Kushner: U.S. Used Israel’s Isolation After Doha Strike to Push Gaza Deal

Jared Kushner said the Trump administration treated the diplomatic aftermath of Israel’s September 2025 strike on Hamas leaders in Doha as negotiating leverage. In his account, the operation failed militarily, isolated Israel internationally and gave Washington an opening to press Jerusalem into accepting a Gaza ceasefire-and-hostage agreement. 315

What Kushner said

Kushner described the Doha strike as “a terrible thing” and said it was “unsuccessful as a military operation,” adding that it left Israel “globally isolated.” He said U.S. negotiators used that changed diplomatic environment “in order to push them into a deal that now today they’re quite happy with.” 313

His argument was not that the strike itself produced the agreement through military success. Rather, he portrayed its political consequences—international condemnation and a weakened Israeli diplomatic position—as leverage that helped U.S. mediators advance an agreement that had already been under discussion. 915

The strike targeted Hamas figures in Qatar’s capital on September 9, 2025. Hamas said its senior leaders survived; five lower-level Hamas members and a Qatari security officer were killed, according to reporting cited by the BBC. Qatar condemned the attack as a violation of its sovereignty. 1719

Later that month, according to the White House account reported by the BBC, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told Qatar’s prime minister that he regretted the death of the Qatari officer and the violation of Qatari sovereignty, and said Israel would not conduct such a strike again. 17

Israel’s competing explanation

Netanyahu’s Likud party rejected Kushner’s characterization of the operation’s role in producing the agreement. Likud said the decision to expand operations in Gaza City, strike Hamas leaders in Qatar and apply pressure from President Donald Trump together led Hamas to drop its demands and agree to release the remaining hostages.

That is a fundamentally different account of cause and effect:

• Kushner’s view: the strike’s failure and resulting isolation gave the United States leverage over Israel. 313
• Likud’s view: Israeli military pressure, including the Doha operation, signaled that Hamas leaders had no safe haven and increased pressure on Hamas.

These are political assessments from the parties involved, not independently established proof that any single action compelled the deal.

Why implementation later stalled

The central dispute moved from securing an initial ceasefire and hostage arrangement to determining what came next in Gaza. A U.S.-backed roadmap envisioned Hamas relinquishing weapons and governing authority while Israel withdrew forces, with Palestinian governance replacing Hamas and an international stabilization presence contemplated.

But the parties have differed over sequencing. Reuters reported in August 2026 that talks ended without a breakthrough, with Israel and Hamas holding firm on core demands. The reported framework involved phased Hamas disarmament alongside Israeli withdrawal, while Hamas said implementation depended on Israel meeting its commitments first.

Israel, meanwhile, has said it will not redeploy or withdraw further before Hamas is comprehensively disarmed. U.S. and Israeli officials also linked reconstruction to demilitarization.

The practical question behind the disagreement

Kushner’s comments clarify how he believes the October 2025 agreement became possible: U.S. negotiators used Israel’s post-Doha diplomatic vulnerability to extract movement. Israel’s governing party says the same episode should instead be read as part of a pressure campaign against Hamas.

The more consequential unresolved issue is implementation. Any durable transition depends on verifiable disarmament, the timing and scope of Israeli withdrawals, reconstruction, and whether a new non-Hamas administrative structure can assume authority in Gaza.