How North Korea Is Using the Ukraine War to Upgrade Its Military

Kyrylo Budanov argues that North Korea is turning its support for Russia’s war against Ukraine into an opportunity to strengthen its own military. He says Pyongyang supplies weapons and materials, sends troops to fight, and uses experience from the war to improve its weapons—including one-way attack drones. 29 Recent weapons drills and factory displays offer visible signs of a developing drone capability, but they do not independently verify the scale of production or establish that an attack is imminent.

How support for Russia could benefit North Korea

Budanov’s central point is that the relationship is not simply a flow of weapons from North Korea to Russia. In his account, North Korean personnel are also gaining direct experience of combat, while Pyongyang applies lessons from the war to its own military development. He says North Korea is adopting new weapons, including some of Russian origin. 29

Other reporting describes Russian help to North Korea with production of long-range Shahed-type drones, including the transfer of technology and manufacturing expertise, according to Budanov. 11 That is an attributed claim about cooperation; the available reporting does not establish the precise terms or extent of any transfer.

What recent drills and factory displays show

A September 12 exercise brought together short-range ballistic missiles, rocket artillery, cruise missiles and two types of drones, according to the Institute for the Study of War’s account. Reuters also reported North Korea’s announcement of a live-fire drill involving drones, missiles and artillery. 717 The exercise showed a range of systems being tested together; by itself, it does not demonstrate how effectively they could be used in a conflict.

Images released after Kim Jong Un visited defense-industry facilities between September 16 and 18 showed several drone types, including one-way attack drones, according to reporting on the factory displays. The images make drone production a visible part of North Korea’s military buildup. They do not, on their own, verify Budanov’s claim that mass production is already established. 2

The reported North Korean workforce in Russia

A separate indicator of closer military and industrial ties is North Korean labor in Russia. Bloomberg reported that a Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team report estimated that up to 25,000 North Koreans were working in Russia’s drone industry, including at facilities in Alabuga, where unmanned aircraft are assembled. The number is an estimate, not a verified headcount.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has also pledged to “expand and deepen” cooperation with Russia, state media reported, according to Reuters. These reports point to a relationship involving more than battlefield supplies, though they do not specify exactly what military technology or expertise North Korea will receive in return.

Why Budanov sees a risk—and what the evidence does not show

Budanov’s warning rests on the possibility that combat experience, improved weapons and closer cooperation with Moscow could increase North Korea’s military options and the danger of escalation on the Korean Peninsula. 9 That is a warning about future capability and risk, not proof of an imminent attack.

The evidence should be read in layers: Budanov’s claims describe how North Korea may be learning and upgrading; drills and factory images show weapons activity; and the worker figure is an external estimate. Together, these reports support concern about a growing military relationship, but they do not establish the timing or likelihood of a conflict.