Meloni said Russia’s repeated provocations across Europe show “a kind of nervousness”: an effort to divert attention from a war in Ukraine that is not progressing as the Kremlin expected. She said Italy’s pro-Ukraine position “has never wavered,” arguing that a country that wants influence must remain clear and consistent. 14

• On Matteo Salvini’s meeting with Russia’s ambassador, Meloni treated it as unexceptional. She likewise said there is no absolute legal prohibition on Italian firms operating in Russia, provided they comply with sanctions; neither point, she indicated, changes Rome’s foreign-policy line supporting Kyiv. 14

• Military aid: Italy has formally authorized continued military assistance to Ukraine through 2026. 5 Reports of a new roughly €3 billion package—including SAMP/T NG air-defence batteries, Aster 30 interceptors and long-range radars—should be treated cautiously: Defence Minister Guido Crosetto said in late August that no such 13th package had yet been adopted as a formal act. 15

• Lithuania: On 15 September, an Italian NATO fighter operating from Lithuania shot down a drone that entered Lithuanian airspace; Italian Defence Minister Crosetto said it “most probably” originated in Russia. The attribution and type—reported as a Gerbera—remain assessments rather than publicly conclusive forensic findings. 2

• Leipzig: Germany has directly blamed Russia for the attempted explosive-drone attack at Leipzig Airport, describing it as part of a systematic hybrid campaign; Moscow denies responsibility. The EU characterized Leipzig as an escalation on EU territory and, alongside NATO, signalled stronger pressure and response measures. 78

Taken together, the cases fit Europe’s concern that Moscow is combining its conventional war in Ukraine with lower-threshold coercion—airspace violations, sabotage and attacks on critical transport infrastructure—designed to test NATO readiness, intimidate governments and strain allied unity without necessarily triggering a conventional military confrontation. That is why the emerging European emphasis is on faster air-defence and counter-drone capabilities, better intelligence and attribution, resilient infrastructure, and coordinated diplomatic/economic consequences rather than treating each incident in isolation. 17

Meloni said Russia’s repeated provocations across Europe show “a kind of nervousness”: an effort to divert attention from a war in Ukraine that is not progressing as the Kremlin expected. She said Italy’s pro-Ukraine position “has never wavered,” arguing that a country that wants influence must remain clear and consistent. 14

• On Matteo Salvini’s meeting with Russia’s ambassador, Meloni treated it as unexceptional. She likewise said there is no absolute legal prohibition on Italian firms operating in Russia, provided they comply with sanctions; neither point, she indicated, changes Rome’s foreign-policy line supporting Kyiv. 14

• Military aid: Italy has formally authorized continued military assistance to Ukraine through 2026. 5 Reports of a new roughly €3 billion package—including SAMP/T NG air-defence batteries, Aster 30 interceptors and long-range radars—should be treated cautiously: Defence Minister Guido Crosetto said in late August that no such 13th package had yet been adopted as a formal act. 15

• Lithuania: On 15 September, an Italian NATO fighter operating from Lithuania shot down a drone that entered Lithuanian airspace; Italian Defence Minister Crosetto said it “most probably” originated in Russia. The attribution and type—reported as a Gerbera—remain assessments rather than publicly conclusive forensic findings. 2

• Leipzig: Germany has directly blamed Russia for the attempted explosive-drone attack at Leipzig Airport, describing it as part of a systematic hybrid campaign; Moscow denies responsibility. The EU characterized Leipzig as an escalation on EU territory and, alongside NATO, signalled stronger pressure and response measures. 78

Taken together, the cases fit Europe’s concern that Moscow is combining its conventional war in Ukraine with lower-threshold coercion—airspace violations, sabotage and attacks on critical transport infrastructure—designed to test NATO readiness, intimidate governments and strain allied unity without necessarily triggering a conventional military confrontation. That is why the emerging European emphasis is on faster air-defence and counter-drone capabilities, better intelligence and attribution, resilient infrastructure, and coordinated diplomatic/economic consequences rather than treating each incident in isolation. 17