How Iran Shifted From Proxy Power to Direct Coercion

Iran’s regional strategy is becoming more direct and more openly state-led. Rather than relying primarily on partners and deniable pressure, Tehran has paired missile and drone attacks with coercion around the Strait of Hormuz and threats to Gulf energy infrastructure. The goal appears to be to raise the cost of continued conflict for the United States, regional governments and global energy markets—while retaining enough control to use de-escalation as bargaining leverage. 68

From indirect pressure to direct retaliation

The clearest change is the visibility of Iran’s own role. Reuters reported that Iran fired ballistic missiles at two U.S. Navy ships in early September, after which U.S. forces struck three Iranian vessels. Iran also warned that further attacks could draw a faster and more painful response. 4

Earlier reporting described Iranian missile fire at what Tehran called U.S. assets in Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait and Iraq following a new U.S. wave of attacks. 9 These actions place Iranian state capabilities—not only aligned armed groups—at the center of deterrence and retaliation.

That makes coercion more immediate, but less deniable. Direct attacks can demonstrate reach and resolve quickly; they can also give adversaries identifiable military targets and create a faster path to escalation.

The Strait of Hormuz is now a bargaining tool

Hormuz has become the most economically consequential part of Tehran’s strategy. Before the conflict, the waterway carried roughly one-fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas shipments. 8 Iran has tightened restrictions on passage since the February 28 U.S.-Israeli strikes, while the United States and Iran have publicly disputed who controls the route. 68

Iranian officials have connected maritime access to political conditions. Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, said ending the regional war was among Tehran’s conditions for reopening the strait. He also said Iran and Oman had agreed on a transit corridor using a designated central channel. 2

That framework matters because it points to managed disruption, not simply closure. Tehran can use access, routing and restrictions as negotiating leverage while preserving the option of limited commercial transit. Iran later said it would announce a new restricted zone in the Gulf and maps for a new shipping corridor, with ships entering the zone potentially added to a sanctions list. 3

Why maritime leverage also hurts Iran

Hormuz pressure can affect energy prices, insurance, shipping and the political calculations of Gulf states. But the same disruption constrains Iran. Reuters reported in September that Iran had gone about seven weeks without shipping meaningful volumes of crude through the strait. 15

This is the strategic trade-off at the heart of Tehran’s approach: the more effectively it disrupts the waterway, the greater the international cost it can impose—but the greater the economic burden it may place on itself and the stronger the incentive for opponents to counter its maritime forces or develop alternatives.

A harder-line security structure

The leadership transition has reinforced the centrality of security policy. Mohsen Rezaei was appointed secretary of the Supreme National Security Council in August, replacing Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr in the body that coordinates Iran’s security and foreign policy. Reuters described Rezaei as a prominent hard-liner and close ally of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. 12

Rezaei has also become a prominent public voice on the Hormuz campaign, setting out conditions for reopening the waterway and describing the proposed corridor and restricted zone. 23 That does not by itself prove a fully unified decision-making system, but it shows that maritime coercion is being articulated through Iran’s highest security institutions.

The regime’s political position remains constrained by the war’s domestic costs. Reuters reported annual inflation of 66% in the month before its late-August report and said officials were concerned that additional financial pain could spark unrest. 1 A more concentrated security posture, therefore, does not automatically translate into greater domestic resilience.

What the emerging doctrine looks like

The evidence points to a hybrid strategy:

• Direct military retaliation: missiles and drones can reach U.S. and regional targets without relying on intermediaries. 49
• Economic coercion: shipping restrictions and the threat to Gulf energy interests raise costs beyond the battlefield. 368
• Conditional de-escalation: a transit corridor and reopening conditions create a mechanism for trading maritime access for political concessions. 213
• Persistent regional pressure: Iran can still benefit from relationships with aligned actors, but current events show more emphasis on tools controlled directly by the Iranian state.

The main risk: escalation without a stable bargain

Diplomacy has not insulated the conflict from renewed confrontation. An interim ceasefire reached in June later unraveled, according to Reuters, while negotiations remained at an impasse amid additional U.S. economic pressure. 18

The danger is not only a full closure of Hormuz. A strike on a ship, an attack on Gulf energy infrastructure or a new exchange involving U.S. forces could turn calibrated coercion into a broader regional escalation. Iran’s revised strategy shows that it can still impose high costs. Its weakness is that exercising that leverage increasingly invites direct military and economic consequences in return. 4615