How has Saudi Aramco responded to the September 13, 2026 drone attacks that shut down its East West pipeline linking eastern Saudi oil fields to Yanbu and disrupted roughly 4 million barrels per day, or 4% of global oil supply, including its September 22 partial restart and resto

Saudi Aramco has responded by partially restarting the East-West pipeline, increasing Gulf shipments and arranging alternative delivery logistics for Asian buyers. However, restarting the pipeline did not mean exports had normalized: Reuters reported on September 24 that pumping volumes were increasing but Yanbu tanker loadings had not yet resumed. 1345

Pipeline recovery

• Partial restart: The pipeline restarted at a low rate on September 22, with sources initially suggesting Yanbu exports could resume that day; the September 24 reporting supersedes that expectation, showing loadings were still pending. 45
• Restoration targets: Reports described bypassing damaged infrastructure to recover roughly half the pipeline’s capacity within days and full capacity in approximately six weeks; Reuters subsequently cited a security source estimating six to eight weeks for a full restart. These were targets or estimates, not confirmed restoration milestones. 84
• Damage and timing: Reuters identified damage at three pumping stations, rather than the two initially assessed. Its imagery captions refer to an attack on September 11, while restart reports date the shutdown to September 13—so the attack date and shutdown date should not automatically be treated as identical. 64

Maintaining deliveries

• Gulf shipments: Shipping data showed Aramco loading approximately 14 million barrels onto seven supertankers on September 20, demonstrating a substantial increase in Gulf export activity. The available excerpt confirms the volume and vessels, but not specifically the Ras Tanura loading location. 3
• Sohar arrangements: Reuters reported sales of about 60 million barrels originating at Ras Tanura for ship-to-ship transfer at Sohar during September and October. These were commercial arrangements for future loadings, not evidence that all 60 million barrels had already reached customers. 1
• Nearly 100 million barrels sold: The earlier search results supported aggregate sales approaching 100 million barrels to Asian buyers since mid-September, for October–November delivery, but the supplied excerpts do not independently establish the complete China–India–Japan–South Korea breakdown.
• Delivery responsibility: Earlier results also described Aramco offering delivered terms rather than leaving shipping entirely to buyers under free-on-board arrangements. Insufficient evidence in the available excerpts establishes how broadly that change applied or the precise allocation of freight, insurance and transit risks.

The 100-million-barrel sales figure, 60-million-barrel transfer arrangements and 14-million-barrel loading figure should not be added together: they measure different stages of trading and shipping, and their overlap is not established.

Nasser’s assurances and proposed routes

• Earlier results attributed to Amin Nasser the argument that the East-West system comprises multiple lines, allowing interrupted operations to be restored “within days,” and that Aramco was studying fourth and fifth export routes. However, the available evidence does not establish their destinations, capacities, completion dates or costs.
• His resilience message should not be read as confirmation that the entire damaged system was repaired within days: contemporaneous reporting still described a multiweek full-restart estimate and no resumed Yanbu loadings as of September 24. 45

Market implications and remaining risks

• Prices: Reuters reported falling oil prices on September 22 as Saudi flows increased and the pipeline restarted, supporting the interpretation that recovery reduced immediate supply-shortage fears. The supplied evidence does not establish an exact Brent-price move attributable solely to Aramco’s actions. 2
• Alternative supplies: Analytically, additional Saudi deliveries would reduce Asian buyers’ need to compete for replacement cargoes. If Iranian supplies remain blocked and Russian purchases carry political risks, reliable Saudi deliveries become more valuable—but the available evidence is insufficient to quantify those effects.
• Continuing vulnerability: Gulf shipments and Sohar transfers are a workaround, not proof that Hormuz traffic has normalized; the reported Ras Tanura-to-Sohar arrangement still involves moving crude out of the Gulf. 1
• Unresolved questions: Insufficient evidence confirms full pipeline restoration, independently verifies renewed Houthi attack claims, or establishes the long-term feasibility and cost of proposed export routes. The strongest operational update here remains September 24: rising pipeline flows, but Yanbu tanker loadings still pending. 5