered carriers have assembled near Qatar, with room for about 1.1 million tonnes of LNG—roughly 2% of global LNG tanker capacity—if they can load and sail through Hormuz. The September rebound and early-October deliveries make that prospect credible, but security risks, damaged production capacity and unfulfilled contracts limit what the ships alone can prove. 531

• Traffic is recovering, but counts are estimates. S&P Global Energy counted 19 outbound LNG cargoes in September—13 Qatari and six Emirati—while Kpler estimated 21. Both indicate the busiest month since the war began, rather than a full reopening. Qatar-linked loaded ships were again heading out and empty ships returning by late September after an August lull driven by attack fears. 32

• Some cargoes demonstrably got through. Four Qatari LNG vessels reappeared outside Hormuz around October 2–3 after gaps in their tracking signals. Al Sadd delivered to India’s Dahej terminal on October 3; Al Gattara signalled Zhejiang, China, as its destination. Transponder-off “dark transits” help explain why trackers’ totals differ and why a missing signal cannot by itself establish that a ship did not cross. 134

• Commercial activity is not the same as restored supply. Adnoc Trading’s multi-year agreement to deliver about 2 million tonnes in total to Thailand’s Gulf Group beginning in 2027 shows continued Asian demand, but undisclosed pricing, scheduling and cargo origins make it no evidence of imminent Hormuz shipments. QatarEnergy’s delivery problems also persist: Edison said supplies were suspended until early December, and Asian customers faced cancellations through November. 101

• The ceiling remains uncertain. The March 18 strike on Ras Laffan reportedly disabled about 17% of Qatar’s LNG production capacity, so available ships cannot on their own restore prewar output. Qatar’s push for a Gulf–Iran security framework and protection against attacks may help reduce shipping risk, but it is not a reopening agreement; Iran’s stated conditions involving the U.S. blockade of its ports and oil sanctions remain a political obstacle. For a strait that carried about one-fifth of global oil and LNG supplies before the war, the evidence supports a fragile, partial recovery, not dependable normal service. 115