A very strong El Niño would most likely create a renewed, uneven supply shock: higher and more volatile agricultural prices, costlier food imports and fertilizer, and delayed disinflation—especially in import-dependent emerging markets. It is a serious risk scenario, not a certainty: weather impacts vary by region and crop, while current global cereal supplies still provide some buffer. 113

• Forecast and timing: NOAA assesses a greater-than-90% chance of a very strong event in Northern Hemisphere autumn and winter 2026–27, with a 75% chance of a historic-strength event in October–December. Its current outlook has El Niño persisting through March–May 2027, but assigns a 55% chance of ENSO-neutral conditions by April–June—so “continuation through mid-2027” is possible but not the central outcome. 14

• Food commodities: The principal transmission is altered rainfall and heat: drought risks in parts of Southeast Asia, Australia, southern Africa and some Latin American producers, versus flood risks elsewhere. That raises upside risk for rice, sugar, soybeans, corn and wheat, but there will be regional beneficiaries as well as losers. FAO has already cut its 2026/27 global rice forecast to 553.1 million tonnes, 1.9% below the revised prior-season estimate; it still forecasts total 2026 cereal output at 2.98 billion tonnes, the second-largest harvest on record. 13

• Food-price outlook: The World Bank’s baseline food-commodity forecast—about a 2.5% rise—should be treated as a relatively benign baseline rather than an El Niño stress case. It warns that El Niño, energy and fertilizer costs, biofuel demand and export restrictions can drive a substantially worse result. 12 JPMorgan’s scenario work estimates a super El Niño alone could add about 0.7 percentage points to peak global food inflation; together with an oil shock and regional conflict disruptions, it estimates 1.3–1.5 points and food inflation around 5% in early 2027. These are conditional estimates, not official forecasts. 57

• Energy and logistics compound the shock: War-related disruptions to oil, LNG, shipping and fertilizer supplies can simultaneously raise farm-input, freight and household-energy costs. Higher fertilizer prices are particularly consequential because they can reduce application rates and yields with a lag; the World Bank reported a sharp urea-price surge amid the Middle East conflict. 12 European gas demand may be reduced by a warmer winter and stronger wind output, but lower storage, competition for flexible LNG, and any constrained Qatari supplies could still create sharp price spikes. The net effect depends more on physical LNG availability and shipping routes than on El Niño alone.

• Inflation and central banks: JPMorgan estimates the El Niño–oil combination could add roughly 0.3 percentage points to global headline inflation. 5 Food and fuel have a larger weight in consumer baskets in lower-income economies, so their inflation and currency pressures could be disproportionately high. That could force some emerging-market central banks to hold rates higher or tighten despite weak growth—an adverse “supply-shock” trade-off. Advanced-economy central banks are more likely to look through a one-off food-price shock unless it spreads to inflation expectations and wages.

• Markets: Agricultural futures and options are likely to price weather risk earlier than physical shortages appear, producing episodic rallies and larger volatility rather than a uniform sustained bull market. The most vulnerable positions are concentrated importers, unhedged food processors, livestock producers exposed to feed costs, and firms reliant on fertilizer or disrupted shipping corridors. Conversely, producers in regions receiving favorable rainfall may benefit from higher prices and stronger yields.

• Humanitarian consequences: The gravest effect would be on households already facing conflict, drought, weak currencies and high debt. Rice is a staple across many low-income Asian and African countries, so production losses or export restrictions can quickly worsen affordability. The World Bank has warned that El Niño-related declines in affected rice-producing regions could be severe, with South Asia, southern Africa and parts of East Asia among the most exposed. 6 Higher food prices also reduce the purchasing power of humanitarian agencies, leaving fewer people reached for a fixed aid budget.

• Why the outcome could be milder: Global grain stocks, adaptation by farmers, favorable weather in key exporters, lower oil prices, restored fertilizer and shipping flows, and the expected transition toward ENSO-neutral conditions in spring 2027 could contain the shock. FAO’s still-large cereal forecast is the key counterweight to the bearish scenario. 13

The central risk is therefore not “El Niño causes a global food crisis” by itself; it is a synchronized climate, energy, fertilizer, shipping and geopolitical shock that turns localized harvest losses into broader food-price inflation and humanitarian stress.

A very strong El Niño would most likely create a renewed, uneven supply shock: higher and more volatile agricultural prices, costlier food imports and fertilizer, and delayed disinflation—especially in import-dependent emerging markets. It is a serious risk scenario, not a certainty: weather impacts vary by region and crop, while current global cereal supplies still provide some buffer. 113

• Forecast and timing: NOAA assesses a greater-than-90% chance of a very strong event in Northern Hemisphere autumn and winter 2026–27, with a 75% chance of a historic-strength event in October–December. Its current outlook has El Niño persisting through March–May 2027, but assigns a 55% chance of ENSO-neutral conditions by April–June—so “continuation through mid-2027” is possible but not the central outcome. 14

• Food commodities: The principal transmission is altered rainfall and heat: drought risks in parts of Southeast Asia, Australia, southern Africa and some Latin American producers, versus flood risks elsewhere. That raises upside risk for rice, sugar, soybeans, corn and wheat, but there will be regional beneficiaries as well as losers. FAO has already cut its 2026/27 global rice forecast to 553.1 million tonnes, 1.9% below the revised prior-season estimate; it still forecasts total 2026 cereal output at 2.98 billion tonnes, the second-largest harvest on record. 13

• Food-price outlook: The World Bank’s baseline food-commodity forecast—about a 2.5% rise—should be treated as a relatively benign baseline rather than an El Niño stress case. It warns that El Niño, energy and fertilizer costs, biofuel demand and export restrictions can drive a substantially worse result. 12 JPMorgan’s scenario work estimates a super El Niño alone could add about 0.7 percentage points to peak global food inflation; together with an oil shock and regional conflict disruptions, it estimates 1.3–1.5 points and food inflation around 5% in early 2027. These are conditional estimates, not official forecasts. 57

• Energy and logistics compound the shock: War-related disruptions to oil, LNG, shipping and fertilizer supplies can simultaneously raise farm-input, freight and household-energy costs. Higher fertilizer prices are particularly consequential because they can reduce application rates and yields with a lag; the World Bank reported a sharp urea-price surge amid the Middle East conflict. 12 European gas demand may be reduced by a warmer winter and stronger wind output, but lower storage, competition for flexible LNG, and any constrained Qatari supplies could still create sharp price spikes. The net effect depends more on physical LNG availability and shipping routes than on El Niño alone.

• Inflation and central banks: JPMorgan estimates the El Niño–oil combination could add roughly 0.3 percentage points to global headline inflation. 5 Food and fuel have a larger weight in consumer baskets in lower-income economies, so their inflation and currency pressures could be disproportionately high. That could force some emerging-market central banks to hold rates higher or tighten despite weak growth—an adverse “supply-shock” trade-off. Advanced-economy central banks are more likely to look through a one-off food-price shock unless it spreads to inflation expectations and wages.

• Markets: Agricultural futures and options are likely to price weather risk earlier than physical shortages appear, producing episodic rallies and larger volatility rather than a uniform sustained bull market. The most vulnerable positions are concentrated importers, unhedged food processors, livestock producers exposed to feed costs, and firms reliant on fertilizer or disrupted shipping corridors. Conversely, producers in regions receiving favorable rainfall may benefit from higher prices and stronger yields.

• Humanitarian consequences: The gravest effect would be on households already facing conflict, drought, weak currencies and high debt. Rice is a staple across many low-income Asian and African countries, so production losses or export restrictions can quickly worsen affordability. The World Bank has warned that El Niño-related declines in affected rice-producing regions could be severe, with South Asia, southern Africa and parts of East Asia among the most exposed. 6 Higher food prices also reduce the purchasing power of humanitarian agencies, leaving fewer people reached for a fixed aid budget.

• Why the outcome could be milder: Global grain stocks, adaptation by farmers, favorable weather in key exporters, lower oil prices, restored fertilizer and shipping flows, and the expected transition toward ENSO-neutral conditions in spring 2027 could contain the shock. FAO’s still-large cereal forecast is the key counterweight to the bearish scenario. 13

The central risk is therefore not “El Niño causes a global food crisis” by itself; it is a synchronized climate, energy, fertilizer, shipping and geopolitical shock that turns localized harvest losses into broader food-price inflation and humanitarian stress.