QatarEnergy LNG Crisis: What Hormuz Disruption and Ras Laffan Damage Mean

QatarEnergy’s disruption is best understood as two overlapping crises. The Strait of Hormuz has curtailed shipping, insurance coverage and equipment deliveries, sharply limiting what Qatar can produce and export today. Separately, missile damage at Ras Laffan has removed a material share of LNG capacity for years—even if safe navigation through Hormuz returns.

The immediate constraint: Hormuz has choked exports and operations

QatarEnergy chief executive Saad al-Kaabi said on September 20 that the company was producing only a “very minute” volume of LNG as the Hormuz crisis continued. He also said that critical equipment was unable to reach Qatar, potentially delaying expansion projects.

This is especially consequential for Qatar because LNG cargoes require seaborne access through the strait. Iranian threats and attacks on commercial vessels caused cross-strait traffic to drop sharply, disrupted oil and gas flows, and affected global energy markets, according to the Congressional Research Service. 17 Reuters reported that shipping had nearly halted early in the conflict, while insurers cancelled war-risk coverage and tankers were damaged or stranded. 1819

In practical terms, a liquefaction plant may be operational, but it cannot sustain normal LNG exports when vessels cannot reliably arrive, load and transit the only maritime outlet. The same disruption also impedes delivery of replacement parts and construction equipment.

What the March strikes damaged at Ras Laffan

The missile strikes on March 18 and early March 19 damaged LNG Trains 4 and 6 at Ras Laffan Industrial City, as well as one of Qatar’s two gas-to-liquids facilities. The two LNG trains represent 12.8 million tonnes per year (mtpa) of production capacity, or about 17% of Qatar’s LNG exports. 311

QatarEnergy estimated the damage could cost roughly $20 billion per year in lost revenue and take three to five years to repair. It also said the outages would require force majeure on some long-term LNG contracts. 312

That distinction matters: the maritime crisis is a transport and operational constraint, while Trains 4 and 6 are a physical-capacity loss. A reopening of Hormuz could allow undamaged facilities to restart, but it would not put the 12.8 mtpa back into service.

How fast could LNG output recover after Hormuz reopens?

For facilities that were not hit, QatarEnergy has indicated a relatively rapid restart is possible once shipping conditions permit. Al-Kaabi said Qatar’s LNG capabilities could return to normal levels within “a couple of weeks” after Hormuz reopens. 5

A Reuters report in June similarly said Ras Laffan could resume LNG production very quickly and that unaffected facilities could reach full output within about a month. 2

Those estimates should not be interpreted as a return to Qatar’s pre-strike export capacity. The more realistic near-term outcome would be:

• restoration of operations at undamaged trains, subject to safe shipping and available insurance;
• a continuing capacity gap of about 17% while Trains 4 and 6 remain under repair; and
• possible constraints from delayed equipment, shipping costs and cautious vessel operators.

The speed of recovery therefore depends on more than an announcement that the strait is open. Commercial traffic must be able to move safely and obtain insurance at workable prices.

North Field expansion: equipment delays create schedule risk

The Hormuz disruption is now also an expansion-project risk. QatarEnergy says critical equipment cannot reach the country, which could delay some projects.

The company’s stated timetable remains that several North Field East LNG trains are due to begin operating in 2027, while the North Field South expansion is set to start production in 2028. However, this is an exposed schedule rather than a confirmed outcome under current conditions.

There are countervailing signs. McDermott, a contractor on the North Field East development, said in June that it had not halted work during the conflict and expected to deliver its portion on schedule once conditions stabilized. Earlier reporting, meanwhile, said first exports from North Field East had been pushed to at least 2027 after the initial attack-related shutdown.

The evidence supports a cautious conclusion: the projects are not confirmed as cancelled or comprehensively rescheduled, but sustained disruption to equipment deliveries can still delay them.

Implications for ExxonMobil and long-term LNG buyers

The damage has commercial consequences beyond QatarEnergy. The affected Ras Laffan trains are QatarEnergy–ExxonMobil joint-venture assets, leaving ExxonMobil exposed to the operational disruption and contractual fallout from a prolonged outage. 3

QatarEnergy has also been negotiating multi-year LNG purchases from U.S. producers through 2031 to replace volumes lost after the strikes, Reuters reported. 1 That points to an effort to manage supply commitments while the damaged capacity is repaired, and may create incremental demand for U.S. LNG supplies.

For buyers in Europe and Asia, the problem is both missing Qatari output and uncertainty over delivery. QatarEnergy said the Ras Laffan damage would affect supply to those markets. 11

Why the shock reaches beyond Qatar

Hormuz is a global energy chokepoint. In 2025, about 25% of global oil trade and 19% of global LNG trade moved through the strait, according to the Congressional Research Service. 17 Attacks and security threats therefore affect not only physical energy availability but also the cost of moving it.

Reuters reported record-high Middle East supertanker costs early in the crisis, while suspended war-risk cover further restricted shipping. 1819 The result is pressure on oil and gas prices, freight rates, insurance premiums and delivered fuel costs.

For Gulf economies, the effects can extend to delayed cargoes, lower export revenue, interrupted imports and equipment supply chains, and greater uncertainty for industrial and construction projects. The longer maritime security remains unresolved, the greater the risk that temporary logistics disruption becomes a broader investment and economic drag.

The bottom line

A safe, insurable reopening of the Strait of Hormuz could unlock a rapid recovery in QatarEnergy’s undamaged LNG operations—potentially in weeks rather than years. 25 But it would not reverse the March damage to Ras Laffan Trains 4 and 6.

With 12.8 mtpa, or 17% of Qatar’s LNG export capacity, offline for an expected three to five years, the crisis leaves Qatar facing both an immediate shipping blockade and a long-lived production shortfall. 311 The North Field expansion remains strategically important, but blocked equipment deliveries mean its 2027–2028 timetable is vulnerable until Gulf shipping conditions stabilize.