Saudi Arabia produced far more crude in July 2026 than in June, but shipped only a little more abroad. The July figures show a recovery in output—not a comparable recovery in exports—and the routes available to move that oil remain crucial to the outlook for October through December.
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What changed from June to July?
| Measure |
June 2026 |
July 2026 |
Change |
| Crude exports |
3.993 million barrels per day |
4.125 million barrels per day |
Up 132,000 barrels per day, or about 3.3% 17 |
| Crude production |
7.122 million barrels per day |
8.135 million barrels per day |
Up 1.013 million barrels per day 17 |
| Refinery crude throughput |
2.498 million barrels per day |
2.478 million barrels per day |
Down 20,000 barrels per day 17 |
| Direct crude-burning |
About 583,500 barrels per day* |
561,097 barrels per day |
Down 22,403 barrels per day 17 |
*The June direct-burning figure is calculated from the July level and the reported monthly decrease. A separate June report rounds that month's figure to 583,000 barrels per day.
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Production rose by more than 1 million barrels per day, while exports rose by 132,000 barrels per day. Refinery intake and direct burning both edged down. Those figures do not, by themselves, establish where the rest of the additional crude went: subtracting exports from production is not a reliable measure of an inventory change.
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How much did the Iran ceasefire and OPEC changes matter?
The brief Iran ceasefire opened a window for more Gulf shipping. One report citing Kpler data put Saudi shipments through the Strait of Hormuz at approximately 34 million barrels between June 17 and July 1, compared with 15 million barrels over a longer wartime period beginning in March. Across five Gulf producers, Kpler estimated that crude and condensate exports in the first half of July were about 16% above June's daily average. Those are shipping estimates for particular routes and periods, not Saudi Arabia's full-month JODI export figure.
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Saudi Arabia also reported to OPEC a July production rebound of roughly 1 million barrels per day, broadly consistent with the direction of the JODI figures. But a rise in Saudi output—or a higher OPEC+ output target—does not mean the same volume can be exported. The July data make that distinction clear: production recovered much faster than Saudi crude exports.
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Why could fourth-quarter exports still be constrained?
Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline carries crude from eastern oilfields to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, providing a way to export without sending those barrels through the Strait of Hormuz. That alternative has its own vulnerabilities: disruption to the pipeline can restrict crude reaching Yanbu, while threats to shipping can complicate moving cargoes onward from the Red Sea coast. Some voyages can avoid the Bab al-Mandeb strait by sailing north through the Suez Canal, but rerouting ships cannot replace pipeline capacity.
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The pipeline was temporarily closed in September, and Saudi Arabia signalled on September 22 that it was preparing to restart it. Reporting at the time said it was unclear how much oil could flow when operations resumed. Meanwhile, the post-ceasefire increase in shipments through Hormuz demonstrated another possible outlet, but one exposed to renewed uncertainty over the strait.
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The fourth-quarter question is therefore logistical as well as geological: how much crude can reach Yanbu, whether tankers can safely move it from the Red Sea coast, and whether Hormuz remains usable for Gulf departures. July's production figure alone cannot answer how much Saudi oil will reach export markets.
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